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# ***Daily Report***

## ***Supplement***

# **Sub-Saharan Africa**

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# Sub-Saharan Africa SUPPLEMENT

FBIS-AFR-90-031-S

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14 February 1990

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## Gabon

### \* IMF Reviews Structural Adjustment Program

34190040D Libreville L'UNION in French  
6 Nov 89 p 7

[Article by Neltoh]

[Text] An IMF team, in Gabon for two weeks for a regular consultation, released the conclusions of its first review of the SAP [Structural Adjustment Program] at a joint work session (IMF-ministries of Finance, of Economy-BEAC [Bank of Central African States]) chaired by Minister of Finance, Budget, and Participations Jean-Pierre Lemboumba-Lepandou. Gabon approved the SAP 15 September. The program runs 18 months and calls for total IMF aid of 18 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs.

At the end of this first review, corresponding to the first control phase of the program called for in the confirmation agreement governing the 18-month period (September 1989 to March 1991), the chief of the IMF team, Mr. Grant Taplin, gave the Gabonese authorities high marks for their execution of the SAP.

The IMF experts had to examine the 1990 budget, the monetary and structural policies, and the program for rehabilitating parastatal enterprises. In addition to voicing the satisfaction of the IMF, Mr. Grant Taplin suggested that Gabonese officials show the same rigor in consolidating results to date and in protecting the future from possible jolts from unfavorable external economic conditions.

### Total Aid

It is important to recall that the 18-billion-franc grant by the IMF is an aid package equaling 43 million SDR [Special Drawing Rights] (1 SDR = 417 CFA francs) for our balance of payments, a part of which could be used for financing the 1990 budget. This aid amounts to a repayable loan, Gabon making withdrawals from the IMF's resources according to its quota with the institution. The Gabonese quota is now 73.1 million DTS, around 30.4 billion CFA francs. Repayment of the loan is to begin the third year after the grant and end 6 semesters thereafter.

The loan is managed by the Central Bank, the financial agent of the state. Our access to the resources of the IMF, however, is conditional upon the adoption of a macro-economic adjustment program identifying our financial needs. When these conditions are met, the IMF partly participates in covering these needs, along with other foreign backers. In actuality, the IMF's participation takes place through a method of certified deficits. This means that it participates in financing the GAP [as published] or residual deficit remaining after all other

internal and external resources are identified. The IMF's aid to Gabon is set out in a confirmation agreement for an 18-month period. The agreement calls for three reviews, the first of which took place in October. The second is scheduled for May and June 1990 and the last for October 1990.

### \* Expanded Cooperation With Yugoslavia Urged

34190040B Libreville L'UNION in French  
9 Nov 89 p 7

[Article by Ndong-d'Akomayo]

[Text] The Yugoslav ambassador, Mr. Cedomir Strbac, and the president of the CES [Economic and Social Council], Mr. Alexis Mbouyi-Boutzit, talked yesterday about cooperation and the chances for expanding it. Areas as diverse as commerce, technology transfer, and transportation were the likely candidates for greater attention in Gabonese-Yugoslav relations.

Ambassador Cedomir Strbac began by assuring his partner of his country's special interest in Gabon's currently very inadequate highway system. In this connection, he announced the availability of Yugoslav firms for continuing their participation in our country's public works projects.

Expressing the desire for more regular relations with Gabonese officials, the chief of Yugoslavia's diplomatic mission in Libreville said there was also reason to spotlight commercial trade, which has fallen off considerably since 1988. To set it rolling again, Mr. Cedomir Strbac said Yugoslavia, the country of independent socialism, was ready to export necessities and rolling stock to Gabon at competitive prices.

After presenting the Economic and Social Council to the Yugoslav diplomat as an institution created for improving conditions for the understanding and exchange of ideas among all economic forces in order to develop the country, Mr. Mbouyi-Boutzit responded by briefly outlining the priority the government now assigns to road construction and maintenance.

His organization supports and will support all efforts to improve our communication routes. He indicated to Mr. Cedomir Strbac that all Yugoslav proposals in this vein will be welcome.

The CES president thanked his guest and Yugoslavia for its contributions to the Gabonese Republic, notably the 12-March Palaces, the Libreville City Hall, and the road system for Oyem, which to him symbolize the presence of Belgrade in Gabon. Mr. Mbouyi-Boutzit concluded with the wish that the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia participate, in spite of unfavorable economic conditions, in mineral research and mining and in large dam construction.

**\* PRC Education Aid for Scholarships, Training***34190040C Libreville L'UNION in French  
7 Nov 89 p 7*

[Article by Claude Moussavou]

[Text] A Chinese educational delegation visiting our country and its leader, H.E. Mr. Teng Teng, vice president of the State Education Commission, met yesterday in turn with the deputy to the minister for foreign affairs and cooperation, charged with cooperation, Mrs. Honorine Dossou Naki; the high commissioner for the minister for national education, Mr. Luc Marat-Abyla; and the minister of state for higher education, Mr. Jules Bourdes-Ogoulguende. The four-member Chinese delegation, accompanied by the Chinese ambassador to Gabon, Mr. An Feng Shi, and their hosts discussed cooperation in education, scientific research, and higher education.

At Foreign Affairs, Mr. Teng Teng summarized his country's proposals for rekindling relations and Chinese participation in our educational system, especially in secondary and higher education. The deputy minister, Honorine Dossou Naki, expressed the government's interest in education for youth and wished for more effective cooperation under the 1986 agreement between the People's Republic of China and Gabon.

At National Education, High Commissioner Yves Marat-Abyla, representing Minister Nzouba, who was detained, referred to the same agreement under which the Chinese Government agreed to send teachers to Gabon. He then expressed satisfaction at the agreement's immediate execution, six Chinese teachers in scientific disciplines having assumed duties in our country's secondary schools as of September 1986.

Mr. Marat said there was an initial communications problem because of the teachers' language, but their determination and will has resulted in successful integration into our society today.

The high commissioner for the minister of higher education also wished that contacts between the Chinese State Education Commission and the Gabonese Ministry for Education would proliferate along new lines of cooperation, especially in scientific fields, since Gabon wants to benefit from Chinese technological experience.

In turn, Mr. Teng Teng told High Commissioner Marat that China is making grants available to Gabon for teacher training in scientific and technical fields. In response, Mr. Marat said the Ministry for Education is opening its doors to all Chinese offers.

The Minister of State for Higher Education stressed the importance of cooperative relations between the USTM [University of Sciences and Technologies of Masuku] and Chinese universities. Consequently, a team of experts will visit our country next year to discuss implementing this cooperation.

In addition, China is also willing to train Gabonese senior management. This is the first visit by a Chinese education team to our country. It reveals the country's willingness to establish more dynamic South-South cooperation, greatly desired by developing countries. The Chinese delegation leaves Libreville today for Beijing.

**\* Recent French Aid Reviewed, Praised***34190040A Libreville L'UNION in French  
17 Nov 89 p 7*

[Article by Dady Bouchard]

[Text] Mr. Ali Bongo, minister of foreign affairs and cooperation, received France's ambassador to Gabon, H.E. Louis Dominici, yesterday in his offices on the sixth floor of the 2-December building. The French diplomat presented to Minister Bongo two of his new colleagues, Messrs. Christian Bernard, first deputy, and Jean-Claude Quirin, chief of the mission for aid and cooperation, who are replacing, respectively, Messrs. Vidal, named as representative to the Elysee, and Chapellet, assigned to Senegal. Before his assignment to Libreville, Mr. Christian Bernard was vice consul to Spain.

After the presentations, the two men reviewed the status of cooperation between Gabon and France, with the understanding that Paris takes an active role in our country's development. Several weeks ago, the two countries signed an agreement for modernizing Libreville's hospital complex. In addition, France has just taken a role in establishing a laboratory for endemic illness control. Moreover, it is among the sponsors enabling us to carry out our medium-term campaign against AIDS. A new form of cooperation is planned for scientific research in higher education. Last, according to the AFP, under two financial assistance agreements, France has granted Gabon more than 4 billion CFA [Central African] francs as part of our country's structural adjustment program. Before the end of this year, another agreement is to be signed for support for Gabon's agriculture policies. It will help the development of plantations for hevea and related crops. All these milestones point to the good health and continual bright future of cooperation between the two countries.



## Ethiopia

### \* Regime 'Crumbling' in Face of Rebel Blitz

34000326A London AFRICAN PREVIEW in English  
Jan 90 p 3

[Text] After a year of retreat, mass defections and an abortive coup there is heightened speculation that the government of President Mengistu Haile Mariam is on the brink of collapse as government forces crumble in the face of a combined Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and Ethiopian People's Democratic Revolutionary Movement (EPDRM) offensive.

President Mengistu's current problems began in March last year when 20,000 of his troops were captured by the Eritrea People's Liberation Front (EPLF) after the fall of the garrison town of Afabet. The remaining government forces in the region numbering some 100,000 men, almost half the Ethiopian army, withdrew to Keren only to be encircled by the main body of the EPLF army. A separate offensive launched by the TPLF, to seize the strategic town of Inda Sellasie in Tigray Province, routed 30,000 government troops. The rebels went on to capture the provincial capital Mekele.

The poor fortunes of the government camp prompted a coup attempt in May which was foiled by the intervention of the elite 102nd airborne division. Mengistu purged the entire army leadership. At least 300 senior officers including 50 generals, have since been either arrested or executed and the arrest and subsequent release of the prime minister, Fikre Selassie, would suggest that Mengistu is far from confident in his Dergue colleagues. The latest developments indicate that the TPLF has successfully moved into Gondar, Wollo and the Central Shoa province. The rebels are now within 150 km of the capital and are reported to have cut the crucial Assab-Addis Ababa road.

President Mengistu has been in tight corners before but this time it appears unlikely that he will be able to fight his way out. On the 18th of October in a televised speech the President confirmed for the first time what most Ethiopians already suspected, that the government is losing the war. Since then Mengistu's television appearances have lacked their usual self-assurance. He is well aware that his forces have lost the will to fight and he has launched desperate appeals to his countrymen, now friends and brothers rather than comrades, to take up arms and defend the Ethiopian unity.

For want of military muscle the President has turned to diplomacy to buy time for his regime but his enemies are well aware that he is no longer negotiating from a position of strength. The ongoing negotiations with the EPLF have made little progress, the resolution of the Eritrean conflict would give President Mengistu breathing space to turn his full attention to the Tigrayan offensive. The secretary general of the EPLF, Issayas Afeworki, understands his opposite number's precarious situation and political tactical responses; and he has

ensured that Eritrean independence, a price Mengistu has not yet been prepared to pay to secure his flank, has remained on the agenda at both the Atlanta and the Nairobi talks. If the President refused to accept Eritrean secession a solution may still be possible, but only if he resigns first. The TPLF has also made it clear that a negotiated settlement with the Ethiopian government will only be possible after the President's departure.

President Mengistu's position is further undermined by the actions of both the superpowers. Ethiopia is in a position of great strategic importance. The Horn of Africa is on the strait of Bab-el Mandeb which connects the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea and is thus of vital significance for Western oil supplies coming from the Middle East as well for links with the military base at Diego Garcia and with East and Southern Africa. The United States has brought its influence to bear in pushing for a settlement between the Dergue government and the EPLF to the extent of the successful offer of former US President Jimmy Carter as a mediator in the Eritrean dispute. Mr Afeworki visited the USA in May meeting with the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Herman Cohen, at the State Department and addressing top American policy institutions including the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. The visit was considered a major diplomatic coup by the EPLF. President Mengistu has good reason to be suspicious of American involvement for the United States certainly has no interest in ensuring his regime's longevity and every interest in establishing a friendly enclave in the region. Of far greater concern for President Mengistu however is the attitude of the Soviet Union which possesses naval facilities in the Eritrean Dahlak Islands and has actively supported the Dergue since 1977. The Soviet Union appears to have lost confidence in Mengistu and have also begun to press for a settlement with the EPLF. In July the versatile Mr Afeworki was to be found in Moscow where he met with Yuri Yukalov, Director of the African Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The upshot of this meeting was the USSR's rejection of President Mengistu's proposed division of Eritrea along religious lines by recognising the region's territorial integrity. The Soviet Union apparently places the security of its base in the Dahlak Islands above the security of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) and is anxious to ensure that it will not be jeopardised by an EPLF victory.

In desperation President Mengistu has spent the last few months on the international stage attempting to win support and to raise the profile of his regime abroad. In August the President toured the Gulf States and made a state visit to Egypt. In September his government released 87 political prisoners—including the former minister of law and justice Zegeye Asfaw, the former permanent representative to the UN, Berhanu Dinka and three of the late Haile Selassie's grandsons detained in 1974, princes Wossen-Seged Mekonnen, Mekele Mekonnen and Bede-Mariam Mekonnen—to counter Amnesty International's criticisms of Ethiopia's human

rights accord. Also in September, Mengistu announced and carried through the withdrawal of the remaining 3,000 Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia, and the Dergue withdrew its active support for the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in the hope that the Sudanese government would bring its association with the EPLF to an end. In November the government announced the reopening of full diplomatic relations with Israel and extended an existing development cooperation agreement with West Germany. Yet all this activity has failed to achieve its objective. The diplomatic community no longer considers the overthrow of Mengistu an issue but are rather concerned with what the implications of his fall will be.

#### \* Peace Talks Said Making Little Headway

34000326B London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL  
in English 15 Dec 89 pp 4-5

[Text] Moves towards peace appear promising yet all sides are simultaneously pursuing the war. The Addis Ababa government and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) have agreed to open substantive talks in the New Year. A second round of preliminary talks between the government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) was due to open in Rome on 12 December. Yet both sets of talks have been filled with days of wrangling.

Even at the final Ethiopian/Eritrean press conference in Nairobi on 29 November, accusations were flying around of foot-dragging, misrepresentation, blackmail and "sinister manipulation." The EPLF has claimed it was because of Ethiopian pressure that the United Nations (UN) refused to be an observer at the talks, a role the EPLF has insisted upon. In fact, we understand that, aside from its official obligation not to get involved in a state's internal affairs, the UN simply does not want to get embroiled in what promises to be a long and bad-tempered negotiation (AC Vol 30 No 17).

The disagreement in both sets of talks have been largely petty and procedural. And some accusations of bad faith appear well-founded. President Mengistu Haile Mariam is certainly looking among a wide range of countries for military assistance. The recent resumption of relations with Israel is expected to lead to substantial military aid. Mengistu's price included arms and ammunition, as well as advisors and training, particularly for pilots. We understand Israel agreed, and in return secured the free emigration of Falashas (Ethiopian Jews) to Israel.

Colonel Mengistu is also trying to stem the advance of the TPLF and its partner, the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM). A major recruiting campaign aims to raise at least 200,000 men to add to the 100,000 already called up this year. Huge supplies of weapons have been distributed in parts of Gondar and northern Shoa to allow local Amharas to resist the Tigrayan advance. With long-standing mistrust between

the two peoples, the policy has been having some success. It was local people, not government forces, who halted the advance of the TPLF/EPDM alliance, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).

The aims of the EPRDF and of its major component, the TPLF, have been confidently expressed in recent weeks by central committee members at supporters' meetings in the United States and Europe, as well as over the Voice of America radio. They have included immediate independence for Eritrea and a "people's democratic government" in Addis Ababa. The TPLF has specifically stated that this does not involve the Western liberal concept of elections. TPLF chairman Meles Zenawi also argues that the military situation has its own dynamics and is not related to any peace talks, and he has insisted that the TPLF is not prepared to consider a unilateral ceasefire while the talks go on.

For its part, the EPLF has been so eagerly recruiting new forces that hundreds of people have fled into Sudan to escape conscription. EPLF forces are also in northern Tigray with the brief of preventing any attempt by Ethiopian forces in Eritrea to move south into Tigray. There are reports the EPLF has recently sent advisors to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in western Wollega to try to improve OLF effectiveness. The EPLF has also been reassuring overseas supporters it has no intention of abandoning any of its aims, including independence. EPLF chief Issayas Aferworki has been graphically (though improbably) insisting the EPLF could take the Eritrean capital, Asmara, at any time and will do so when appropriate.

As the military posturing and the fighting continue, there are two main pressures for peace. One is internal. The first group to walk out of the peace talks would have serious domestic problems. For the fronts, it could mean real splits; for the government, real trouble from the army (AC Vol 30 No 22). Even more important in keeping talks going is the external pressure. Along with his army, Mengistu's Soviet ally and European Community donors have made it clear he must look seriously for a political solution. Equally, the USA, Sudan, Egypt and other regional powers have indicated to the liberation fronts that they must do the same. Aid agencies have also pointed out that their assistance may become dependent upon such efforts.

Another factor complicating mediation attempts is the current famine alert. Allegations that politics are being played with lives are already flying about. There are serious differences about the amount of food aid needed and, of course, about how to get food to those at risk.

Drought has hit harvests in northern Wollo, Eastern Tigray and Eritrea. The government Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) estimates around 1.8 million people are at risk, needing some 330,000 tonnes of food. Pledges total only 132,000 tonnes. The RRC calculates Eritrea needs about two-thirds of the total. But the UN

World Food Programme figures are a great deal higher, totalling 3.55 mn. people, of which 1.25 mn. in Eritrea and 1.5 mn. in Tigray. Excluding Eritrea, the TPLF claims 2.2 mn. are in need. Yet most evidence suggests Eritrea, with at least 60 per cent of the harvest lost, has been much more badly hit than Tigray. Privately, the EPLF has shown dismay at what it regards as TPLF exaggerations that it feels could seriously reduce the assistance sent to Eritrea.

The delivery of food remains, as ever, in dispute. Since the Ethiopian government is reluctant to allow food into rebel-held areas, the USA and Britain favour cross-border operations from Sudan. But there is growing unease about the TPLF's ideological stance. Recent media attention has highlighted the TPLF's Stalinist and pro-Albanian position. It seemed a little out of tune with the times when a TPLF political commissar recently told the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC): "Stalin's path was a genuine democratic and socialist path, whereas the path of Gorbachev is an under-democratic path... The reality tells us that Stalin was democratic and genuine." Such comments have made Washington wary about continuing its considerable funding, which took off in a big way in 1984, at a time when the Ronald Reagan administration had been seriously considering turning the TPLF in the "contras" of Ethiopia. Money was the compromise alternative to full military backing.

Other food distribution options are being explored. As in the past, the TPLF has called for an "open roads" policy. The government, which still claims it has not formally received this proposal, will probably turn this down, as it has before. Likewise, the TPLF will refuse the government's suggestion, currently getting UN support, that up to 200,000 Tigrayans should be encouraged into southern Eritrea and fed under government auspices. Whoever controls food distribution gains substantial political advantage, as the government found in 1984-85.

One interesting idea recently floated by some Western governments is a "peace corridor." This would follow the Addis Ababa-Asmara road, right through the eastern side of Tigray and Wollo. This plan could be extended. If TPLF estimates are correct, then another corridor would be needed from the Tigray capital, Mekelle, into central Tigray and then through Adua and Axum to the Sudanese border at Humera. Another corridor could run from Keren, in Eritrea, along the road to Sudan through Agordat, Barentu and Tessenei. Such demilitarised corridors would divide the warring armies.

The government is interested in this plan in spite of the threat to its sovereignty. Kenya's President Daniel Arap Moi claims Mengistu has pronounced himself in favour. The fronts may be less keen, seeing it as weakening their positions. If the corridors plan were adopted, it would at last suggest the warring factions were prepared to put humanitarian interest above political advantage and had some genuine interest in the peace process. Neither attitude has been much in evidence so far.

#### \* Journalist Warns of Severe Famine in North

34000342A Nairobi SUNDAY NATION in English  
10 Dec 89 pp 11, 17

[Article by Mohamed Amin: "The Famine Next Time; 4 Million Face a Slow Death by Starvation"]

[Text] Photojournalist and television cameraman Mohamed Amin, whose moving reports of Ethiopia's 1984-85 famine aroused the conscience of mankind, warns of yet another massive famine to come. Braving the potent risks of landmines, ambushes and air strikes—and surviving a rolled vehicle—his 1-day assignment took him thousands of kilometres across the deserts of Sudan and the barren mountains of Eritrea and Tigray in northern Ethiopia.

Once again the spectre of famine haunts embattled Ethiopia—and on a scale that threatens to be greater than that of 1984 when shocked governments and world citizens sent more than a billion pounds sterling in cash and kind to save millions from certain death.

Five years later, I was unprepared both for the scale of the war I witnessed—one of the largest since World War II—and the depth of the threatened famine.

Already, four million people face death from starvation following drought and crop failure in the rebel-held northern provinces of Eritrea and Tigray.

Field workers, missionaries, clinical staff, and aid personnel all told me that time was running out and without a massive international effort in the next few weeks, the effects of the 1990 famine would be much more harrowing than the previous one which claimed at least 800,000 lives.

Now the war situation does not allow any food to come in, except through Sudan.

Father Angelo Regazzo, who runs a training school at Mekelle, said things were really changing for the better in 1986. But with a scarcity of rain in 1987 and 1988, and very little rain or none at all in 1989, the situation was now critical.

"I think there's going to be another famine. And I think everybody will be afraid of it because the people do not have the facilities to take food around or to get food in, so I think it's going to be worse.

"Before, we had this airlift. Now the airport is completely destroyed and there is no permission for any plane to land here and it's going to be a really hard, hard time."

The missionary added that because of the war, the people could not travel freely or grow crops as they used to. "They are afraid and when people are afraid, they're not willing to do anything. Therefore, they are just waiting for somebody to give a hand.



"When the government left in February, we were completely cut-off and went back another 50 years. We do not really see any solution. Unless the boundaries are open or a free channel for food coming in is allowed, we are really going to face starvation."

He added that unless the war situation changed, there would be disaster.

"By 6.30 in the morning, everybody has to be off the roads because the MiGs come and bomb between 7 and 7.30 a.m."

Nobody is around until between 5.30 and 6 p.m. They stay near the trenches and the air raid shelters they have dug close to their homes.

"So it is an impossible life. People need to prepare their food but they cannot even come out from the trenches because they're so afraid."

"They cannot harvest and this is the time of harvesting, so they have to do it at night hoping there is the moon. But even in the night, there are reconnaissance flights and people are really afraid."

"It is an impossible life. Everybody is praying for peace and we hope that peace will come. I don't know what is going to happen."

"At a time when Ethiopia again needs outside help, how can people understand that there should be famine when at the same time the government is bombing the people?"

"The world should know what is happening. People are dying. And not for a just cause but because somebody would like to impose their own way. The world should know what is happening here and they would understand."

Sister Jean Harris, another missionary in the area around Mekelle, told me: "Before, when we heard planes coming, everyone ran out to cheer."

"Now there is a real feeling of menace because they know it is the other way round—they are not exactly aiming at us but Mekelle is going to be bombed. It's a menacing feeling."

No matter how much aid is donated by the West, the situation this time is far more uncertain and perilous than five years ago. At the moment, all food and medical supplies have to follow the same appalling route that I took by night. Anything moving by day is prone to air strike by the Ethiopian Air Force. The main problem is that there are just not enough vehicles to carry the massive supplies needed, nor enough men to drive them.

And all along the way I was haunted by those so tragic images of 1984-85—starving waifs dying as I filmed them.

Another missionary in Adigrat, Father Kevin O'Mahoney, told me that in 1984, the famine was "much more on a national level. This time it's more localised but

many districts are drastically affected and in some of the affected areas, it could be even more precarious than in 1984.

"An 81-year-old Ethiopian says he has never seen such a bad rainy season as this one. Another priest says he has never seen such a disastrous rainy season—disastrous in the sense that there has been no rain when there should have been."

"It's the first time in many years that I have not seen a flood sweeping across the town."

"The people will starve unless protective measures are taken. The present situation is complicated by man-made disasters. The organisations which are trying to help the people at the moment are doing their best to provide the ways and means of providing relief food for the people."

"But if relief food is not provided, many will die. They have been living on prickly pear or cactus pears since September. Now these are beginning to die out. The really hard time will begin in January."

"At the moment, they're eating their reserves—they're eating what they put away for future sowing as seed."

The situation, he said, was complicated by the war for two reasons:

"First, the problem of transporting food from internal markets and, secondly, the complicated logistics of getting supplies from foreign-based donor agencies."

"In this region, it's estimated that the harvest failure is between 92 and 100 percent. In some other parts of Tigray, 60 percent of the people need food. At Axum it's a little better. But in this district, the needs are between 92 and 100 percent."

The missionary said he did not think he would ever see a repeat of the 1984-85 famine.

Lessons were learnt from that horror. It became policy not to establish hunger camps for these disrupted family units. "If people stay at home at least the old people and the children will be catered for. They'll die but they'll die with respect, dignity, love—and affection."

Today, the problem is out of control. "We have tried to make the people independent. We want them to be self-reliant and we have taken steps, down the valleys, to build small check-dams. Nothing big."

"But when you get a total drought, what are you going to do?"

My journey took me more than 600 kilometres from the Sudanese capital of Khartoum to Kassala, where I had to get a Sudanese permit to travel to the Eritrean border. I also had to acquire permits from the rebel Eritrean People's Liberation Movement (EPLM) to travel across Eritrean territory with my Tigrayan People's Liberation Front [TPLF] escort to Tigray.

From Kassala all travel had to be under the cover of the night. The first leg to Adi Sasar, the threshold into Tigray, involving a journey of 190 kilometres over unmarked trails across a barren plain pitted with mine-fields, took 12 hours.

Two heavy lorries served as pathfinders to absorb the impact of any mine. My escort comprised 25 TPLF soldiers.

The second leg of 211 kilometres to Inda Silase took 15 hours with the last 2 1/2 in broad daylight. My escort had lost the way and it was a tense situation because the Ethiopian MiG 23s make their first strikes during the early morning hours.

From Inda Silase, over a succession of nights on appalling roads, I travelled another 600 kilometres in all—though Axum, Adigrat, Idaga Hamus, and the two places that in 1984 were inscribed on the history of human tragedy, Mekelle and Korem, to the TPLF front-line, less than 200 kilometres from President Mengistu Haile Mariam's capital of Addis Ababa.

With the long overnight journeys averaging between 10 and 12 hours, I slept very little.

Wherever I travelled, I found the situation more extreme than anything I saw in 1984. The only major organisation trying to avert disaster within the rebel-held territory is the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) which says its warnings and appeals have barely been heard.

Nonetheless, in December—thanks to financial assistance from donor agencies—internal purchases of about 55,000 tonnes meant that they could continue food relief operations until at least the middle of December, and quite possibly still have enough to continue until the end.

What happens after that depends very much on international reaction to the crisis.

REST and other aid agencies in the field say that in normal circumstances they would have been able to survive by organising internal markets and transportation. The idea is that drought-affected areas should buy their needs from those areas which have had a reasonable surplus.

"That's why," one field worker told me, "for the first time, this last two months, the policy of internal purchases has been put into operation.

"Previously, there had been no initiatives taken to supply grain by internal purchases. This is a new experience and a very good one. I have no doubt that in peace time, this would solve the problem of famine caused by drought."

At Idaga Hamus, an insignificant little village in this mountainous region, Sister Mary Malone was nursing young babies—most of whom were already condemned to death by either injury or starvation.

One tiny victim was suffering from a war wound and had lost the desire to eat. "He's three years old and was a victim of the bombing. It's even difficult to begin encouraging him to take food again."

She pointed despairingly at another little girl whose mother died at birth from TB, leaving the baby with the disease.

"She's on TB treatment which she must continue for a year, but in fact we don't have a year's supply at the moment. So we are treating her on a month to month basis, hoping that somehow, we will soon get in both medical and food supplies."

The missionary medic had seen many children die in recent weeks for very few places were offering medical treatment or food. "There's just this one. The next one is 60 kilometres north of here and the one after that is 100 kilometres to the south."

Detailing the shortage of medicines and food, Sister Malone said that in many instances survival became a lottery, with field workers having to decide on the few who should live and the many who would die.

"The decisions you have to make are to say: 'I'm sorry, I'm not able to do anything for you.'"

"There was one man who came last week suffering from TB and I had to say: 'We don't have the drugs. You must go to the next place where you might get treatment.'"

"The man died four days later. He was already too far gone before he even saw us. Even if we had had the drugs, he wouldn't have survived.

"It's difficult for the people to accept or believe because they look around and see medicines but they're not appropriate to the illnesses they have."

Unless food reaches the affected areas by the end of December, Sister Malone's grim scenarios will be played out over the corpses of many hundreds of thousands. It will be a replay of the 1984-85 famine on a large scale.

At the moment, the responsibility and only hope of avoiding such a tragedy rests on the shoulders of Teklewoine Assefa, who runs the field operations of REST in Tigray. He told me there were three options: the free unhindered movement of relief supplies; cross-border operation from Sudan; and the internal purchases from areas where there was a food surplus.

"We are buying food from areas where there is a surplus in the western part of Tigray and transporting and distributing it. Currently, the cross-border operation is the only other possible alternative. The problem is the means of transportation. If more trucks are provided, then this problem would be minimised.

"It's simply a matter of time, maybe not this month or next—but in three months the situation will be like '84 and '85."

My return journey to Kassala told me just how grim the threat could be. It took five nights of travel and the final leg to Khartoum involved 10 hours—without brakes which were destroyed after the Land Cruiser rolled on the way from Adi Sasar.

Soon after my return to London, I showed pop singer Bob Geldof, the inspiration behind the fund-raising for the 1984 famine, film and pictures of my tragic footage.

The singer, knighted for his work, said that this time the situation would not be helped by another concert.

It needed, he said the combined influence of Soviet President Gorbachev and American President George Bush to pressurise President Mengistu into allowing the free flow of famine and medical relief supplies from government-held Ethiopia into the rebel-held areas.

Nonetheless, days later, with 40 top pop singers, Geldof was in the studio recording a 1989 version of the Band Aid hit "Do They Know It's Christmas?"

But unless the roads are opened now, Ethiopia '90 could be the grimmest horror of this century.

#### \* Thousands Facing Famine in Wollo Province

34000327B Kampala THE NEW VISION in English  
16 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by Alfred Taban; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The world may be a global village but horrendous events are often overlooked in the jostle for headline space. Little is known of the sufferings of the people of Sokota where thousands are threatened with famine and death.

Starvation threatens the 80,000 inhabitants of Sokota, an Ethiopian town and a large surrounding area. Sokota is one of the main towns in Wollo province of central Ethiopia.

Since the highly publicised drought of 1972/3, in which at least 200,000 people died in Wollo, Gondar and Tigre provinces, there has been little improvement in Gondar or Wollo despite heavy rains last year.

There have been intermittent droughts since 1973, the latest from 1985 to 1987. Many people and most animals perished. Since almost all cultivation in these provinces is done by oxen, ploughing is now a problem because of a shortage of domestic animals.

The few families who own oxen could not take advantage of the heavy rains which fell last year because of a lack of suitable ploughs. "Although the place is fertile it is rocky and it requires ploughs made of steel," says Zerihune

Demesse, the chairman of the Ethiopian Relief Organisation (ERO), the relief arm of the Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movement (EPDM).

The people of the area, over 90 percent of whom depend on cultivation for their livelihood, have only wooden ploughs. There is also an acute shortage of seeds, as well as sickles and other farm implements.

Last year's rains were so heavy that they washed away most of the top fertile soil on the high ground, and flooded the lowland areas. This made cultivation either impossible or reduced yields.

One million of the 2.5 million people living in areas controlled by the EPDM are now experiencing an acute shortage of food and need aid. To prevent mass starvation and deaths, at least 150,000 metric tonnes of relief food are needed for the next six months, or four million Ethiopian Birr (about US\$2 million) to purchase food. Several people have already died of hunger.

The most serious handicap to any major relief operation in the area is lack of transport. Sokota is about 600 kilometres (372 miles) from Addis Ababa and only 100 kilometres (62 miles) from Desalegn, the capital of Wollo province.

But those two cities are in areas held by the Ethiopian government while Sokota is held by the EPDM, so there is no contact between them.

Most areas in Wollo province can be reached only on foot because of mountains which make this some of the most hostile terrain in the world. Sokota itself is accessible only to small vehicles which must travel through narrow mountain passes barely resembling roads.

For the residents of Sokota, lack of communication with the outside is the most serious problem. The townspeople depended almost entirely on trade for their livelihood.

Merchants used to come from as far as Eritrea in the north to buy and sell commodities. Now business has almost dried up because of the war. Sudan is too far away, and to travel there traders have to pass through more war zones.

Almost all basic commodities are thus in short supply at Sokota. There are only three salaried people in the town—the local priest and two medical workers employed to take care of the town's sick. The workers earn 80 Birr (US\$40.00) a month and are paid by the local government council. The priest does not say how he gets his money.

There are only two clinics for the 2.5 million people in the Wollo and Gondar areas. There is no doctor or trained medical assistant.

One of the two clinics is in Sokota, but it has no drugs. Disease is rampant. Several people are reported to have

died on meningitis this year. Malaria, diarrhoea and typhoid are also very common, say town residents.

Although Wollo province is one of the most mountainous areas in Ethiopia, there are few running streams. Sokota and all the other areas in the hands of the EPDM are suffering from an acute shortage of water. Lacking soap, too, people find it hard to keep clean.

There is no school in the town. The school buildings stand empty. The students fled at the start of hostilities in the province.

Now, the only school is a primary school, with 200 pupils, in the town of Belasa in Gondar province.

Two years ago there was electricity but the only generator has broken down and has not been repaired. The hotels are empty because there are no guests and half the houses are empty because the owners have either fled to Sudan or to government-held areas. Very few stores are open because they have little to sell.

The hunger and lack of services in Sokota have been compounded by uncertainty. "You have to remember that this is a contested area. Today we are in control here but tomorrow nobody knows. This hampers the development of social services," said one EPDM commander.

### Kenya

#### \* President Moi Attacks Critics of One-Party Rule

34000347A Nairobi KENYA TIMES in English  
11 Jan 90 pp 1, 13

[Article by George Munji]

[Text] President Moi yesterday dismissed as "a man whose head is not normal" a priest who recently demanded the scrapping of the one-party system in preference for a multi-party one.

In a short apparent reference to the controversial New-Year sermon delivered by a priest of Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), the Rev Timothy Njoya, the President said those advocating many parties were simply serving their masters abroad.

Besides having the colonial mentality, they faithfully served their masters' instructions to hurl abuse at the free democratic system in their mother country.

President Moi was speaking at the Makuyu Large-Scale Farmers Company, Murang'a District, where he presented title deeds to the shareholders of the farm.

The best policy was to be mindful of other people's welfare while tackling the problems that are facing the people, he said.

The Rev Njoya on New-Year day called on African leaders to scrap the one-party system, claiming they had borrowed it from Eastern Europe.

He said the one-party affair should be scrapped and the multi-party system introduced. The New Year sermon delivered at the St Andrew's Church, Nairobi, has been condemned by leaders countrywide.

National leaders of all category replied to Njoya condemning the sermon and pointing out that the Rev Njoya had failed to reflect the historical background in the one-party communist states, which experienced revolution and solidified into tyranny.

This was the first major function the President has undertaken since the New Year and the 13th title deeds ceremony presided over by him since 1983. In total, he has presented nearly 55,000 title deeds in various parts of the country, Mr Darius Mbela, the Minister for Lands and Housing, reported.

President Moi arrived at Makuyu Secondary School, where he presented the deeds shortly after 11.20 am, wearing a grey suit, a matching shirt, a tie and black shoes.

On his arrival, President Moi was met by Mr Mbela and local leaders. He was then introduced to the officials of the Makuyu large-scale farmers.

The President was entertained by a team of school choirs and traditional dancers from the area before he was invited to address the nation by the Minister.

After his address, President Moi braved the scorching midday sun and walked to the Makuyu play ground where he issued the title deeds to thousands of shareholders.

On his way, President Moi was given a rousing welcome by wananchi as he drove from Nairobi to Makuyu.

Hundreds of students, schoolchildren and wananchi from all walks of life gathered at Kenyatta University, Ruiru township, Jomo Kenyatta University College of Agriculture, Mangu High School and other centers to greet him.

At Kenyatta University, the President told the students his Government valued the well-being of citizens more than anything else.

President Moi said the Government spent 40 percent of its budget on education, unlike other countries which spend the same percentage or more to buy arms.

President Moi criticized those educated Africans who do not see any good value in a black man, describing such people as mentally colonized.

At Ruiru township, the President told wananchi not to be driven by hate.



### \* Moi Chides State Tea Authority Managers

34000347B Nairobi KENYA TIMES in English  
11 Jan 90 p 12

[Text] President Moi yesterday chided top managers of the state-owned Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) for feeding on the farmers' sweat by turning the authority into a personal estate.

The President said the authority, which was wholly-owned by the farmers, had been used by its executives to impoverish tea growers.

Speaking during the presentation of title deeds to shareholders of Makuyu Large-Scale Company in Murang'a District, the President also directed all District Commissioners to convene monthly public barazas in all their administrative divisions to serve as forums for listening to wananchi's problems. He said substantial time should be accorded to the governed to air their problems.

"I am tired of listening to problems which would otherwise have been handled by my administrative officers. Wananchi have often wasked me to request their local chiefs to do things for them," the President said and posed: "Chifu amekuwa mkubwa wangu? (Have I become subordinate to a chief?)."

President Moi rebuked some administrative officers who planted themselves in their offices instead of mingling with the wananchi they ruled to understand their problems.

He noted that land problems had plagued many wananchi in the country and urged District Commissioners, District Officers, Chiefs and their assistants to help their people in solving some of the land cases.

The President revealed that the KTDA managers had collected Sh175 million as management fee annually, which they later put to their personal use.

"Yet when they are exposed they go yapping that the Government wants to take over the authority. The Government will run the company to ensure that farmers' interests are protected," said the President.

President Moi on Tuesday announced a price increase on tea from Sh1.90 to Sh3 per kilogramme, immediately after receiving the special interim report of a committee he appointed last October to probe the KTDA with a view to restructuring it.

The President said the team, headed by Mr Eliud Mahihu, had detected serious discrepancies and unfairness to farmers. The committee recommended that the KTDA Act be restructured to enable farmers acquire a controlling voice in the affairs of the authority.

The President said the latter was one of the report's recommendations that needed immediate implementation.

President Moi deplored increasing child abuse by their parents and said the future leaders of the country should be given maximum love and security.

### \* Foreign Donors Cited for Easing Country's Debt

34000345B Nairobi SUNDAY TIMES in English  
24 Dec 89 p 6

[Article by Nixon Kariithi]

[Text] Third World countries experienced mixed fortunes in debt servicing during 1989. Some of them, like Kenya, were lucky to have part of the debt burden written-off but this did not hinder the souring debt scourge which reached 1.3 trillion US dollars by the end of the year, says BUSINESS writer Nixon Kariithi.

The end to the hard-hitting debt crisis facing Third World countries remained elusive during most of 1989, with growing fears among the creditor industrialized countries and financial institutions that debt management efforts in the 1990s might be frustrated by mass defaulting.

Since the beginning of the year, rich industrialized countries have expressed little hope that poor countries could improve debt serving during the year. The fears arose from a vicious cycle borrowed from 1988, which saw many debtor countries, especially in Africa and Latin America, crying for rescheduling of their loan obligation. By December 1988, the World Bank estimated Third World debts at 1.3 trillion US dollars in its publication, Annual World Debt Tables, 1988.

The World Bank, which is an inter-governmental financial institution, said the continued failure to resolve the debt crisis posed serious threats to the stability of the governments in debtor nations as well as new risks for the creditor banks in industrialized countries.

Little room was available for remedial action other than the bank's own controversial policies. By the beginning of 1989, bank sources argued that the only alternative was the erosion of political support of national governments and prudent economic policies. They, however, offered a recovery recipe of highly-criticized policies, saying the packages were working well in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Colombia. Such policies included privatization of state firms, setting of realistic exchange rates and increasing imports.

The year opened with great pessimism on the improvement of debt management. The Secretary-General of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Prof Adebayo Adedeji, predicted a bleak situation to prevail over many sub-Saharan economies, saying the region's external debt was expected to grow by six to ten per cent over the 1988 level. The total debt obligation was expected to reach between US\$244 billion and US\$253 billion by the end of this year.

He said Africa's total external debt obligations, which stood at US\$230 billion last year as compared with

1987's US\$218 billion, had grown by nearly 32 percent during the past three years. The average debt service ratio had also increased from less than 14 percent in 1982 to about 50 percent in 1988.

Adedeji cited factors like increasing interest rates on loans, declining export earnings and high annual debt servicing obligations as the most pertinent contributors to the looming debt scourge.

Most of the anticipated borrowings during the year were for servicing new maturities as well as reducing accumulated arrears, a measure many economists have criticized as a shortsighted solution.

The debate on effectiveness of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) sponsored reforms for the recovery of poor nations dominated most of the first quarter of 1989. The growing chorus by politicians and economists echoed bitter criticism of the proposed approaches to an amicable settlement of the debt crisis. The critics hit at the famous James Baker Plan for recovery, which called for a combination of new loans, write-offs and economic reforms in debtor nations. They contended that the plan failed to stimulate economic expansion and to trigger new money in loans from reluctant banks.

The plan also drew criticism from the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, who said the approach had fallen short of its goals and called for a new political impulse towards more permanent solutions. Other leading authorities in world politics called for an expansion of "menu of options" available for the reduction of the developing world's debt burden. They said the Baker Plan failed because banks did not lend as much money as the plan called for, hence Third World nations had been unable to wriggle themselves out of their economic doldrums.

London's National Westminster Bank made \$652 million special provisions (Write-offs) for loans to developing countries, which resulted in a 50 percent decline in pre-tax profits for trading during the first six months of the year. Lloyds Bank was also reported to have set aside \$1.87 billion from profits as provisions against non-repayment of loans by debtor countries. Standard Chartered PLC also lost \$310 million through provision for bad and doubtful debts in trading during the first half-year. The choking losses forced the Standard Chartered Group to endorse an emergency bail-out programme, which included the sale of its headquarters in London as well as regional offices in Singapore and Bangkok.

The growing incidence of default prompted banks in the United States to propose that an international insurance scheme be initiated to protect lender banks against absconding tendencies. But the US government quickly rejected the proposal, saying such a move would be premature. The G-7 (group of the world's seven leading industrial powers) was also reported to have turned

down a suggestion proposing the creation of an international organization to deal with the intractable debt cases.

All this time, political and economic groupings for Third World countries kept crying out for consideration of the escalating debt issue saying there was room for discussion. As early as March, African finance ministers were reported having pleaded for round-table talks between the donors and problem countries. The long frustrated drive to convene an international debt conference were, however, met by a cool and reluctant response from the creditors.

Similar sentiments were made in the subsequent conferences of sub-Sahara Africa leaders with pleas that the developed countries should not only write off the debts but also supply adequate aid in grants, for the balance of payments and other immediate needs.

The calls for reprieve were pegged on the grounds that all countries in the region were generally poor and needed a strong boosting of their respective economies before a stable situation was realized. Other sources noted that Africa owed about US\$233 billion in foreign debt by the middle of the year and that repayments swallowed are nearly 30 percent of the region's exports income.

Sighs of relief swept across Africa as several industrialized countries and economic power brokers started yielding and offered to write off outstanding debts. In May, France announced that it was writing off some US\$2.3 billion owed to it by the world's 35 poorest countries. Two months later, the United States said it had written off official development loans amounting to US\$1 billion owed by several sub-Sahara Africa countries.

In September, the Non-Aligned Movement appealed to the developed world to cancel debts of the world's poorest nations.

Barely a week later, West Germany cancelled nearly US\$2.5 billion in debts owed by African countries over the last two years. In the same month, the Paris Club of lender nations rescheduled US\$96.7 billion in official loans to 51 debtor countries since the Third World debt crisis began in 1983. Of this, US\$46.1 billion had been for Africa.

In Kenya, 1989 was a year marked with generous reprieves by a number of foreign donors. Early in February, West Germany said it was planning to write off US\$383 million owed by Kenya. At the same time, the European country said it would relax import restrictions for Kenyan goods in a move to improve Kenya's export earnings.

In July, Kenya and 12 other African countries benefited from a reprieve of nearly US\$20 million in loans they owed to Belgium. Kenya's part of the debt offload amounted to about US\$6.3 million. Two months later, the Netherlands cancelled some US\$8 million owed by

Kenya, bringing its total debt reprieve to about US\$30 million over the last three years.

#### **\* Implications of Value-Added Tax Examined**

34000348A Nairobi SUNDAY TIMES in English  
10 Dec 89 p 10

[Text] Since VAT was proposed by the Vice-President and Minister for Finance, Prof George Saitoti, in his budget last June, it has sent ripples through the manufacturing and service sectors amid criticism that it had gaping loopholes in its functional and operational framework.

The new tax has been viewed by many people as one of the few alternatives to the issue of effective taxation policy in the country's fast growing goods and service industries.

In his budget speech, Prof Saitoti said the 16-year-old sales tax was beset with shortcomings especially due to the increased sophistication of the economy. The Government then identified VAT as the appropriate alternative which would be charged on consumer expenditure accruing from business transactions and imports of all goods.

One of the apparent advantages of the new tax was its applicability on all goods and services, like the sales tax which was only levied on manufactured goods from registered establishments. He further pointed out that the burden of tax would eventually be passed on to the consumers by the producer.

Since then, VAT gained popularity among the local business circles. Several professional and business associations went back to their boardrooms to evaluate the possible effects of the new levy on their investments as well as the suitability of its implementation.

By the time the Ministry of Finance was issuing guidelines on how the tax will be effected, several institutions like the Institute of Certified Public Accountants and Kenya Association of Manufacturers, had already gone on record as having given their opinion on the levy's probable impact on the economy.

To some of these institutions, the implementation of VAT system will be a big blow to the development of small-scale enterprises since they will be required to incur high costs in the hiring of accountants and clerks to maintain monthly records, something which has been absent among small firms in the past. Other quarters have called for further clarification on some of the provisions of the new tax which they say were ambiguous and subject to different interpretations.

Serious questions were raised in a recent seminar organized by Coopers and Lybrand to discuss the applicability of VAT systems. Participants observed that VAT did not provide for the recovery of tax charged on goods supplied to a person registered for the new tax by an unregistered person. It was further felt that traders would

lose in the event of a dispute arising from recoverable VAT paid on goods since the new Act stipulated that all tax dues should first be paid awaiting the decision of the VAT Appeal Tribunal. This is unlike the case in Sales Tax Act where traders were allowed to withhold disputable tax until the appeal was heard before a tribunal.

But observers, optimistic about the success of the new scheme have played down such criticism saying that VAT will initially be levied on goods presently registered under the Sales Tax Act and any loopholes will be sealed as the system was expanded to include all forms of goods and services. Once the anomalies were streamlined the cost of inputs among two registered traders will eventually be lower than if the source was unregistered.

Consequently, the observers feel that the system was loaded with a self-adjusting mechanism which would force manufacturers to source their goods from registered persons in order to lower their input costs. The system will also compel unregistered producers to seek registration for better sales.

Among the most obvious advantages of the VAT system is the simplification of the surcharged tax recovery procedure. Observers say the new procedure was a positive change from the outdated Sales Tax Act, under which sales tax was payable within 30 days while refunds were met with lengthy delays.

So far, the only respite in sight for the sealing of the loopholes already pointed out to the new VAT Department is the VAT regulations booklet and the VAT guide which are to be released soon. Many people hope the two publications will iron out the simmering problems which may render the new tax policy ineffective.

Much as the VAT is expected to generate more income to the exchequer, it is clear that the Government will invest vast sums in terms of personnel and other administration costs. The large volume of paperwork and records maintenance will certainly call for efficiency in processing.

Initially, the new tax department will settle for major errors in accounting since the VAT system will call for high standards of accounting, not to mention management problems as the appointed officers struggle to manage large teams of tax clerks chasing evaders.

At the end of the day, Government revenues from VAT may be less than the anticipated earnings until the new system is fully implemented and streamlined. And until such a time, some considerable number of potential local entrepreneurs may have to wait and study the new system before taking a step to invest. This will, however, depend on the degree to which the forthcoming publications tackle the shortcomings of the VAT policy.



**\* Overhaul of Country's Major Industries Urged**

34000345A Nairobi SUNDAY NATION in English  
24 Dec 89 p 23

[Article by Robert Shaw]

[Text] Last week Robert Shaw examined the tourism industry and offered some ideas on how it could be improved. This week he looks at the state of Kenya's major foreign exchange earners and argues that they are in need of urgent scrutiny and overhaul.

To most observers of the Kenyan economy, one of its major weaknesses is the continuing and ever widening imbalances of foreign trade. In short, we are importing far more than we are exporting and the differences increasingly being made up of substantial inward aid flows.

Some would argue, with concern and conviction, that Kenya is becoming increasingly over-dependent on an unhealthy diet of foreign aid. Others would counter argue that it is better that way than to continue running up overseas debt by borrowing more at often hard commercial rates.

This is especially so when we bear in mind that the debt service ratio, as a percentage of exports, is already hovering around the precarious 40 percent level. It was only 12 percent 10 years ago. The latter argument has a luring ring to it because much of Kenya's aid today is on very soft terms and is often in the form of grants or loans that eventually get written off.

But surely the soundest way to approach the problem is to look at ways to strengthen export performance and base. Unfortunately the export base has weakened in the course of this year.

Tourism, tea and coffee are Kenya's principal foreign exchange earners. At this stage we should also mention fresh and canned horticultural and fresh floricultural exports, because although they are not yet in the same league, their growth has been phenomenal.

Last week I looked at the tourism industry and argued that although its growth in recent years has been impressive it cannot be assumed that it will continue that way considering its fickle and competitive nature. What Kenya needs to do is look at ways of improving the product we are offering. Considering how increasingly dependent Kenya is on this industry it is absolutely vital that something be done. My suggestions were just a few of many that could be offered if the industry at large were consulted.

Over the last few months there has been considerable publicity about problems in Kenya's other three major foreign exchange pillars.

The most serious, of course, is coffee where prices have fallen by half in recent months and further to that show no sign of any revival whatsoever for the foreseeable future. Indeed in the last week or so coffee prices have

weakened further. I emphasize the last two points because there is still a lingering hope, particularly in official circles, that things will improve soon. As argued in a previous article (SUNDAY NATION, October 8), the coffee industry is in dire need of restructuring involving a variety of measures, a faster transition to the Ruiru 11 strain; the turning over of some coffee land to horticulture and the abolition of gravy train of the cooperative middlemen. So far the only tangible result I have seen is despondency among coffee farmers.

The smallholder sector of the tea industry, and in particular the KTDA [Kenya Tea Development Authority], has been the focus of much criticism and antagonism recently. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the arguments, and their possible political connotations, we must not forget that tea is our second largest foreign exchange earner and it is imperative that its health is maintained.

Has the spectacular growth of the smallholder sector resulted in the KTDA's infrastructure being over-stretched? Are some areas more favored than others? Has the KTDA become a big and cumbersome bureaucracy resulting in a disproportionate amount of the proceeds being eaten up in bureaucracy? Should the KTDA be decentralized? I have posed the questions in dispassionate, economic terms because that is how they need to be addressed.

Anyone who has watched the phenomenal rise of Kenya's horticulture industry will know that it has been impressive and still has a lot of potential. But as the recent Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry report makes clear all is not rosy.

Competition is increasingly fierce and we face some major problems, particularly to do with air cargo space, high standard packaging requirements and adequate storage and refrigeration facilities. The very welcome move by the Government in reducing the price of jet fuel by 39 percent may well go a long way in solving air capacity problems.

In conclusion, all Kenya's export foundations are in need of thorough and urgent scrutiny due to increasing balance of trade deficits and the various problems now threatening them in various degrees.

**\* Growth of Country's Building Sector Assessed**

34000348B Nairobi KENYA TIMES in English  
22 Dec 89 p 11

[Text] Despite some operational problems, Kenya's building and construction industry performed well in 1989, continuing a cycle that started last year. The good news has sent the industry in a sweet frenzy which may be the most favorable since independence.

The persistent shortages of cement and nails, absconding of contractors and stringent Government policy posed halted the flamboyant growth of the sector, but not to the

extent of slowing down construction activity around major urban centers in the country.

In Nairobi, town planning authorities wrestled with the largest construction turnover in the last 25 years. Developers threatened to convert low rise buildings into skyscrapers within the next five years.

Over the last eleven months alone, 1,725 building projects were approved estimated to cost Sh4.18 billion, compared to Sh3.6 billion during the same period last year.

Residential buildings accounted for Sh1.33 billion, and commercial buildings Sh1.32 billion. Industrial and public buildings were estimated to cost Sh932.7 billion and Sh590.4 million, respectively.

Among the most exciting projects was the Kenya Times Media Complex situated next to Uhuru Park in Nairobi. The 60-story structure, the tallest in black Africa, will house the proprietors' newspapers publishing section, and a satellite antenna for the proposed private television channel for Kenya Television Networks Ltd.

Across Uhuru Park and along the Haile Selassie Avenue, Kenya Pipeline Company is to construct an 18-story head office building. The project estimated to cost over Sh250 million, will commence construction early next year, sources say.

Along the Valley Road Capital Hill, the National Security Fund (NSSF) is putting up an extension to its headquarters at an estimated cost of 957 million. The new building, whose construction started early this year, comprises a twin tower of 25 stories each, sitting on a substructure basement of four floors. It was further reported that the existing NSSF head office would be extended from the present 10 floors to 16 floors.

Several other building projects commenced around the central business district (CBD) during the year. These include the five-star Meridian Hotel along Uhuru Highway, the proposed ICDC Investment House next to the prestigious hotel, Nation Center as well as initial works for the construction of the Tana and Athi River Development Authority (TARDA) headquarters along Haile Selassie Avenue.

The year further saw the demolition of General Post Office (GPO) along Kenyatta Avenue to give way to the proposed Sh 300 million Kenya Posts and Telecommunications headquarters. The proposed Y-shaped structure will go up 30 stories.

Several major companies also extended their buildings in a bid to ease the growing problem of office space.

Among the most active contributors to the present construction boom were savings and credit co-operative societies (SACCOs) who initiated more than two dozen construction projects around the country. In Nairobi, Sacco announced three major projects namely Reli

Towers, Kenya Union of Savings and Credit Co-operative Society (KUSCO) and the Posta Cooperative head offices.

Other upcoming Sacco Projects announced during the year include a Sh24-million office building for teachers Sacco in Kerugoya, Sh40-million Kisii-South Nyanza Sacco house in Kisii, and a Sh30-million Plaza in Siaya for the Siaya teachers Sacco. Others are a Sh40-million office complex in Bungoma, Sh33 million tourist hotel in Kakamega and ultra modern office block to house the headquarters of Mwalimu Sacco (value still not yet disclosed).

Although considerable growth was recorded by the sector during the year, observers feel that building and construction activity around the country would have been significantly higher had it not been for the persistent shortages of inputs which characterized operations throughout the year.

The year opened with severe nails shortages in most parts of the country. By mid-January the Government ordered Kenya National Trading Corporation to import nails since local manufacturers had been unable to satisfy the local demand. Almost immediately, nails reappeared on the shelves but at exorbitant prices.

But problems were far from over for the building industry had already started suffering spasmodic shortages in the supply of cement. Although initial explanations from various authorities pointed fingers at a machinery breakdown, the shortages did not ease even after the cement-making equipment at the Athi River-based East African Portland Cement Company were repaired.

Since then, persistent cement shortage threatened the smooth growth of the industry with construction work in several major urban areas coming to a halt occasionally.

As the year draws to an end, no recovery is in sight for the rejuvenation of the local cement industry. Observers say that the recurrent shortages are as a result of demand overstripping supply.

The two cement factories have been criticized for not undertaking effective expansion programmes in view of increased local and foreign demand.

Besides the unending shortages, the building industry also experienced major changes through Government policy. The surprise announcement that the Government had reduced professional fees charged in the building industry was met with bitter objection.

The Government explained that the new conditions of engagement and scale of fees were aimed at harmonizing the relationship between the professionals and the public. On average, building clients benefited from reductions in professional fees of between 10 and 30 percent depending on the size and type of project.

The increasing costs of building production seemed to dominate most deliberations in the industry and culminated in the development of numerous cost-saving materials. Among these was the development of suitable technology, which reduced costs by between 40 and 50 percent. The new technology, with a lifespan of 80 years, was developed by a local private firm.

Other innovations included the dissemination of research findings by Housing Research Development Unit (HRDU) of the University of Nairobi through a series of seminars and workshops around the country.

**\* Country Nearing Record Tourism Figures**

34000346A Nairobi DAILY NATION in English  
11 Jan 90 p 11

[Article by Paul Redfern]

[Text] London, Wednesday. Despite fears that increased poaching in Kenya's game parks would lead to a drop in tourists visiting the country, 1990 again looks set to break all previous records.

Thomas Cook, one of Britain's leading travel operators, reports an astonishing 68 percent increase in bookings for Kenya in 1990, compared with last year while African travel specialists—the Africa Travel Center—reckon their increase in bookings is between 20 and 30 percent.

Only Kuoni, who instigated the first package charter holidays into Mombasa, report a slight downturn at present. But their bookings for 1989 were a mammoth 70 percent up, on the previous year.

A spokesman for Kuoni said it was their beach bookings which were slightly down on last year but Safari Tours were still holding up well. "I think the slight drop is totally attributable to the down-turn in the British economy and high interest rates and is nothing to do with some of the troubles there have been in the game parks," the spokesman said.

Both Thomas Cook and the Africa Travel Center, said they had received hardly any questions about the safety of the parks from customers.

In West Germany, the picture appeared to be similar with spokesman for the Kenya Tourist Office in Frankfurt, reporting that bookings were also up although he was unable to put an exact figure on the number.

In the United States, the US Travel and Tourist Information Service based in Washington, said they were not able to ascertain as yet whether the numbers travelling to Kenya would be up or down.

The early signs for 1990 are therefore good for Kenya's tourist trade, the country's biggest foreign exchange earner.

Nevertheless, the continuing investigation into Julie Ward's death in the Maasai Mara Game Park and the

subsequent publicity, coupled with Press interest in the continuing poaching, could yet affect this year's figures.

But Kenya is seen as taking serious steps to tackle the difficult problems of poaching in the game parks. In Britain, a lot of publicity was given to President Moi's instructions to game rangers to "shoot on sight", if they encountered poachers as well as the deployment of elite troops in the game parks.

Because of the continuing slaughter of the elephant Kenya also received praise when it joined many of its East African neighbors in calling for a world ban on the ivory trade.

**\* Growing Economic Impact of Tourism Cited**

34000346B Nairobi KENYA TIMES in English  
22 Dec 89 p 6

[Article by Veronica Forwood]

[Text] Kenya will close this year with coffee prices still on the slide but with its number one foreign currency earner, tourism, still buoyant, financial experts said here.

Kenya, along with other producers in the region, has been losing heavily on coffee since the collapse of the international coffee agreement last July.

The price of a 50-kilo (110 pound) bag has fallen by about half, from an average \$150 before the collapse to around \$75 this month.

Finance Minister, George Saitoti, however, has rejected any suggestion that Kenya should reduce its production of coffee, to which some independent analysts accuse it of having an "over-romantic attachment".

"Kenya's experiences of coffee prices over the years has always been one of exposure to fluctuations," he told AFP.

"I might point out that the prices in mid-1987 were very similar to those we are currently experiencing and they rose by about 80 percent over the six-month period thereafter," said Prof Saitoti, who is also Vice-President.

However, he said, Kenya had been "aggressively working towards the diversification of the economy". He pointed out that the value of horticultural export sales had risen from Sh 1,060 million (\$50 million) in 1988 to almost Sh 1,900 million (\$90.4 million) in 1989.

Tourism which this year took over from coffee as top foreign exchange earner, took a minor knock with killings of foreign tourists by poachers in wildlife parks and an inquest verdict on young British woman, Julie Ward, which concluded that her death in a game park last year was murder.

After a mini slump the market rapidly picked up again with the announcement of new security measures and a successful government campaign against poachers.



Tourism Minister Mr Noah Katana Ngala, recently reported that foreign exchange earnings from tourism had topped Sh 6.9 billion (\$328 million) last year. Tourist arrivals had increased from 662,100 in 1987 to 676,900 in 1988 with the 1989 figures set to go higher.

some experts consider the safari holiday already to be at a saturation level, with 10 or more tourist buses circling around one bored-looking lion all too frequent a spectacle.

It has been suggested that the solution may be to sell fewer safaris but at higher prices. Despite heavy development of coastal resorts around the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa, undeveloped coastline is still available.

Kenya, which is heavily dependent on donor money for balance of payments support, will eventually close its massive balance of payment gaps by expanding exports and by an increased flow of foreign private investment, Mr Saitoti predicted.

A far-reaching structural adjustment policy on which Kenya has embarked will "require considerably increased sums of foreign exchange in the short run."

But he said: "I am perfectly satisfied we are on track and that donor support to fill the balance of payment gaps have been very welcome but they are seen neither as a permanent need nor as a hazard to our long term solution."

According to Government figures, the current account deficit, which was 377.9 million dollars in 1988, is projected to hit more than \$476 million for 1989. The trade deficit has more than doubled in three years and rose from \$771.42 million for 1988 to a projected \$1,142.85 million for 1989.

Despite this, Kenya is in general favorably viewed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which in May this year granted 306 million dollars in balance of payments support over three years.

Kenya's steady economic growth—real growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been around five percent in the past few years—has always been seen as under threat from population expansion.

But some modest success has been registered. President Moi said last September that Kenya, with one of the highest population growth rates in the world at 3.7 percent, has recently managed to reduce the number of births per woman from an average of 7.7 to 6.7. The population is estimated at 23 million.

Despite this, the Government's own estimated acknowledge the need to create six million new jobs by the end of the century.

"We regard this as a challenge and not a cause from despair or despondency," Mr Saitoti said, adding: "I am sure it is possible to do this."

He said surveys in both rural and urban areas suggested that policies supporting small scale enterprises in towns and for non-farm rural activity were thriving.

Responding to a question about Nairobi's slums, in which an estimated two thirds of the capital's 1.5 million residents live, Prof Saitoti said: "All nations have slums, that is not to say that we approve them, but that we, like any international metropolis, must face the fact that people the world over suffer from the 'bright lights' phenomenon."—AFP

#### \* Tourism Fueling Growth in Coast Province

34000325B Nairobi KENYA TIMES in English  
12 Dec 89 pp 31, 40

[First paragraph in box]

[Text] Kenneth Mwema traces the development of the port of Mombasa to present day and analyses the impact of the Coast Province's contribution to the economy through cargo handling, agriculture and tourist attractions which have pulled in many visitors.

For the last 26 years the coast Province has witnessed unparalleled growth in various sectors of the economy—an achievement which has mainly depended on the existing peace and tranquility since independence.

The province, once plagued by food shortages, relying entirely on supplies from other parts of Kenya, now confidently strides towards self-sufficiency in Agriculture to meet its needs with surplus for export.

Mombasa is the capital of the province with an estimated population of about 700,000. The town is a beehive of economic activity interlinked to the Mombasa port.

The port is the backbone of the town's commercial success, oiling the wheels of commerce apart from providing employment to 12,000 people.

The port has over the last eleven years, improved and enhanced its cargo handling capacity to efficiently cater for the country's needs and those of her neighbours.

With its history tracing centuries back, the current Kilindini Port was established in 1896 when it was shifted from the current old port to a site more suitable for expansion and handling of larger vessels.

Construction of the first lighterage wharf began at Mbaraki in 1907, followed by construction of loading facilities for soda ash.

The development of the port into its modern state started in 1926, with the completion of the first deep water berth followed by 4 up to berth number 5 supported by double storey transit sheds which were completed in 1931.

An additional facility—an oil berth capable of accommodating the largest tanker then afloat—was completed during the same year and named Shimanzi Oil Terminal.

Construction of two more deep water berths at number seven and eight started in 1942. In order to relieve a sudden increase in shipping and traffic prompted by the outbreak of the Second World War and British naval requirements in the Indian Ocean sector.

These were completed in 1944 followed by another 2 more berths—number 9 and 10 completed in 1958.

Demand for more berths necessitated the extension of the port to mainland Kipevu where berths 11 to 14 were constructed including the Kipevu oil jetty, built in 1963 to accommodate tankers of up to 65,000 tonnes dead-weight.

Other specialised developed facilities included a bulk cement wharf at Mbaraki, a jetty at Shimanzi for loading cased oil and facilities for handling exports of molasses in bulk.

Traffic in the eighties has averaged about 6.9 million tonnes with a peak through-put of 8.4 million tonnes in 1981. At the same time containerisation started gaining momentum globally with a few containers arriving at Mombasa unnotified on general cargo ships.

Due to this new concept in cargo handling, deepwater berths numbers 16 and 17, completed in 1975, were therefore, planned and designed for eventual conversion into container handling berths.

Due to the rapid increase in the amount of containerised cargo, the need to extend container handling facilities up-country during the Nyayo decade became more apparent as soon as the Kipevu terminal was completed.

The Inland Container Depot at Embakasi, Nairobi was commissioned taking dry port facilities into the commercial and administrative capital.

The Inland Container Depot came into full operation on 1 July 1984, at a time when container traffic handled at the port reached a record of 92,461 (Twenty Equivalent Units) TEU's at the end of that year.

In 1987, TEU's handled at Mombasa reached 115,367 which was slightly lower than the 1986 figure of 119,855 TEU's.

As a major seaport, the port has a capacity of handling more than 20 million tonnes of cargo annually depending on the performance of economies of the client countries.

The port also handles transshipment traffic to and from various ports in Eastern Africa. Between 1985 and 1988, transshipment traffic has averaged about 26,000 tonnes per annum although there are adequate facilities for handling greater volumes.

To improve on the capacity and efficiency of Mombasa Port, a number of development projects are scheduled to be undertaken during the 1989/93 plan period.

They include the expansion of the port in the Dongo Kundu area where 3,050 acres in the south mainland have been acquired for new port facilities, mainly for bulk cargo.

Feasibility studies on the project funded by the U.S. government have been done and the final report on the Phase II study is still being awaited.

Development on the project will be undertaken in phases in response to the demand for more port facilities.

Tourism is another major economic activity in the province with about 60 percent of the total hotels in the industry concentrated in the province.

Most of the tourist hotels are located along the azure blue sandy beaches fronting the coastline in Malindi, in the North Coast, Watamu, Diani and Msambweni areas. Others are located within Mombasa where there has been a noticeable development in hotels to cater for businessmen, tourist and conferences.

The sprawling Tsavo National Park in Taita Taveta District, the Shimba Hills Game Reserve and the Mpunguti/Kisite and Malindi Marine National parks are also part of the main attraction attracting tourists mainly from West Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Britain.

Agricultural production has been galloping over the last seven years with bumper crops of staple foods such as maize, casava and beans being reported in the main agricultural areas in the province.

Kwale and Kilifi districts lead in maize production followed by Taita Taveta in beans. While Tana River leads in rice production.

Currently, the province is able to feed its population and sell the surplus to other parts of the country.

Cash crops grown in the province include cashewnuts, cotton, simsim, coconut palm, mangoes, citrus fruits and bananas. There are factories already established to process cashewnuts, simsim, coconuts and fruit.

Due to the intensification in irrigation along the lower basin in the arid and semi-arid areas of the province, agricultural production has been boosted.

Cotton grown under irrigation in Tana River district's Bura and Hola Irrigation Schemes, account for about 30 per cent of the total cotton production in Kenya.

Plans are underway for a major rice irrigation scheme at Garsen to be undertaken by the Tana River and Athi Development Authority (TARDA) which will make the province a major producer of rice.

The rich volcanic soils of Taveta have ensured abundant production of food crops which have made the weekly Taveta markets a must for traders from other parts of the republic.

The Government has invested large sums of money in the construction of roads and bridges in the province to provide easy access to all parts of the province.

During the last 11 years, two key bridges—the New Nyali Bridge and the Mtwapa Bridge have been completed, providing an important link to the North Coast. The Moi International Airport, Mombasa, and the Malindi Airport were also expanded.

Construction work on the New Kilifi Bridge and the Garsen Bridge across the River Tana are underway. The Garsen Bridge is expected to be completed by the end of this year while the Kilifi Bridge will be completed by the end of 1991.

With such a rapid growth attained over the period, Coast Province shows signs of playing a significant role in the country's economic future.

### Tanzania

#### \* Officials Dissociate 'Ujamaa' From Marxism

34000339 Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN  
NEWSLETTER  
in English 13 Jan 90 p 5

[Text] During a student debate which took place at the end of December at Kivukoni College in Dar es Salaam, the Secretary General of the CCM (Ghana Cha Hapinduzi (Revolutionary Party), Rashidi Kawawa said that Ujamaa—the Tanzanian cooperative system—had its roots in African tradition and was based on the Arusha Declaration, thus it had nothing to do with Marxism or socialism. Commenting the recent events affecting Eastern Europe, Rashidi Kawawa said "our socialism originates from the declaration which we formulated ourselves without any foreign influence."

Visiting Kivukoni College a few days later, was Ngombale Mwiru, head of ideology, policy and education within the CCM. He considered the situation in Eastern Europe showed "democracy and socialism should not be separated." He added that the party was setting up work committees to try to make an in-depth analysis of the changes taking place in Eastern Europe.

Rashidi Kawawa and Ngombale Mwiru's declarations reflect the concerns of the CCM in the face of the downfall of the communist regimes with which Tanzania has maintained close links. The Tanzanian press has published articles and numerous letters from readers wondering what lessons Tanzania can learn from these upheavals. A debate was even organized on the subject at Dar es Salaam University.

The "left" wing of the Party has tried to show that perestroika in fact strengthened socialism while the liberals have been drawing the opposite conclusions from the same events. The next Party session, due in February, may end, after fierce debate, to the re-orientation of Tanzanian politics. Although some party members consider that Cuba, North Korea or China may still be taken as models, others would like to see more efforts being poured into the creation of an "African socialism." If this notion is taken up, it will require alterations to be made to the Arusha declaration and to the Party's programme.

### Uganda

#### \* Country's Economic Problems Highlighted

34000344A Kampala THE STAR in English  
2 Jan 90 p 3

[Text] The economic problems ambushing this once rich country have almost become heavyweight amidst debt servicing, drastic fall in coffee prices and slow capital inflow, rising costs of petroleum products and inflation which still renders the Uganda Shilling a laughing stock from within and out.

The two are starving on food prices though food is abundant in some rural areas and agricultural produce rot in shambas.

The produce cannot reach the market due to lack of effective transportation and also due to delayed payments. Some roads are still in a sorry state due to time—long neglect while the vehicles which ply them are off the road most times for they need maintenance.

"Magendo—black marketeering and smuggling is not withstanding alive and doing well. What the government ought to do is to balance commodity shortfalls to ensure that prices do not go through the roof making the sky the only limit.

Special Import Programme (SIP, II) a polite name for government business was greatly hoped to influence pricing for 1989/90 fiscal year. Now that the SIP II is nonoperational, if there is a need for resurrection to SIP III, the Minister will need to call for stricter control and discourage subversive activities among the economic financial and business parties involved in SIP III.

Government badly needs money if some of its ambitious targets are to succeed. The question of production equally continues to be important on the agenda as reflected in 1989/90 financial budget.

Another eclipse in production process is the delaying tactics by the managers of desired projects; lateness in acquiring capital and projects reason: lack of data and seriousness, persistent economic constraints and stringent donor-recipient relations.



The above bear testimony to the fact that dependence of Ugandan economy on coffee is substantial. The government therefore needs to diversify not only its own source of revenue but also the source of export earnings; manufacturing sector could play a large role in the future.

The 1988/89 agricultural year was on a whole a good one. The weather was favorable and fish protein production and consumption increased. The war situation in the North and East of the country served to depress the output somewhat.

The history of exchange rates and devaluation of the Ugandan shilling has always been a windy one since 1971.

On May 15, 1987, a new shilling equivalent to Shs 100 (old currency) was introduced for the period beginning October 1975 through May 1981, the shilling was pegged to the SDR; and the shilling/dollar rate was calculated by the Central Bank based on this relationship.

However, owing to timing differences, the cross rate between the SDR and the US dollar for the shilling was not always exact. The consumer price index used to calculate the index of real effective exchange rate for the period through 1981 is largely estimated.

On May 15, 1987 the official exchange rate stood at Shs 60 (new currency) against 1 US dollar. Later on the shilling was devalued to Shs 150 against the dollar in July 1988. In December 1988 the official exchange rate fell to Shs 165.

In the period beginning March 1989, there was a devaluation which put the shilling at Shs 200 to the dollar. On October 24, another devaluation put the shilling at Shs 340. Hardly a month after that, the shilling dropped further to Shs 370 to 1 US dollar, which is still operative today.

On the political front, the Political School at Kyankwanzi still continue to pass graduates for politization process in departments and to preach to Wananchi the gospel truth of NRM [National Resistance Movement] government. The Parliament (NRC [National Resistance Council] is broadbased and acting a pivot role albeit the large membership cabinet. But NRM political line is very unpredictable especially when different NRM lords pronounce contrasting statements. It seems NRM and government have no spokesman.

President Yoweri Museveni has always, minding of tomorrow's nation and generation emphasized the need for increased research, science, and technology in homes, schools and industrial production. Against this background, Mbarara University of Science and Technology has been born to spearhead this will power of our fatherly President.

While economic and financial indicators don't tell of best results the NRA [National Resistance Army] on the other hand is now a productive army as they say in their construction unit—"We build and defend." The army

farms, construction units, NEC and others are sound example of NRA efforts to feed itself, help itself and the nation.

The making of a new constitution for the nation by 1995 is high on the agenda. The constitution commissioners have finished going around the country's 34 districts to get different opinions of new constitutions and governments.

But there is passiveness and doubt in some people whether the new constitution can do any better for the country.

The rebels, the exiles and refugees are not represented. The question to ask is that won't this growing up clamor that there are no part of this formulations: in the constitution to be, who will be and will not be a Ugandan?

#### \* Nation's Unemployment Problem Analyzed

34000344B Kampala *FINANCIAL TIMES* in English  
22 Dec 89 p 5

[Text] Despite the employment opportunities in our economies, many are still unemployed and yet in Western countries, a government could lose their vote due to failure to provide employment for its people.

Presenting a paper on the employment constraints in Uganda at a seminar on Uganda Economy last week, the Chairman of the Federation of Ugandan Employers Mr Abaliwano cited the major constraints and tried to identify the steps taken to solve the bad situation.

In the case of Uganda which is rated among the non-monetized economies; that basically depends on Agricultural Mr Abaliwano advised the government to direct most of its resources to this sector. It is sad to note that despite 90 percent of the population living in rural areas; Agriculture cannot substantially cater for this percentage.

The system of education and training has also contributed to unemployment. In Uganda today; a greater part of unemployment arises out of the prevailing system of education. The education and training received is not sufficient to satisfactorily prepare recipients for employment. Alternatively the sort of institutions that train for new challenges to be faced are the vocational training institutions.

Mr Abaliwano also lamented the widely practiced discrimination in labor market; especially against women.

About only 1/3 of the labor force are women. This has been aggravated by the men not allowing women to operate independently of them. Until women get into the business community rather than being servants of men; the economy will not take off.

Ugandan women are trying to redress the situation in all fields; of which so on the results will be positive.



Mr Abaliwano went at length to elaborate the strategy of the NRM government towards creation of employment opportunities.

The government has come up with the overall expansion of the economy changing it from a traditional approach to a more dynamic one.

Finally, Mr Abaliwano was optimistic that the Barter System, which has been introduced in the economy, will result in increased economic activity; for creation of employment "The public sector is also expected to diversify its activities for areas run by private sectors" he stressed.

**\* Domestic, Regional Policy Since De Klerk Analyzed**

34000365A Harare SOUTHERN AFRICA POLITICAL & ECONOMIC MONTHLY in English Dec 89/Jan 90 pp 3-9

[Article by the Center for African Studies, Maputo]

[Text] Of central importance for the goals of peace, security and development in southern Africa is the domestic and regional policies of South Africa. The objective of this article is to briefly describe and analyse the changes in South Africa since F. W. de Klerk assumed the presidency on August 14.

What are the positions of the various actors? What factors and dynamics on the domestic, regional and international level enter into the equation? Which steps have been taken by the government, how have they been justified and what do they imply? Are the changes indicative of political goodwill and qualitative change within the National Party [NP] or are they simply the result of increased internal and external pressure? What is the best path to be followed by the international community in order to support real change and further the objectives of the democratic forces inside South Africa?

**Background to the Current Actions of the de Klerk Regime**

Much conventional analysis of the policies of the de Klerk regime is based on assessments of de Klerk's own personality or character traits (which are often contrasted to those of his predecessor, P. W. Botha) and/or speculation about his own subjective intentions. Not only are such approaches methodologically shallow and inadequate, they also fail to grasp the significance of the most important dynamics of the current situation in South and southern Africa.

Although de Klerk has a reputation for pragmatism and is not closely linked to the parallel structure of military-dominated administration which was developed under P. W. Botha, he is in fact a rather cautious and conservative figure who comes from the centre right of the governing National Party (NP). His entire political career, like that of his predecessors, has been devoted to defending the philosophy, system and institutions of apartheid. In particular, de Klerk has acquired a reputation as one of the most dedicated defenders of racially exclusive "own affairs" political structures. The change in leadership in the apartheid state has thus not led to the rise of a figure any less dedicated than his predecessors to the defence of the essentials of the apartheid system. The main significance of de Klerk's rise to power rather lies in the changed objective circumstances in which he has taken over and in the potentially different response of the regime he leads to the pressures generated by these circumstances.

De Klerk's accession to the leadership of the apartheid state took place against the background of the emergence

of important new realities in the regional, domestic and international terrains of struggle. Among the most important of these were:

- The military setbacks at Cuito Cuanavale, which highlighted the limitations of militaristic aggression as a means of guaranteeing long-term security for apartheid;
- The failure of both "Total Strategy" and its successor WHAT ("Winning Hearts and Minds") to create a new supportive alliance capable of resolving the domestic crisis of apartheid, as well as the gradual withering away of white political cohesion concerning what the future path of South Africa should be;
- The growing pressures of international isolation, and most particularly the effects of South Africa's exclusion from the "normal facilities" of international financial markets on the South African economy; and
- The changing international environment, resulting particularly from the adoption of the policies of glasnost, perestroika and "new thinking" in the Soviet Union. This has led to growing cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West in seeking "political solutions to regional conflicts". There is also in the West a growth in anti-apartheid sentiment.

Even before de Klerk took over, it had become clear that these "new realities" had congealed to produce new objective circumstances which the authorities in Pretoria could not ignore. The military option in Angola had become extremely costly in military, political and economic terms. Pretoria's known involvement in destabilisation elsewhere in the region, and most notably in Mozambique, was threatening to become costly diplomatically and ideologically, and this was threatening to increase South Africa's international isolation at precisely a moment when economic pressures dictated the necessity for a major effort to reduce this isolation. At the same time, the regime needed space, time and degree of legitimacy to tackle the question of how to proceed with domestic restructuring given the growing recognition that neither "Total Strategy" nor WHAT were capable of producing a viable solution to the continuing crisis of apartheid.

However, while most of the above described "new realities" can be recognised as setbacks or at least barriers to Pretoria's militarism, it is necessary to recognise that they did not constitute decisive defeats. It was not, therefore, a question of Pretoria simply surrendering, but of adapting its policies to take account of changes brought about by the "new realities". The new international conjuncture, in particular, is not wholly unfavourable from Pretoria's point of view. While glasnost, perestroika and "new thinking" had undermined Pretoria's capacity to capitalise on the previous ready identification of "regional conflicts" in East-West terms, the new conjuncture also held out new opportunities for Pretoria to reduce its isolation through gaining acceptability as a negotiating partner and factor in the search for a "political solution" to the conflict in southern Africa.

The de Klerk regime can essentially be identified as being drawn from forces within the National Party which see the need not only to adapt to these new realities but also to try to maximise the potential advantages opened up by the new terrain. The Botha regime had come to power in 1978 as an alliance between the military and Afrikaner monopoly capital. As its original "Total Strategy" fell into total disarray, it fell back increasingly on militaristic policies managed by the "securocrats" of the National Security Management System (NSMS). Relations with monopoly capital became increasingly strained. Although the "securocrats" remain a powerful force within the institutions of the apartheid state, the leading figures within the de Klerk regime have not had a strong association with the institutions of the NSMS. In a context where militaristic policies are seen not to have been a great success, the "securocrats" appear no longer to have the same preponderant influence in the formulation of strategy as they had under Botha. At the same time, significant effort is clearly being devoted to repairing strained relations with monopoly capital. This reflects itself in such things as the new dynamic which the de Klerk regime has given to the privatisation programme. A prominent business, Wim de Villiers, was appointed by de Klerk to manage the sell-off of state corporations to the "private sector". The regime's privatisation programme is clearly intended to achieve more than merely rebuilding links with monopoly capital. It is intended to reduce the public debt and the burden of debt service in the state budget; to raise funds for "upgrading programmes" in selected townships as part of the effort to "win heads and minds"; and to create a new fait accompli which would limit the options available to any new government to bring about transformation in the economic system. Nevertheless, the privatisation does offer a number of bargain buys to monopoly capital and is thus welcomed by this social force. Wim de Villiers is also heading a major review of economic policy, which is expected to lead to the introduction of a number of measures called for by "Big Business"—including possibly a reduction of state expenditure.

The de Klerk regime appears to have recognised that there will be no solution to the continuing crisis of apartheid without some credible process of constitutional negotiation. It also seems to have recognised that it has no chance of achieving this unless it makes at least some gesture in the direction of the well established demands of the democratic movement to first create a climate conducive to negotiation by, inter alia, releasing political prisoners, unbanning banned political organisations, ending the state of emergency etc. This does not, of course, mean that the regime has come to accept the positions of the democratic forces on these questions. Much of the current rhetoric and ideology of the de Klerk regime depends on attaching a very different meaning to the same language and terminology as its opponents.

While all sides accept in principle the possibility of a negotiated settlement to the crisis of apartheid, the issue

of who will negotiate with whom, over what and under what circumstances remains contested terrain. The way these questions are answered would of course significantly shape the outcome of any negotiating process which would emerge. The de Klerk regime's major initiatives in the struggle to define the terrain of future constitutional negotiations appear largely to have been directed at an international rather than a domestic audience. In this respect it appears to be hoping to substitute the domestic legitimacy which its plans continue to lack with a measure of international acceptance in the expectation that this will lead to overwhelming pressure on the national liberation movement to accept a deal within parameters acceptable to the regime. To do this, as indicated above, the regime appears to have recognised the need to make some concessions—to make a tactical retreat on some issues.

#### Official and Semi-Official Positions of the Main Actors

##### The de Klerk Regime

The above line of argument can be illustrated by examining the five-year Action Plan adopted by the NP as an election platform in the September whites-only election. This plan entails certain re-formulations of Botha's "reformed apartheid" project, accompanied by a rhetorical shift which proclaims the regime's intention to eliminate apartheid and white minority domination. The plan speaks of:

- Setting up institutions in which leaders of all groups can participate in the creation of a new constitution (National Council, great Indaba),
- Possible acceptance of a Bill of Rights in a new constitution,
- Possible de-criminalisation of the Group Areas Act,
- Greater emphasis on freedom of association and disassociation in ethnic group formation (e.g., the formation of an open race group characterised by voluntary association), and
- A reassessment of the functions and power of the head of state and the manner of his election.

Despite some new elements, a close reading of the Five-Year Plan and an analysis of official statements made later leads to the conclusion that the plan in its essentials sticks to the policy of the Botha government. Entrenched racial and ethnic group divisions remain the key to the NP's outlook for the future. The complicated distinctions on the composition and decision-making principles of various proposed "own affairs" and "general affairs" bodies as well as the proposed "unique system of democracy not based on numbers" but on "power sharing" and "concurrent majorities" in general serve the purpose of securing overall white dominance. Whites will be able to veto almost any change not to its liking. The new elements thus represent quantitatives, and not qualitative shifts.

Instead of addressing the main issue, Pretoria enmeshes itself in a twisted constitutional rhetoric which offers a

first class "collector's item for students of bizarre constitutions" as the South African political scientist David Welsh recently put it. The Five-Year Plan is thus not a workable proposal to end the race and class conflict in South Africa. If de Klerk sticks by it, he again positions himself as a man of the past. The NP plan represents phony political participation and one-sided power distribution with respect to the socio-economic transformation of apartheid. It may even produce more instability, in that it gives certain de jure political participation to the black majority, while de facto continuing to deny it real influence.

The positive element in the latest developments is that the regime, or parts of it, may have come to the conclusion that there is no solution to the South African crisis without the ANC and that it is necessary to involve the liberation movement in the process of negotiating a new constitution. This is not unambiguous, however. For example, the regime would probably like to see the ANC split and deal with a truncated ANC as one of several negotiating partners. However, the regime is interested in dialogue and thus follows the example set by other representatives of the white community (there have been over 30 meetings between the ANC and South African whites since late 1985). Another sign is the, albeit selective, lack of punitive action against certain activities linked to the recent defiance campaign. A third sign is the hints that the ANC does not need to renounce violence in order to be unbanned and participate in negotiations. They should instead, according to the regime, commit themselves to peaceful negotiations and solutions. The struggle between the apartheid regime and the liberation movement has thus taken on the dimension of being an overt struggle for political legitimacy, initially about who has the more convincing negotiating formula to offer.

#### The Liberation Movement

The ANC, as leader of the liberation movement, sees negotiations as a process in which the major protagonists—the national liberation movement and the mass democratic movement [MDM], on the one hand, and the apartheid regime, on the other, seek an agreement on the terms to end their conflict. The ANC's position is that it is in principle willing to seek a negotiated solution, but insists that any negotiation should have as the objective "the transformation of our country into a united and non-racial democracy". Moreover, before negotiations can take place, a climate conducive to negotiations would first have to be created.

On the future, the ANC has issued a tentative proposal of constitutional guidelines and, more recently, a detailed plan for settling the conflict in South Africa. This plan has been endorsed by the OAU [Organization of African Unity] and the Non-Aligned Movement. The key elements of these proposals are:

- Any process of negotiation should have as its objective the ending of apartheid and the establishment in

South Africa of a non-racial and democratic system of government;

- Any decision to participate in a process of negotiation should be taken by the people themselves through a process of democratic consultation and debate;
- The above implies the necessity to create a climate conducive to negotiation by normalising political life through the following measures: the unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees; lifting the state of emergency; the unbanning of all banned organisations; repealing all repressive legislation and withdrawing the army and the police from the townships mentioned above; and
- The existing regime should be recognised as an interested party in the negotiations. This means that the existing regime and its agencies cannot manage the transition process; a cease-fire should be negotiated at which time an acceptable interim transitional government will be established.

The above constitutes what the ANC considers to be the principles for serious negotiations. These positions and proposals are supported by the mass democratic movement and other forces for change inside South Africa as well as by the key international actors, such as the Frontline States, the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations as well as by the USA and the UK.

#### Other Important Domestic Actors

While the positions of the de Klerk regime, on the one hand, and of the national liberation movement and the MDM, on the other, represent the most significant alternatives on the contested terrain of negotiation politics, a number of other forces inside South Africa have adopted positions on this issue. At the one extreme, the PAC [Pan Africanist Congress] and Black Consciousness tradition has declared that any negotiation at this stage would be a sell-out. Inkatha, on the other hand, after vacillating for years on this issue, has finally declared itself willing to participate in a negotiation process. It has said that its ideal is a united, non-racial South Africa, but that it is willing to contemplate a compromise formula which results in less than this. However, this gesture comes at a time when it is increasingly becoming recognised within the dominant classes that a deal with Buthelezi and other similar forces will not be sufficient to resolve the crisis of apartheid. At the same time, Buthelezi's base is being significantly undermined by the recruitment of a number of chiefs in the Zululand area to the MDM-affiliated Congress of traditional leaders of South Africa (Contralesa). Buthelezi's marginal importance in this process is reflected in the relatively lukewarm response of the regime to Inkatha's announcement and in the increasingly erratic behaviour by Buthelezi (who is currently involved in a legal action after making a crude slur against the Transkei leader, Bantu Holomisa).

Developments in the other bantustans also provide an interesting index of the extent to which a polarisation is



taking place around the two major positions. The Transkei military leader has met with the ANC, allowed the burial of the late paramount chief of the Tembus and ANC member Sabata Dalindyebo, indicated he may unban the ANC, and submitted the OAU document on negotiation for discussion by the Transkei cabinet. The Ciskei regime, which remains one of Pretoria's closest clients, is showing signs of increasing instability and members of its security forces have been quoted in the press publicly predicting a coup.

Within "white politics" the far right is evidently unhappy about the trend of recent developments, but has thus far confined its reaction to verbal criticism and implicit threats. The possibility of far right terrorist action sometime in the future cannot, however, be ruled out. The SADF (South African Defense Forces) and, more particularly, the Police also appear to be somewhat disconcerted by recent developments. The decision to allow protests to take place was apparently only taken after a heated 8-hour debate in the State Security Council during which de Klerk overrode the advice of the securocrats not to permit these protests to take place. Brigadier Leon Mellet of the Security Police also made it clear in public that he was not happy with the decision to allow the rally in Soweto on October 29 to take place. At the moment, however, the securocrats do not have a viable alternative to offer, whereas de Klerk's policies do seem to be making some headway in reducing South Africa's international isolation. The situation is, nevertheless, pregnant with the possibility that in a future crisis the security forces might decide to act on their own, possibly reinforcing a right-wing terrorist backlash.

#### Important International Actors

The Commonwealth at its meeting in Kuala Lumpur took the decision to give the de Klerk government six months to show clear and irreversible change or there will be more sanctions. Meanwhile, existing sanctions are maintained.

In the USA, President Bush is against more sanctions since, he argues, it would threaten the process of change currently underway. However, new punitive measures will be considered if no legislative action (e.g., a repeal of the Group Areas Act) has occurred by June 1990. Bush is prepared to abstain from vetoing further sanctions bills if substantial change has not come about. The Bush Administration has also said that a dialogue between the regime and various representatives of the black majority should be preceded by 1) liberation of all political prisoners, 2) the return of political exiles, 3) an end to the state of emergency, 4) all political parties should be allowed free activity, and 5) an end to violence.

Up to now, the USA has largely accepted Britain's leading role in coordinating Western policy on South Africa. However, there are signs that the Bush Administration is reviewing this situation and may assume an increasingly independent role. This is partly linked to Mrs Thatcher's increasingly isolated and erratic stance.

Britain's position is essentially less demanding on the Pretoria regime than that of the USA. It appears to be influential within the EC, however. A meeting of the EC foreign ministers in July saw the adoption of proposals by Britain to refuse total sanctions and to downgrade the preconditions identified by the EC as essential for a dialogue to just one point—the release of Nelson Mandela.

The Soviet Union's position remains in many ways fluid and still open to debate. In general terms, Soviet policy seeks a "political solution" to the conflict in South Africa as it does in other Third World conflicts. What this means in practical terms is a matter of debate. Officially, the USSR supports the demands of the ANC and the OAU on the climate for negotiations and the USSR accepts the right of peoples to define their own methods of struggle, including armed struggle. However, a number of figures within the USSR have expressed various doubts about armed struggle and indicated some desire to see more gestures in the direction of accommodating demands of the white minority. At all events, Soviet policy currently differs in a quantitative, rather than a qualitative sense from that of a number of Western powers and there is an increasing dialogue between the Soviets and the West which has resulted in the identification of a common position on a number of issues.

#### Conclusions

The political concessions and other measures taken by the South African government since de Klerk came to power do not in themselves offer a basis for analysing the current political processes in South Africa. Rather, they have come about as a result of various factors and dynamics at the national, regional and international level and can only be understood and interpreted with those factors and dynamics in mind.

The present climate appears to favour negotiations both to the conflict between apartheid and the forces of liberation inside South Africa and to the other conflicts in the region caused by apartheid South Africa. Whether negotiations lead to a political solution to the domestic and regional conflicts or to the continuation of apartheid domination in another form depends on what type of negotiation, with whom and in what climate. The crucial question is of course whether there is a new thinking within the apartheid regime which reflects qualitative changes in the subjective views of the decision-makers or whether the measures result from changes in the objective circumstances in which political decisions are made. The CEA [UN Economic Commission for Africa] agrees with most observers in concluding that there has been no fundamental shift in the basic and consistent objectives of the apartheid regime, that is, the aim is still to safeguard political and economic power in the hands of the white minority and maintain a position of regional hegemony in economic and security matters.

The main conclusion, then, is that the present political concessions made by the NP government in South Africa should be interpreted as tactical retreats and political and diplomatic manoeuvres in order to buy enough time to find a solution which guarantees the continuation of white political and economic domination despite the changes that have occurred in the balance of forces. The need for such manoeuvres has been brought about by the "new realities" mentioned under item Background...

Promises of detente, dialogue and negotiations are not new features in South African politics. When under pressure in the past, the apartheid regime has on several occasions turned to such policies in order to buy time and ward off internal or external pressure. This has never meant a change in overall objectives—the goals have remained the same. What has changed has been the precise mix and timing of various "carrot and/or stick" instruments to achieve these goals, especially with respect to regional policy. But the manoeuvring space has constantly narrowed and history may not necessarily repeat itself for ever and ever. On the domestic level, the manoeuvring space of F. W. de Klerk is such that words need to be followed by action of some kind. On the level of regional policy, at least some South African officials now begin to recognise that destabilisation has exacerbated, rather than reduced the threat to white power. Destabilisation has been a rational and cost-effective strategy to defend white domination and achieve certain aims with respect to the policies of some neighbouring countries, there is no doubt about that. But there are basic contradictions in such a strategy: it is a defensive strategy aimed at buying time—it does not offer any solution to the basic problems of domestic legitimacy and external pressures.

Inside South Africa there are currently two main projects facing each other. One is the reformed apartheid project of the NP government as expressed in the Five-Year Action Plan, e.g., a project aimed at maintaining race group classification as the key instrument in the political and economic affairs of the country and guarantee that ultimate political and economic control continues to rest with the white minority. The other is the project of the liberation movement and the mass democratic movement, e.g., a unitary, non-racial, democratic South Africa where universal suffrage determines the distribution of political power.

Despite the heavy-handed repression during the latter half of the 1980s, the balance of forces has constantly shifted in favour of the democratic forces. Promises and empty words no longer satisfy international opinion. The organisational capability and commitment of the forces for liberation has proven strong enough to survive the concerted assault of the regime since 1984. The impact of internal and external pressure (limited as the latter may be) is beginning to be seriously felt inside South Africa, both in economic and political terms. This, more than anything else, has brought about the moderate concessions so far made by the de Klerk government. These concessions represent an attempt at regaining the

strategic initiative definitely lost by the Botha government in the mid-1980s. De Klerk and the people close to him appear to have concluded that the new realities described above make it necessary to enter into some form of credible negotiations with the ANC on a new constitution.

What we witness at the moment is a cautious jockeying for positions of the two main opposing internal forces. Both sides try to advance their positions and respective strategies in a complex gameplan in which both the apartheid regime and the forces of liberation seek to turn the confrontation into a political contest, while at the same time trying to maintain support from their respective constituencies, gain support from new ones and satisfy the expectations of international opinion.

For de Klerk and the NP this implies a delicate balance between the necessity of a hard-pressed government to demonstrate a willingness to end apartheid (without really relinquishing overall white domination) and the fears of the consequences—domestic in particular, but also international—arising out of concessions thus made. This is very difficult: each concession, however small, implies a de-legitimation of apartheid and a legitimisation and strengthening of the democratic forces. Each concession reneged implies a risk for increased external pressure. The capacity of the regime to control such a process and come to a final result to its liking is very small and it can therefore be expected that the regime will raise various obstacles whenever the process takes an unwanted turn.

The new realities thus brought about on the regional and international level are not necessarily, however, all negative to Pretoria. The regime has involved its diplomats in various negotiations in order to substitute some endorsement by the region and the international community for its lack of domestic legitimacy. Through maximum utilisation of its current international goodwill (after the Namibia Accord and the substitution of F. W. de Klerk for P. W. Botha as State President), South Africa is currently using diplomatic and economic action to gain tacit support for three of its currently most important regional policy objectives:

- Breaking out of the international isolation through an acceptance of its "constructive" political role as a regional peacemaker,
- Gaining greater access to the regional markets by promoting itself as the regional economic powerhouse through which the region can be economically "re-stabilised", and
- Win regional and international endorsement for the modified "internal reform" programme of the NP and thus ward off further sanctions.

A central aim of current strategy is to win sufficient international support to pressure the ANC, the democratic movement and the FLS [Frontline States] to accept major concessions as the price for some measure of peace and stability.

There is no single inevitable future for South Africa or for the region. Rather, several possible scenarios exist and are being struggled for by different forces. Which of them materialises in practice will depend on the strategies pursued by the various national, regional and extra-regional forces involved.

The range of possible scenarios is to a large extent shaped by the balance of forces in the major conflict—that between apartheid and the forces of liberation inside South Africa. The new realities in South and southern Africa has widened the range of possible near-term scenarios. However, apartheid South Africa remains a powerful economic and military force and, whereas, the new South African government talks about profound domestic change, it has also firmly rejected the prospect of a system of universal franchise in a unitary state. On the other hand, the transition to a phase of regional relations involving some element of dialogue between Pretoria and its neighbours has, as noted, opened up a new terrain with certain possibilities for the Western powers. These factors also have to be taken into account in considering the range of possible scenarios in the region in the immediate future. Below follows some assumptions concerning the international, regional and domestic domain which are likely to influence future scenarios:

- The conflicts in South and southern Africa will not be considered sufficiently important by the superpowers to provoke large-scale military intervention, either directly or indirectly;
- The superpowers and other major powers with interests in the region will continue to favour a non-revolutionary transition to democracy in South Africa. Keeping South Africa and the region safe for capitalism will continue to be a fundamental objective to the Western powers;
- South Africa's external trade and financial linkages, as well as its economic growth will continue to be hampered by internal political opposition and external action, sanctions in particular;
- South Africa's neighbours will continue to be willing to offer substantial concessions with respect to both their economic links with South Africa and their domestic socio-economic development projects as long as they can see light at the end of the tunnel;
- The goal of FLS/SADCC [Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference] diplomacy will remain to raise the costs to Pretoria of continuing its destabilisation, bring about a withdrawal from such policies and thus secure their national independence and create conditions for economic recovery. There is also, among the FLS/SADCC member states, an interest in exploring whether the new realities are conducive to some form of negotiated solution to the problems of apartheid's elimination;
- There is widespread dissent within South Africa's white population—a dissent that covers the entire South African political spectrum. This dissent will grow further as the extreme right with its socially and

geographically limited support base finds its breathing space further diminished and as the more powerful interests linked to monopoly capital find the prospects for capital accumulation and economic growth hampered by apartheid and the external reaction against it;

- The ruling National Party strata is also likely to become further divided. Such divisions within the ruling bureaucracy, paired with a split white political constituency as a whole, will make it very difficult to formulate a long-term strategy and mobilise the resources required to support it. The capacity of the regime to control events is likely to diminish; and
- The leadership of the ANC and the mass democratic movement will continue to be disposed towards conciliation, at least until all attempts at a negotiated transformation to democracy have been proven futile.

On the basis of these assumptions at least three future scenarios can be envisaged: 1) reformed apartheid or power sharing without a transfer of power, 2) power sharing after a transfer of power, and 3) non-racial democracy. Below follows a brief description of these internal scenarios and their implications for the region as a whole.

#### Reformed Apartheid

This is the domestic scenario currently envisaged by the de Klerk government. It is based on the Action Plan of the NP and has been further elaborated upon in various official statements. This falls well short of a post-apartheid solution since its basic objective is to preserve, and not eliminate the basic pillars of the apartheid system. This scenario could have at least three different impacts on the region as a whole, depending on the balance of forces.

The first possible regional "sub-scenario" would emerge if South Africa succeeded in using the current diplomatic and economic openings to significantly reduce its international isolation and obtain a degree of international endorsement for its "reformed apartheid" programme. If these objectives were to be realised, a greater convergence between South African and Western policy could be expected around a project seeking to "re-stabilise" the region under South African hegemony. This could lead to Western participation in joint ventures with South Africa channelling aid and investment into projects which would tend to strengthen rather than lessen ties of dependence. Such a strategy has been elaborated in South Africa and tentatively named "Marshall Plan" for southern Africa. This scenario implies that the West closes its eyes to the crisis of apartheid inside South Africa and to apartheid's role as the root cause of conflict on the regional level or, alternatively, believes that the newly elected white minority government and its State President somehow will seriously involve itself in negotiations leading to its elimination from political power.

At the security level, this scenario would initially imply some withdrawal from certain forms of destabilisation.



However, since the crisis of apartheid would remain essentially unresolved, a strong impulse towards seeking to export the crisis of apartheid to the region would remain—especially at moments when the domestic crisis of apartheid was felt most intensely. A completely unilateral abandonment of “war by proxy” by South Africa would be extremely unlikely, although cycles of ups and downs in such support would be possible. Any more permanent reduction in the level of destabilisation would probably continue to depend on acceptance by a victim state of some form of “Pax Pretoriana” terms. That is to say a measure of peace (in the sense of absence of war) could be bought, but at the cost of significant concessions to South African demands. This would imply severe constraints on the capacity to assert real independence. For the region, this scenario would also mean that the apartheid regime could acquire the resources to overcome its current military and financial vulnerabilities.

A second possible regional sub-scenario would result from an early collapse of Pretoria's current diplomatic/economic-orientated approach to the region. If this were to occur, and there was not sufficient international pressure to render the costs prohibitive, a rapid return to the cycle of escalating regional aggression could be expected. There could, however, be certain changes in the selection of the major targets of destabilisation, with Zimbabwe and an independent Namibia coming in for more attention. For Mozambique, such a scenario would mean not only the continuation of the bandit war, but also the possibility that Zimbabwe finds itself so tied down by destabilisation at home that it is obliged to reduce its commitment to Mozambique.

A third sub-scenario would be that the momentum of changes in the international system and new regional realities succeeds in continuing to restrain those in Pretoria favouring militaristic options, while not capitulating to the strategies of South Africa's diplomats or allowing apartheid to break out of its international isolation. Such a scenario would amount to keeping destabilisation at bay, while simultaneously keeping apartheid weak. Undiminished or increased international pressure is central to this scenario. For the independent states of southern Africa as a whole, such a scenario would open up a certain space for the advance of SADCC projects currently blocked by destabilisation. It would also be conducive to the role SADCC plays in the strategic planning of the major Western powers. It would enable the anti-apartheid struggle to derive maximum benefit from the new regional conjuncture, while minimising the openings created for the apartheid regime to overcome its current economic and military vulnerabilities.

Identifying the third as the scenario preferred by the FLS and SADCC member states is relatively straightforward. It is, however, the alternative which requires the most skilled diplomacy and the most active and carefully formulated strategy. This will have to be rooted in a recognition that success depends on being able to force

South Africa to respond to proposals from the region (or from extra-regional interests), rather than the other way around. It implies an element of dialogue with Pretoria which does not spill over into legitimisation of Pretoria's policies and objectives. It implies the formulation of policies on economic interaction which not simply offer an open door for South African capital, but seek to obtain the best terms possible in relations which remain unavoidable and allow other forms of economic cooperation where this is compatible with national and regional plans and priorities. It implies continuing to locate the central focus of regional economic policy firmly within the SADCC perspective of reducing historical ties of dependence on South Africa. Such strategy formulation should, in our view, be based on the insight that the present South African government is profoundly intransigent on the key issue: it is neither interested in abandoning white minority rule nor is it interested in any form of serious power sharing. The offering of carrots by extra-regional forces is therefore as counterproductive now as it was in the past. Further progress depends on increasing, rather than decreasing external pressure.

The reformed apartheid scenario and its three regional sub-scenarios have one thing in common: they describe a situation still profoundly characterised by the struggle to maintain or end apartheid. The other two possible domestic scenarios refer to situations in which there has been more substantial change in either the political or socio-economic pillars of apartheid.

#### **Power-Sharing After a Transfer of Power**

This scenario could, albeit somewhat over-simplified, be described as the project of South African “Big Business”, with support of foreign financial and monopoly capital interests. The central trademark of various proposals along the lines of “power-sharing after a transfer of power” is that qualitative changes must take place in the political system—with some proposals suggesting the total elimination of racist minority rule—but with simultaneous restrictions built into the constitution and elsewhere (the current process of large-scale privatisation can in part be seen as an example of such restrictions) in order to limit the capacity of a new government to bring about changes in the restructuring of the South African economy.

While having many characteristics in common, proposals along these lines also display important differences which must be taken into account in assessing the impact of such a scenario on the regional level. For example, it is not clear whether this scenario will lead to a “power-sharing, general affairs government” and a system of “own affairs” ethnic bodies or just a single parliament or assembly. An imposed power-sharing arrangement against the wishes of the majority may not bring about an end to destabilisation, as can be remembered from the Smith-Muzorewa government in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. Another important issue is whether or not such a government will want to assess itself as a regional power. If such a position is sought, then it can be

expected that the government will want to maintain existing patterns of subordination and domination in the region. A passive approach on the issue of regional economic transformation will similarly tend to reinforce existing patterns, while at the same time it can be expected that international support for SADCC—and perhaps also internal SADCC cohesion—will diminish given that apartheid has been abolished.

#### **Non-Racial Democracy**

This is the scenario of the various organisations subscribing to the Freedom Charter and more recent perspectives outlined in the ANC constitutional guidelines and the declaration on South Africa endorsed by the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement. Their goal is to eradicate both the political and socio-economic pillars of apartheid and transform South Africa into a unitary, non-racial and democratic state based on justice and equality.

Little is known about the regional policy to be pursued by such a government. There is, however, an awareness within the liberation movement that, while South Africa will have to be inward-looking for an extended period of transformation and consolidation, there is at the same time an urgent need to transform regional economic relations towards more equitable forms of economic interaction, especially in the areas of migrant labour, transport and trade.

#### **\* ANC Urged To Learn From Eastern Europe**

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[Editorial: "Looking East—Loosening the Chains"]

[Text] At first glance, it is fairly paradoxical that eastern European countries—Hungary in particular—where long-denied personal freedoms are now in rapid ascent, should appear anxious to trade with SA [South Africa] where similar freedoms remain substantially denied. Their sympathies, it would seem logical to assume, should instead lie with the suppressed black majority.

While SA's traditional trading partners in the West have imposed trade embargoes in high indignation at this country's social policies, the people of eastern Europe—who have lived under similar if not more oppression—are showing an increasing desire to trade with a devil of the same hue as the one they are casting out.

The explanation is simple, but intriguing, and it is one to which the ANC [African National Congress], and most countries north of the Limpopo, should pay close attention. It is that the oppressed people of eastern Europe have learnt that the adequate satisfaction of their daily living requirements is more desirable than the creeping and inevitable poverty that collectivist or redistributive government brings in the name of spurious social justice.

It will take more than the persuasive skills of the sophisticated young comrades in the ANC to convince the ordinary people of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania that the collectivist oppression under which they have lived for so long has brought anything like the social justice that "liberation" movements believe so essential to southern Africa.

The revolution taking place in eastern Europe now is a peaceful one—with the exception of Rumania. There is a clearly manifest desire, even within the Soviet Union itself, to recreate the institution of democracy and reduce poverty in a way that does not spill more blood. The ANC is unlikely to find continuing support for an indiscriminate armed struggle in those quarters.

The Soviet bloc spends something like US\$10bn each year on military assistance to dictatorial regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America. It is unlikely that the vast amounts of capital, technology and skills that this bloc says it requires from the West will be forthcoming while it continues to spend sums like that on fomenting socialist revolution.

Moreover, without Soviet arms to sustain them, the socialist governments of eastern Europe are falling like ninepins. Is there any reason to believe that without Soviet arms African socialist governments will prove any more durable?

There is, too, within eastern Europe, and especially in the Soviet Union, an awareness of the perils that minority races face when swamped by egalitarian collectivists. The Soviets have never been able to achieve in their domains the degree of national homogeneity that has been one of the outstanding achievements of the North Americans. The reason is that the Soviets sought to enforce uniformity, rather than encourage cohesion through the guarantee of common individual freedoms. Those who are rejecting that system within their own borders are unlikely to continue supporting it elsewhere.

The SA government, almost alone among governments in this part of the world, appears to be moving away, though too slowly, from the socialist policies that have so impoverished eastern Europe. Elsewhere in southern Africa, most other black governments are moving in the opposite direction.

The stability of many African governments, as Western aid declines and Soviet arms support diminishes, may well be in question as a natural consequence of the revolution in eastern Europe. When the black dictators of Central Africa have to generate their own domestic revenues to finance the opulent lifestyles of their bureaucrats, and counteract the poverty that their own policies have created among the mass of their peoples, their survival could become increasingly less certain.

If SA's reform initiative continues, it will not only be the most prosperous country in Africa, it could also become, by comparison with its neighbours, the most stable.

Simply put, black socialists are going to find reducing sympathy and increasing impatience among those who have lived under socialist dictatorships in eastern Europe for their claims here of the "agony" of having no vote, while black incomes are rising faster than white incomes, the shops are full of food and desirable consumables, and the degree of individual freedom exceeds that in most other black states.

The ANC has every reason to be concerned at the developing trade and other contacts between SA and eastern Europe. For if that revolution fructifies into a more democratic and prosperous region, then the ANC's own negotiating strength will be eroded and it could be intimidated either into a settlement or relegated into perpetual impotence.

From from being on the brink of taking over SA, the ANC may well in the period ahead be facing the most crucial test in its long history—ironically on the eve of the release of Nelson Mandela.

What it needs to do is demonstrate that it does not want simply to take over the coercive machinery of apartheid and use it to the benefit of its own elite, under the guise of bringing greater social justice to all the people of this country. The way to do that is to forswear socialism, abandon violence, cease to disrupt the provision of services as a means of protest, and seek to enhance the integrity of its leaders to facilitate negotiation with government.

The evident desire last weekend of so many Soweto parents to have their children return to school is a move in that direction. It is a response to the F. W. de Klerk reforms that is both constructive and encouraging. It demonstrates that there is a desire here too among ordinary people for peaceful progress towards greater prosperity rather than the destructive waste of violent revolution.

#### **\* Position of ANC on Question of Negotiations**

34000365B Harare SOUTHERN AFRICA POLITICAL & ECONOMIC MONTHLY in English Dec 89/Jan 90 pp 10-14

#### **[Text] I. Why Are Negotiations on the Agenda in South Africa Now?**

The ANC [African National Congress] has always been prepared to negotiate a genuine transition to a non-racial democracy in South Africa. The Nationalist Government has never been open to such negotiations.

Even when apartheid's crisis began after 1976, they hoped that they would get away with apartheid reforms which ignored the people and their organisations. The major imperialist governments—the US, Britain, West Germany and others—backed this position.

Their assessment was that the regime was strong and anti-communist. The liberation movement was too weak to topple the regime, and its anti-imperialist orientation

worried the imperialists. The imperialists therefore supported the policies of "constructive engagement" introduced by Reagan. They calculated that with their support, Pretoria could make the reforms necessary to stabilise the situation.

The question of negotiations has come onto the agenda, then, because the positions of the regime and imperialism have changed.

Botha's reforms were defeated by the mass struggles led by the UDF [United Democratic Front]. The nationwide revolt which followed created an immediate crisis.

#### **II. Imperialist Agenda**

The imperialists began to doubt the regime's ability to secure their interests. They also came under pressure from their own people, who were appalled by their governments' support for apartheid.

In 1987 already, US Secretary of State, George Schultz, reported that no solution was possible through unilateral action by the regime. He recommended talks with the ANC and met Oliver Tambo.

During the second half of the 1980s, US imperialism has become fairly skilled at defusing revolutionary situations. They have recognised that some of the dictatorships they have backed are so repressive and corrupt that they polarise wide sections of the population, including most of the middle class, to the revolutionary forces.

In situations like Nicaragua, this allowed the revolution to triumph. The US has been determined to avoid similar setbacks. They have been prepared to drop some of their dictators, and support a more credible pro-US alternative.

By switching from supporting the dictator Marcos to backing the more popular Corazon Aquino in the Philippines, the US managed to demobilise at least a section of the revolutionary movement.

Presently, the US is trying to get rid of Panama's General Noriega and Chile's General Pinochet in a similar way.

South Africa represents a similar crisis for imperialism—wide sections of the population, including growing layers of black moderates (NAFCOC [National African Federated Chambers of Commerce], CTPA [Cape Teachers Professional Association], Inyandza, etc.) have moved over to the camp of the democratic movement.

But the Nationalist Government cannot simply be removed like a pawn by the US. It has a social base in the population—the majority of whites. Also, with the decline of Buthelezi on the national political stage, there is very little material for building a credible "third force" Muzorewa-option in South Africa.



So, imperialism has to use different tactics in relation to Pretoria. A carrot and stick approach around the question of international isolation has been the most important. The regime's financial crisis creates an urgent need for loans and credit in Pretoria.

Imperialism has used this pressure-point to strengthen its agenda. It promises relaxing of sanctions and international isolation if Pretoria begins dialogue with "black leaders" which include the ANC.

At this point, a negotiation option is the only way in which Pretoria can try to win back the strategic initiative. Thatcher and Bush, long-standing allies of the regime, are under pressure at home and in international forums to show that their "constructive engagement" policies are moving South Africa away from apartheid.

At the same time, they believe that the ANC and Mass Democratic Movement [MDM] are not strong enough to dictate the terms of a negotiated settlement at this point, and that this is therefore the ideal time for Pretoria to take the initiative.

The recent South African tour by the US State Department's Herman Cohen highlighted the Americans' intention to promote talks as soon as possible. But the leading role in this strategy will be played by Britain's Margaret Thatcher.

Bush is held back by a Congress which is more firmly anti-apartheid. Thatcher, on the other hand, has great credibility with the regime because of her stubborn opposition to sanctions which has seen her isolated in the Commonwealth and the European Community.

Domestic and international developments bring a sense of urgency to the imperialist mission. In South Africa, the imperialists are worried that the longer the delay, the more time the MDM has to consolidate its strength, and the ANC to develop its underground political and military structures.

Internationally, Thatcher faces immediate pressure at the Commonwealth Conference in October. Although it is not yet public, the Commonwealth Secretariat's report to the conference is strongly pro-sanctions. If Thatcher is alone in opposition again, there is a real chance of the Commonwealth breaking up, which Britain is not prepared to see.

So, she faces pressure to come up with something to show for her refusal to impose sanctions by October. Furthermore, in the longer run, the political shifts in the imperialist countries could see both Thatcher and Bush voted out by 1992, and replaced by firmer opponents of apartheid. The unification of Europe in the same year will give far greater power to the European Parliament, in which anti-apartheid forces are dominant.

To deal with the situation, Thatcher has adopted a carrot and stick approach to both the regime and the Frontline States:

- For Pretoria, she will oppose sanctions and win greater international space and support in exchange for the release of Mandela and other key prisoners, the lifting of the Emergency and the holding of talks with a variety of different organisations (including the ANC and the MDM).
- For the Frontline States, Thatcher has promised substantial assistance to their ravaged economies in exchange for them pressuring the ANC to suspend the armed struggle and talk to Pretoria.

Thatcher speaks increasingly confidently of the prospect of her demands being met immediately after the election—clearly, her talks with F. W. de Klerk have confirmed that Pretoria will play along.

### III. Nationalist Government Position

Serious negotiations involve a transfer of power from the minority apartheid regime to a government democratically elected by all South Africans. The Nationalist Government is not prepared to surrender power. Nor has it yet been pushed to the point where it is forced to do so.

When the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group brought the regime the message that the ANC was willing to suspend the armed struggle if genuine negotiations were to begin, Pretoria retreated. It sent the SADF [South African Defense Forces] to bomb Lusaka and Gaborone, and launched a renewed assault on the MDM through the State of Emergency.

But the Emergency failed to achieve its political objectives. The MDM was not eliminated, and the Black Local Authorities failed to win support.

Instead, pressure has escalated. The MDM has revived itself despite repression and showed its power in the three-day stayaway protesting against the Labour Relations Act in June 1988.

The regime's position has deteriorated, particularly on the economic front. Their financial crisis made breaking out of their international isolation a matter of urgency. Together with their military defeat at the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, it forced them to agree to implement Resolution 435 in Namibia.

With the failure of the Emergency, the regime found itself directionless. The power struggle within the Nationalist Party, and the open conflict between P. W. Botha and F. W. de Klerk, reflected this directionlessness.

- Botha had to be persuaded at the last minute to reimpose the Emergency.
- Nationalist Ministers say different things about the Party's vision of a future Constitution, for example whether it has one or four chambers.
- F. W. de Klerk is determined to win back for the NP [National Party] caucus some of the decision-making power which Botha had put into the hands of the



National Security Management System and his own office.

Negotiation with the ANC has previously been a major point of debate. As early as 1986, there were already elements in the Cabinet who favoured this option.

The regime's position always hinged on the idea that it would only negotiate with the ANC if it renounced "violence" and its ties with the South African Communist Party.

Clearly, it still hopes to achieve these aims, but NP speakers have been looking for ways around their own "violence" precondition.

Today, the idea of negotiation is clearly on the NP agenda. There are strong indications that Margaret Thatcher's three demands (prisoners released, the Emergency lifted and roundtable talks) will be met in some way soon after the September 6 election.

The regime is not ready for serious negotiation, nor will it be before the balance of forces has been shifted through struggle. But negotiations have become the major focus of NP strategy. The "five-year plan" adopted at the recent NP congress is a two-page document. It uses the word "negotiations" fourteen times. The other important word in the document is "group rights"—it occurs thirty-nine times. The combination of these two words shows the regime's thinking.

The regime remains committed to minority rule, and defeating the objectives of the democratic forces. But it recognises that the only way it can hope to regain the strategic initiative is through opening "negotiations". Its objectives will be:

- Relieving international pressure;
- Confusing and demobilising the democratic movement;
- Dividing the forces presently ranged against apartheid.

The regime is likely to launch a "great indaba" initiative, with "representatives of all race groups". It will set the agenda around NP proposals. If the ANC and the MDM are to be included at all, they will be expected to participate as "one of many" black groups alongside homeland leaders and other puppets.

#### IV. The Frontline States

The importance of the Frontline States' positions will depend on the extent to which the ANC depends on externally-based political and military structures. In the Zimbabwean struggle, they played a decisive role.

ZANU [Zimbabwe African National Union] and ZAPU [Zimbabwe African People's Union] were both dependent on military bases in neighbouring countries. They were unwilling to go to Lancaster House to negotiate, but

were forced by the Frontline States who said they could no longer sustain their level of support for the armed struggle.

Pretoria and the imperialists hope that pressure on the Frontline States can result in the ANC being similarly forced to the negotiating table.

Years of South African destabilisation devastated the economies of Mozambique and Angola. Hundreds of thousands of their people have been killed or maimed. They are no longer in a position to sustain their war against South Africa.

Offers of joint imperialist-South African economic aid in exchange for pressure on the ANC to negotiate are a powerful incentive to Governments facing economic catastrophe.

Mozambique succumbed as early as 1984, and signed the Nkomati Accord which denied facilities to the ANC. The FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front] Government maintains high level links with Pretoria, and obviously favours talks.

Angola has also reached the point where ending the war and securing western economic aid are essential to the survival of their revolution.

The ANC saw peace in Angola as a revolutionary necessity, and offered to withdraw its bases to facilitate the peace process. But the Angolan withdrawal has been a setback for the armed struggle.

The US holds the key to Angola's ability to secure western economic aid, and it is therefore unlikely that the Angolans will be in a position to allow the ANC back after Namibian independence.

Botswana and Zimbabwe are economically stronger, and more resistant to deals with Pretoria, but they are not major support-bases of the ANC.

Zambia is one of the ANC's most important allies in the region, and the Zambian economy has also reached a stage of near-collapse. This makes them vulnerable to imperialist pressure. At some point, the Zambians will be likely to put strong pressure on the ANC to engage in some sort of negotiations.

The vulnerability of an independent Namibia will mean that the ANC is unlikely to be granted more than diplomatic facilities in that country.

The situation in the Frontline States is likely to produce important pressures on the ANC to negotiate.

#### V. Soviet Positions

Many newspapers are promoting the idea that the Soviet Union is poised to push the ANC into negotiations. Margaret Thatcher is among the most prominent proponents of this view.

Certainly the Soviets have adopted "new thinking" on solving of international and regional conflicts. In a bid to reduce international tension and the danger of nuclear war, they have promoted dialogue and political solutions. They are prepared to assist in reaching a political solution in South Africa too.

Although the "new thinking" played a role in the negotiations towards Namibian independence, it was the shifting balance of forces after Cuito Cuanavale that made this possible.

The Soviets certainly favour a political solution in South Africa. But there are major debates over how this can be achieved.

A consensus appears to be emerging around the following view:

- There is an unstable equilibrium in South Africa: the forces of resistance are not able to topple the regime, but the regime is unable to stop the growth of resistance.
- The armed seizure of power in South Africa is possible, but unlikely, because of the strength and loyalty of the SADF, and because the underground political and military structures do not yet appear strong enough to defeat them.
- A political solution is therefore desirable.
- At this point, however, the regime's negotiation-stance will amount to little more than a ploy to win space.
- A political solution depends on all-round pressure to weaken the Nationalist Government to the point where it is prepared to hand over power.

There is clearly debate among Soviet thinkers over the armed struggle. But it is unlikely that the Soviets will put pressure on the ANC to accept the unacceptable.

Perestroika has emphasised the right of different Soviet allies to pursue their own strategies. For example, in Eastern Europe, Poland and Hungary are pursuing a set of reforms even more dramatic than those of the Soviet Union, while the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Romania remain opposed to perestroika. Cuba is also pursuing a course very different from perestroika, and the Soviet Union still continues to supply massive amounts of aid.

In this spirit, the Soviets have acknowledged the ANC's right to choose its own strategies. When an ANC delegation visited the country in February, all their military requirements were met in full.

Of course, there are economic constraints on the Soviets, which have certainly played a role in encouraging them to seek political solutions in Angola, Afghanistan and Ethiopia (where large amounts of Soviet aid have been necessary to fight wars which appear to be unwinnable). But the level of military support sought by the ANC is tiny compared with these countries who need to maintain full-scale conventional armies and air forces.

The Soviets certainly encourage pursuit of a political solution, and will be prepared to play a role if called upon. But they do not appear to be exerting pressure on the ANC to adopt their approach.

Indeed, the Soviet "new thinking" has had a greater effect on the regime. Increasing breakdown of the Cold War means Pretoria can no longer appeal to the west on the basis of the "communist threat". Indeed, it is more likely that the major superpowers achieve consensus on the need for a political solution. Even the regime's own "total onslaught" ideology has been revised, and replaced with nothing particularly coherent.

#### VI. ANC's Position

The ANC has emphasised that its objective is the transfer of power to the people of South Africa. It is committed to achieving that goal through the combination of its four pillars of struggle: mass mobilisation, political underground, armed struggle and international isolation.

The ANC stresses that it has always been ready to realise that goal peacefully, but that successive Nationalist Governments have refused to end minority rule.

The ANC maintains that if the attitude of the regime changes, and genuine negotiations for a non-racial and democratic South Africa become a possibility, it will take that opportunity.

So, the question of whether there are negotiations in South Africa or not depends on the attitude of the Government, not on the ANC. If the Government were serious about negotiations, it would create a climate for talks by:

- Releasing all political prisoners and detainees, and halting political trials;
- Unbanning of all political organisations;
- Lifting the State of Emergency;
- Withdrawing its troops and paramilitary police from the townships;
- Repealing all laws which allow the Government to ban, restrict, detain and imprison individuals and organisations, and allowing freedom of organisation, speech and the press.

The ANC believes that these steps are essential for them to consult the people for a mandate in the process of negotiation. Furthermore, the ANC insists that only a sovereign elected body can draw up a new constitution for South Africa. This will have to involve all South Africans voting on the basis of one-person-one-vote for a sovereign constituent assembly.

The ANC is committed to a political solution in South Africa. But it believes that the regime's present initiative is hoping to buy space and time for continued Nationalist Party rule.

A political solution in South Africa, according to the ANC, depends on escalation of the struggle on all fronts.

The ANC is not prepared to suspend the struggle on the basis of promises about negotiations. The experience of Namibia, where South Africa has implemented UN Resolution 435 twelve years after accepting it has served as a warning on this score.

At the same time, the movement recognises the importance of taking the initiative on this front, because of the dangers which arise if it is left to Pretoria and the imperialists to define the process of negotiation. The ANC is presently engaged in consultation with its allies in the MDM over an acceptable negotiation process which would involve the people of South Africa. The ANC and its allies will then seek to win maximum support, both inside South Africa and internationally, for that position.

The ANC will no doubt have learned from a number of recent examples of negotiation processes:

#### **Lancaster House**

Firstly, the Lancaster House Agreement which ended the Zimbabwean war. Despite jointly fielding 60,000 guerrillas (the equivalent with South Africa's population would be 300,000 guerrillas) and with war in 90 percent of the country, ZANU and ZAPU were forced to accept major compromises in the sphere of privileges for the white minority.

ZANU and ZAPU were not prepared to negotiate—they hoped to seize power by force of arms. The Frontline States, particularly Mozambique, however, forced them to the table by withdrawing their support from the armed struggle.

ZANU and ZAPU were forced into a negotiating situation which they had not prepared for, and in which they had taken no initiative. They had relied too exclusively on one form of struggle, and had failed to anticipate the shift in conditions.

If they had taken more initiative on the negotiation front, and prepared themselves for the possibility that they might have no choice but to talk, they might have held a strong position.

#### **Resolution 435**

Namibian independence is obviously a great victory for the people of Southern Africa, and indeed for Cuban internationalism.

The fact that independence proceeded according to Resolution 435 raises certain problems, however. Resolution 435 leaves South Africa in control until a new government is elected, which gives them tremendous scope to interfere with the Namibian people expressing their will.

Resolution 435 was adopted by the United Nations in 1978. It was a version of an earlier resolution modified by five major imperialist powers.

The point here is that the Namibian people made no input into determining the process of their independence. This highlights the need for the democratic forces to take the initiative in actually defining the internationally-accepted process of transition to a new South Africa.

#### **The Intifada**

The Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories has important lessons for the relationship between negotiation and struggle.

Since the "Camp David" Accords of 1977, Washington has been conniving with Israel and reactionary Arab states to create a Middle East "settlement" which excluded the independent representatives of the Palestinian people.

Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon severely weakened the PLO's ability to wage armed struggle. The organisation split into moderate and left factions over the best way to proceed.

Imperialism took advantage of the situation to try to negotiate a deal between Israel and Jordan, which would exclude the divided PLO and the Palestinian people.

Recognising the danger of a divided PLO, the organisation placed a major stress on rebuilding unity. When imperialism was manoeuvring, the most important thing was for the Palestinians to speak with one voice.

The most effective response to the imperialist initiatives has been based on mass struggles in the occupied territories—the Intifada. Through a popular uprising which has lasted nearly two years, the Palestinian people rendered unworkable all schemes to by-pass them and their organisation.

The Intifada forced Jordan to back out of the imperialist plan. The US has been forced to pressurise Israel towards talks with the PLO.

At the same time, the PLO took the diplomatic initiative by declaring a Palestinian state in the territories, and granting recognition to Israel. This has further eroded imperialist support for Israel.

The most important lessons from Palestine are the need to maintain unity in the face of imperialist manoeuvres, and that mass struggle is the most effective counter to such manoeuvres.

#### **The Challenges**

The regime and the imperialists have had differences on how far to go in making reforms. But the weapon of sanctions has forced Pretoria to implement the imperialist agenda.

"Our ability to make decisions is limited," Police Minister Adriaan Vlok recently admitted. "If sanctions are introduced against us, we can do nothing...."

This was Vlok's explanation of why the Government was not considering talks with the ANC. The Government, he said, was negotiating with the ANC while it could do so from a position of strength.

Talking to the ANC was "a way of fighting them with another instrument", said Vlok. "We want to be able to say in the future that we not only won on the battlefield, but also around the negotiating table."

The regime's objectives in negotiations are to regain the strategic initiative. It aims to do this by:

- Defusing international pressure;
- Demobilising the people from struggle;
- Dividing the democratic movement;
- Winning new allies.

It is not clear exactly how far Pretoria will go. Clearly, the release of Mandela and other prisoners can be expected after the election. The Emergency will probably also be lifted.

At the same time, the regime is unlikely to meet the preconditions set out by the ANC—as it says, it believes it is operating from a position of strength.

It will try to take the initiative by launching an unacceptable negotiation process, in the form of a "great indaba", hoping that the ANC will find it difficult to ignore this under pressure from the Frontline States.

The regime will also try to delay any process of negotiation, and fix the agenda around their political initiatives.

The imperialist initiatives are designed to poison our national democratic struggle. But there are two important mistakes to avoid:

- Imagining that we are in for an "early Christmas", and waiting for foreign pressure and diplomatic activity to create a settlement. The balance of forces is not yet decisively in our favour, and unless we shift it through struggle, our liberation will be stillborn;
- Rejecting negotiations entirely, and ignoring this terrain of struggle. This would seriously weaken the democratic movement, and allow the regime to fight its way out of the corner we have created through a combination of domestic and international pressure.

The democratic movement will have to approach the negotiations issue, bearing in mind the following objectives:

- The struggle for the transfer of power;
- The need to shift the balance of forces through intensified struggle and organisation;
- The need to maintain our unity, and win new allies. We must ensure that we do not become isolated;
- The need to create maximum political space to organise the people.

Most importantly, the democratic movement will have to take the initiative. The process of a negotiated solution in South Africa must be defined by the people of South Africa—we must win the support of the international community for our perspective of a negotiated settlement. This is the importance of the present discussion within and between the ANC and the MDM over negotiations.

He may not realise it, but Vlok has given the democratic movement some good advice. We too must view negotiations as "a way of fighting them with another instrument".

#### \* KwaZulu/Natal Indaba 'Key' to New Constitution

34000358C Johannesburg THE STAR in English  
17 Jan 90 p 10

[Article by Graham Linscott: "Natal's Way May Be Key to New SA Constitution"]

[Text] As the release of Mr Nelson Mandela approaches, talks about talks between the Government and the African National Congress [ANC] and others are just as imminent.

Those talks will have to decide how a new constitution is to be negotiated. South Africans have two models available.

One is Namibia, where a constituent assembly elected by proportional representation has clearly identified the relative strengths of the different groupings and is now engaged in drafting a constitution according to ground rules which prevent the majority party (Swapo) dictating the terms of that constitution.

The other is Natal-KwaZulu, where the Indaba, a convention thrown open to all interest groups, produced a constitution for regional government.

#### Legitimacy

The Namibian model is by far the simpler. It would be welcome by an organisation such as the ANC, not least because it would imply a lack of legitimacy on the part of the present government.

But the Namibian formula seems unlikely to be adopted. Governments do not play political roulette. No matter how sincere today's Nationalists might be about creating a common society, they will want to negotiate the terms of that society and how its political institutions will operate.

It seems more likely therefore that the process will more closely approximate that of the Natal/kwaZulu Indaba. The rules of the new society would be decided before relative electoral strengths are put to the test.

The Indaba was simultaneously two things.



It was a practical attempt to resolve anomalies in government at regional level. And it was an exercise in political accommodation between interest groups which started out almost light years apart—a virtual laboratory experiment for a national settlement.

What happened at the Natal/KwaZulu Indaba? It seems worth recalling now that there is talk of a Great Indaba.

The Indaba invited literally any organisation which believed it could contribute—political parties, municipalities, organised commerce, industry and agriculture. Some sent delegations only with observer status, others altered their status from observer to full delegate as the Indaba proceeded, and vice versa.

Groupings at the extreme left and right declined to participate, and a huge ideological gulf still yawned between those who did. Yet, over eight months, the Indaba made astonishing progress.

It was an unwieldy body. No delegation carried more weight than another. Issues were talked out endlessly until consensus could be reached, the item under discussion being constantly amended. A majority vote was a rarity.

#### Closed Doors

The Indaba's deliberations were behind closed doors. This drew criticism from certain quarters but, as the secretariat maintained, if delegates had been forced to posture their constituencies, agreement could never have been achieved.

It is interesting to note that the constitutional committee of the Namibian Constituent Assembly also intends meeting behind closed doors.

Indaba delegates speak of a growing sense of finding one another, uneasiness and mistrust giving way to regard and trust. Leadership figures began to emerge and deals were struck.

Most of the delegates eventually put their signatures to proposals which, eight months earlier, they would have found incomprehensible.

At a more abstract level, the Indaba amounted to an exercise in which reasonable men of goodwill defined principles by which they would expect society to be ordered.

Its practical proposals might or might not be implemented but it has already proved the conceptual framework for a Great Indaba, as well as some very valuable negotiating procedures.

#### \* New Unity Movement Rejects Negotiations

34000363 Harare SOUTHERN AFRICA POLITICAL & ECONOMIC MONTHLY in English Dec 89/Jan 90 pp 17-18

[Article by R. O. Dudley, president, New Unity Movement (NUM), South Africa: "Negotiations—The Road to Betrayal!"]

[Text] ...The idea that the fundamental rights of the masses can in the present circumstances be gained and protected by negotiation of any kind with the rulers is a disgraceful political hoax. (NUM Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 2)

This sums up the position of the New Unity Movement on the feverish debate that is now being conducted both inside South Africa and in Africa north of the Limpopo. The Unity Movement has rejected proposals made by the imperialist governments through Thatcher, Bush, Mitterrand, Kohl and others. Further, there is no way in which we can support the approach of the Soviet Union and China who, according to reports, are trying to "compel" the Congress movement to negotiate with the South African government on the premise that the "armed struggle" is alleged to have no future.

In a statement prepared for the Workers' Summit held on 26-27 August, 1989, we pointed out that negotiations have, in fact, been initiated by the imperialists as a move to nip in the bud the development of the struggle (in South Africa) on to a higher plateau. It is the imperialist view that a compromise at this stage, when the liberatory movement is in a state of weakness, will be far more beneficial to the local ruling class and the imperialists.

The attitude of the Soviet Union and China shows a complete misapplication of the political and economic considerations which affect their relations with world imperialism to the conflict in South Africa. In South Africa the oppressed are locked in battle with a ruling class and its supporters in the imperialist world. The Soviet and Chinese preoccupation with "negotiated settlements" arises primarily from the frightening impasse that has been reached in build-up of atomic and nuclear arms—a development which makes the thought of a Third World too terrible even to think about. Moreover, the fact that the non-exploiting Soviet Union and China have been driven to devote such huge amounts of their national wealth to non-productive military expansion, and have seen their economic development strangled as a result, has forced them to re-assess their global position. For them the need to negotiate arms treaties with their political enemies seems inescapable.

To transfer the considerations which have applied in that situation to struggles in Southern Africa, and in South Africa in particular, is something for which there can be no political justification. It ignores the aims and objectives of the struggle, as well as the changing balance of forces developing in South Africa. It posits the ludicrous idea that the national oppression and exploitation of the oppressed and the emancipating of South Africa

from imperialist domination can be resolved by "talk" with the very perpetrators of the existing order in South Africa.

The fact that segments of the broad liberatory movement have taken up the initiatives of the Washington-London-Moscow-Bonn-Beijing lobby is a disturbing index of the political immaturity and inexcusable dependence (or lack of political independence) of those segments. It is equally an indication of the deep penetration of the liberatory movement by the new liberals and the missionaries (IDASA [Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa], Five Freedoms Forum, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, etc.) hastening, as did their forebears in the 19th century, to prepare the ground for the reconquest of the rebellious oppressed.

What is of the greatest significance, among many significant changes in the relationships between the rulers and the ruled, is a virtual complete breakdown in structures developed over decades to secure the submission of the oppressed. That is the message in the revolts in the homelands, in the rejection of the tricameral parliament and its second and third tier apparatus (RSCs [Regional Services Council], JMCs [Joint Management Centers], local authorities, LACs, management committees). There is no future whatsoever for the ruling class in its frantic efforts to secure the co-option and co-operation of the collaborators who have any capability of taking the mass of the oppressed with them. The army and the police have been shifted into the foreground in the desperate efforts of the State to halt this development and its consequences. The programme of the ruling class remains embedded in capitalist exploitation, race-, colour- and gender-based policies which are totally rejected by the principal leadership of the oppressed.

The political voice of the oppressed has formulated for every aspect of the lives of South Africans the basic, imperative changes that must be brought about to satisfy the democratic movement. This is not a new development. The Ten Point Programme, a minimum programme, and the policy of Non-Collaboration are nearly fifty years in existence; as are the ideas of building one South African nation, a united, non-racial democratic South Africa with a common citizenship for all and a society freed of discrimination, oppression and exploitation! This ideological flowering is in direct and irreconcilable opposition to the ossified, hated racist ideology of the ruling class.

The New Unity Movement, like several of its allies in the liberation movement, seeks a solution for the problems of the country. The idea that acceptable solutions can be "negotiated" with the present ruling class is in direct conflict with our position that our problems can only be resolved through struggle. That was the message we conveyed to the Workers' Summit. The oppressed have strengthened their relative position in their conflict with the oppressors. But we cannot pretend that we have developed the full fighting potential of the oppressed. We need, desperately, to eliminate division and to weld

unity. We need to heighten the political awareness and confidence of the masses that they must and can change society. We have to build our organisations on all fronts to outmatch the organisational, physical and ideological influences and powers of the ruling class.

To suggest that we simply accept the dictates of overseas sponsors and negotiate with the ruling class and its allies is unacceptable. To suggest further that negotiation is "inevitable" is no better than saying that death is inevitable. We are at one with Zeph Mothopeng when he says, categorically, that negotiation is out of the question. We are equally opposed to the tactics of those who wish to draw trade unions, student bodies, sports constituencies, church communities and a rag-bag of both "black" and "white" liberals into the "negotiating process".

We are convinced, on the basis of our political understanding of struggles here, and on the basis of outcomes of "negotiated settlements" in the neo-colonial world, that all the present talk of "negotiations" is a cruel hoax. It is a hoax offered to embattled millions reeling under a violent and oppressive society that cannot be patched up; whether by talks, talks about talks, racist reforms or by the weight of slush funds with which nation-wide efforts to head off truly democratic change are being pursued. It must be overturned and re-built upon the foundations of universal democratic principles.

#### \* Boerestaat Leader on Negotiations Participation

34000355C Johannesburg SOWETAN in English  
9 Jan 90 p 5

[Text] The leader of the Boerestaat Party, Robert van Tonder, yesterday reiterated the party's determination to represent the boerevolk at any negotiating table.

In a statement referring to the ANC [African National Congress]'s message about a united democratic and non-racial South Africa, he said he had told State President F.W. de Klerk last year the leaders of other BSP [Boerestaat Party], Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and the Transvaal Separatists would represent the boers at the negotiating table, and the boer republics of the Transvaal, Free State and Vryheid were boer ground and were not negotiable.

He said they would also insist on a dispensation in which emphasis will not be placed on racism and colour but on nationhood (volkskap).

"All people's states (volksstate) must be completely free politically and culturally and can work together economically like the EEC in Europe.

"The boer states' (boerestaat) policy should also not be confused with the racist policy of the CP [Conservative Party] that talks vaguely about separation between whites and those of another colour, and that wants to retain the entire country as its territory.

"It should also not be confused with Professor (Carel) Boshoff's idea of a state for 'Afrikaners' (white and brown) in the desert. The BSP has resumed the freedom struggle of the boer people...and will restore the internationally recognised former boer republics," Van Tonder said.

**\* Sixteen ANC Members Defect in Tanzania**

34000356A Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English  
18 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by Tony Stirling: "16 Flee ANC Violence Over Rift"]

[Text] Sixteen members of the ANC [African National Congress] have deserted from the organisation and have taken up refuge with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNCR] in Tanzania.

All were people who had been detained by the ANC for disagreements over policy. Three are pregnant women with children.

Some have been in contact with their families, in South Africa, requesting that their cases be taken up urgently with the released ANC leaders, who are now in Lusaka for a meeting with the organisation's leadership in exile.

In messages sent to family members in South Africa, some have expressed fears that they will be handed back to the organisation and will either be killed or imprisoned by the ANC's security staff.

In a communication with his family, one of the deserters, Stanley Mbengo, also known as Valdez, said that while the group had not abandoned the aspirations of the ANC, they no longer wished to be under the exiled leadership, because Chris Hani and others "do whatever they like", and had "decided to silence us", so that we could not communicate with the released leadership when they came to Lusaka.

Past reports have indicated that ANC deserters who take refuge with the UNCR are often handed back to the ANC, which deals with them harshly.

There is also evidence backed by reports of growing disquiet among families of ANC members who are not informed about the deaths or detentions of members of the ANC, and it is believed to be an issue which the released leaders have been asked to take up with the leadership of the ANC, at their meeting in Lusaka.

One recent case is that of Edward Lawrence, former commander of the ANC's Natal terrorist machinery, whose family was never informed of his death in detention last year.

Another case is that of Aaron Mokhari, a former Radio Freedom announcer in Maputo, who vanished last April after indicating that he intended informing the organisation that he wished to leave it.

**\* Proposed SADF Headquarters Postponed**

34000358A Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English  
12 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Tony Stirling: "Building of R250-m SADF Headquarters Is Postponed"]

[Text] The building of the South African Defence Force [SADF]'s proposed R250 million [rand] headquarters in Pretoria has been "indefinitely postponed" as part of envisaged cuts in expenditure by the SADF and Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa], a spokesman confirmed yesterday.

Substantial cuts to the expenditure of both the SADF and Armscor are to be made, but the final decisions on where the cuts are to be made have yet to be taken.

It is understood that while the Defence Force and Armscor have been working on recommendations about areas in which expenditure should be cut, these have yet to be approved within the SADF, at Ministerial level, and in some cases at Cabinet level.

Announcements on the trimming of expenditure by the SADF and Armscor are expected soon, but not before both have fully informed their staffs of the position.

As in the case with all state departments, the budgets of the Defence Force and Armscor have yet to be finalised and reports of a 25 percent cut were described by a Ministry of Defence spokesman as "pure speculation".

He said it was known that state expenditure as a whole was to be reduced.

As had been indicated by the State President, Mr De Klerk, the SADF and Armscor were not being singled out, and the proposed cuts would effect the entire state machinery, not only the Defence family.

Mindful of the need to cut expenditure to strengthen South Africa's economy, the SADF had made recommendations and submissions which had been laid before the Cabinet on December 6 last year.

Mr De Klerk had in fact referred to this the next day in announcing that the initial period of national service was to be halved, and that further rationalisation would take place.

At the same time, the Chief of the SADF, General Jannie Geldenhuys, had said details of this rationalisation would be given early in 1990.

The spokesman said the envisaged steps had yet to be finalised.

He would not speculate on the nature or scope of the proposed cuts and whether or not they included disbanding elite units such as the Marines, and reducing the strength of Southern Air Command, as well as cuts to the navy and the possible mothballing of ships.



On the Armscor side it appears that some manufacturing cuts might be made, in line with present requirements, but that the developmental aspect, which has provided some of the most advanced weaponry available in the face of a United Nations arms embargo, will be kept going.

The spokesman pointed out that both Mr DeKlerk and the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, had repeatedly stated that a well-equipped, prepared and effective Defence Force would be maintained as a priority, along with maintaining the capabilities of Armscor.

In this regard, General Malan was on record as saying that any country which gambled with its security gambled with its future.

While there would be cuts, and final decisions were being taken in this regard, a strong defence Force would be maintained to ensure that South Africa remained a regional power.

#### \* White Separatists Announce Elections

34000357C Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN* in English  
11 Jan 90 p 13

[Article by Fred de Lange: "White Separatists Will Hold Election on Boerestaat"]

[Text] A National "general election" is to be held among all Whites, supporting a separate Boerestaat, on May 31 (Republic Day) this year.

The leader of the AWB [Afrikaner Resistance Movement] and one of the three leaders of the Boere Separatiste Movement, Mr Eugene Terreblanche, announced in Ventersdorp yesterday that the registration of voters would start as soon as possible.

All White Christians, regardless of language and nationality, who support the idea of a separate homeland for Whites, will be eligible for registration and will be issued with an identity document allowing them to vote.

Mr Terre'Blanche said registered voters would elect a Volksraad which would sit in Pretoria and who would enter into negotiations with the government and other nations inside South Africa for such a state to be created.

The election will take place on a constituency basis and an election campaign is due to start later this month.

Mr Terre'Blanche's own campaign is due to start on January 25 in the Durban City Hall with his next meeting on January 30 in the Johannesburg City Hall.

"We want to stress that our quest for a Boerestaat has nothing to do with politics.

"White Christians belonging to all political groupings but who want an own state will be welcome to register," he said.

He believes that the Boere Separatiste Movement would receive wide support for the election. "I have worked on this for 16 years and I know that our support is large."

Mr Terre'Blanche said this new move came in the wake of a call by the State President, Mr F. W. de Klerk, for groups to prove their support.

"Once we have formed a Volksraad, we will appoint a committee to join the negotiation process as is envisaged by Mr De Klerk.

"During the process we are prepared to negotiate with all groups including the ANC [African National Congress]—even if it is only to tell them that they do not represent a volk and can therefore not negotiate," he said.

The Boere Separatiste aims to negotiate for the traditional Boere Republics to be separated as a Volkstaat. These include Transvaal, the Orange Free State, Northern Natal and Richards Bay. "Boere" in the Cape Province would be assisted to negotiate for an area adjoining the main Boerestaat.

Mr Terre'Blanche admitted that the Volksraad would be a sort of shadow government and that it might be illegal in South Africa.

"We are not concerned about that. We will be giving the volk a chance to elect the leaders to negotiate on their behalf," he concluded."

#### \* Poll: NP Losing Afrikaner Support

34000356B Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN* in English  
8 Jan 90 p 15

[Article by Poen de Villiers]

[Text] The National Party [NP] is losing Afrikaner support while it is gaining support from English-speaking voters, according to the results of the latest Rapport opinion poll published yesterday.

The poll was conducted nationwide among about 2,000 White voters last November by Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd.

The party's support has, however, increased slightly from 41.1 percent to 41.6 percent, since a similar survey in June last year.

The Conservative Party [CP]'s support grew considerably during this period, from 23.9 percent to 27.6 percent and for the first time since October 1988 this Right-wing party had stronger support than the party to the Left of the government.

The latest poll showed that support for the Democratic Party had dropped from 28.2 percent to 24.6 percent.

Afrikaner support for the NP has, however, dropped from 51.9 percent in June last year to 48.7 percent during the last survey.



English support, on the other hand, increased from 22.4 percent to 29.6 percent.

The Herstigte Nasionale Party still has some support, but this dropped from one percent in June to 0.8 percent.

According to the poll, the F. W. de Klerk regime compares well to that of the P. W. Botha era. Of the voters interviewed, the combined percentage of "very satisfied" and "satisfied" people was 35.6, while Mr Botha's government received 38.3 percent support in these categories in June.

In the latest poll 25.1 percent of the voters said they were "very dissatisfied" or "dissatisfied" with the present government.

The weakest support for Mr De Klerk (32.4 percent) comes from his own province, Transvaal, while in Natal he has the support of 42.3 percent of the voters.

Questioned on whether they agreed that since Mr De Klerk took over as head of state, the government had taken certain commendable steps and initiatives, 23 percent of the voters "definitely agreed", 33.6 percent were "inclined to agree", while 18.6 percent "definitely did not agree" and 12.8 percent were "inclined not to agree". Twelve percent did not know what to reply.

Regarding the pace of reform 41.5 percent said it was "just right", 23.3 percent said it was too slow and 15.3 percent were of the opinion that it was too fast. The remainder refused to comment because they did not agree with the reforms taking place.

Only a minority of the voters interviewed felt that reform could be stopped or reversed by the present or any other government.

**\* UDF Calls for End to Violence in Lebowa**

34000357A Johannesburg THE STAR in English  
18 Jan 90 p 9

[Article by Esmare van der Merwe: "UDF Calls for an End to Violence in Lebowa"]

[Text] The United Democratic Front [UDF] has called for an immediate end to the violence in Lebowa which it claims has already left one person dead, others injured and many families homeless.

At a press conference in Johannesburg yesterday, officials of the UDF and the Buchbuckridge Youth Congress claimed the SADF [South African Defense Force], SA [South Africa] Police and Lebowa Police were participating in incidents of violence and intimidation against UDF supporters and organisations in the Buchbuckridge area.

It was claimed they were acting on instruction of Lebowa's Chief Minister, Mr Nelson Ramodike, through the Sofasonke vigilante group.

Spokesmen said the Lebowa government was trying to stifle political freedom as a result of UDF mobilisation in the homeland.

At least one person, Mr Matthews Thibela, had died and another was in hospital.

Fifteen houses had been attacked, 10 of which had been destroyed. Police had refused to make statements, it was claimed.

**Harassment**

Also present at the media conference were two independent Lebowa MPs [Members of Parliament], Mr. Laynas Mashile and Mr Winias Mashile. The brothers said they were ANC [African National Congress] supporters and had been the victims of harassment by the homeland's government.

Spokesmen for the Buchbuckridge Youth Congress claimed police ammunition had been used in some attacks, while vigilantes involved in the attacks had been spotted at roadblocks, wearing police uniforms. They said the clamp-down on political expression had started in September following a Youth Congress protest march against lack of democracy and freedom of expression, police brutality and water shortages.

A SAP [South Africa Police] spokesman denied the allegations but urged people to report incidents of violence to the police. A SADF spokesman said he was not aware of any SADF involvement, but asked people to forward details of the allegations to the SADF's public relations directorate in Pretoria for investigation.

The Lebowa police denied the allegations, and Chief Minister Ramodike could not be reached for comment.

**\* Camay Explains Resignation From NACTU**

34000358B Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 12-18 Jan 90 p 15

[Interview with Phiroshaw Camay]

[Text] [THE NEW NATION] Why did you resign from Nactu [National Council of Trade Unions] at the end of last year?

[Camay] I resigned from Nactu primarily because I felt I was no longer able to serve the working people as effectively. A whole number of issues over the past 18 months made Nactu's influence within the working people less in the sense that two pretty negative decisions were made regarding the unity of working class people.

The first was obviously the first Workers' Summit. Despite the fact that Congresses and national councils had taken decisions on building working class unity, we found that the representatives to a national council decided to ask for a postponement of the Workers' Summit when they actually knew that arrangements had progressed beyond a cancellation of the summit.

Secondly, Nactu was asked to sit on the convening committee of the CDF [Conference for a Democratic Future] and as such was aware of all decisions made by the convening committee.

At this moment in our struggle, we need maximum unity among the oppressed and we need to display this unity. To pull out of conferences or summits at the last minute for some small short-term political gains does not benefit the unity of the working people nor does it benefit the unity of the liberation struggle as a whole.

To my mind, it has always been important for a working class movement to be at the forefront of a national liberation struggle. Hence we participated in a whole range of activities. For example, despite a lot of criticism, we assisted in the funeral arrangements for Neil Aggett as we believed that Comrade Aggett had really sacrificed for the working people of this country and his martyrdom needed to be respected by the working people. We did the same for Andries Raditsela.

We protested at the detention of trade union leaders, ensured that our members took part in protest marches.

It is important for people both inside and outside this country to see that people are united over the basic issues.

Various people have interpreted this involvement in various ways. For example, some see this as a watering down of the noncollaboration principle. They've also seen it as an issue that there is no unity within the so-called Azanian tendency or that we're actually supporting one or more movement within the liberation struggle.

My own ethic that I've brought to the position as general secretary of Cusa [Council of Unions of South Africa] then as general secretary of Nactu is not to allow my own personal political feelings and views to influence democratic workers' decisions. And we followed worker mandates to the letter.

[THE NEW NATION] Are you saying there are violations of the principle of worker control of Nactu which led to your resignation?

[Camay] Yes. Nactu has two core resolutions, one on building working class unity and the other on participating in the national liberation struggle.

Those two decisions of congress are cornerstones of Nactu principles and policies.

For some people to try to make short-term political gain out of issues like the Workers' Summit and the CDF is in fact a negation of building working class unity and the national liberation struggle.

[THE NEW NATION] Last year saw the strengthening of ties between Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] and Nactu, especially around the anti-Labour Relations Act (LRA) campaign and many Cosatu leaders

say you played a vital role in promoting this unity. How did you find working with Cosatu and do you think these ties will survive given the apparent hostility of the Nactu leadership to the mass democratic movement (MDM) of which Cosatu is part?

[Camay] I found it fairly exciting to work with Cosatu. For the first time since the unity talks days in '83 and '84, workers with different political views were being brought together to share in the common fight against the LRA.

I sincerely hope that those links survive and that the political hostility between the MDM and the PAM [Pan Africanist Movement] is reduced to serve the interests of the working people and not parochial political interests.

[THE NEW NATION] How do you see the process of worker unity developing?

[Camay] The second Workers' Summit resolution on building working class unity is a very important resolution that has not been implemented yet.

It is necessary that Cosatu and Nactu and the independent unions find ways of implementing the resolution which basically calls for meetings at a local level between workers as well as meetings at a local level of industrial sectors to come together and discuss differences and decide how best to build unity.

We need to establish strong industrial unions in our country so that we can eventually establish one trade union federation.

In the unity talks...we tried to build unity from the top and we have learnt some lessons from that.

[THE NEW NATION] Do you believe that Nactu's rank and file members on the factory floor are prepared to unite with Cosatu members?

[Camay] Yes. For example, the train commuters have developed common strategies. Workers have also recently taken both the Cosatu Southern Transvaal region and the Nactu Johannesburg local to task for decisions that were taken unilaterally. That's an important demonstration of unity where workers are coming together and discussing their positions then challenging their leadership for decisions made without consulting them.

[THE NEW NATION] Nactu is said to have close links with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). How did you find working with the ICFTU?

[Camay] Nactu has ties with the ICFTU, but I wouldn't describe them as close. When Cusa was affiliated to the ICFTU we did not find that affiliation was working against the interests of the working class.

ICFTU affiliates fund Nactu to the extent of about 80 percent. ICFTU affiliates also fund Cosatu to about the

same extent. The difference is that Nactu goes straight to the ICFTU and gets funding on a multilateral basis whereas Cosatu has gone to the various affiliates.

[THE NEW NATION] How do you see the role of the International Trade Secretariats (ITS's), especially in the light of accusations that they further division in the South African trade union movement? [as published]

[Camay] Firstly the ITS's are autonomous from the ICFTU. They have associate membership but are independent.

I'm not aware of ITS's in any sector perpetuating division. The International Metal Federation (IMF), for example, has attempted to build unity in the sector. It threw out the conservative white-led unions in the sector for organising workers on a racial basis. It has established a co-ordinating committee within the country to build unity rather than perpetuating divisions.

[THE NEW NATION] Does Nactu have links with the AFL and CIO, and, if so, were these maintained after allegations of them funding Uwusa?

[Camay] The links that Nactu has with the AFL [American Federation of Labor] and CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations] are the same as those it has with all national centres as they have an important role to play in our struggle.

We work with national centres on the basis that they regard us as equals. This prevents imperialism on their side.

Any funds that might come to Nactu from the AFL and CIO would come through the ICFTU.

[THE NEW NATION] What do you see as the priorities for the trade union movement at present?

[Camay] The trade union movement needs to identify its own priorities for itself.

There are a whole number of issues that workers will have to concentrate on this year.

One is the opposition that working people have to the LRA. The new amendments to this are likely to go before parliament this session.

Unions also need to develop their thinking about the National Manpower Commission as well as possible meetings with the minister of manpower and the strategies and tactics regarding such meetings.

Unions will have to work to reduce the distance between leadership and membership. We found during our LRA campaign that there was a dire need for communication with membership and for proper mandating processes to take place. The trade union movement needs to develop a finesse about such communication.

Internal trade union unity demands a great deal of concentration from trade union leaders. Parochial political positions that leaders take would only damage this unity.

There is also a need to organise public sector unions and develop definite plans about winning union recognition in the sector.

There is also the whole spectre of privatisation and public sector unions need to develop joint strategies to attack privatisation.

Grassroots issues that people have to take up on a daily basis like fighting injustice on the shop floor, dismissals, strike action and collective bargaining have to be developed and sophisticated by the trade union movement.

[THE NEW NATION] Would you align yourself with any political grouping in the country, and if so which?

[Camay] Over the years I have refined my own political thinking and am able to maintain access to all political organisations.

[THE NEW NATION] What are your future plans?

[Camay] I would like to stay in touch with the trade union movement. I can't walk away from the workers' struggle in this country and I don't intend to. At present I am busy investigating various options in the country.

#### \* Status of 'PAC Five' in Country Disputed

34000353C Johannesburg SOWETAN in English  
8 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Themba Molefe: "Status of 'PAC Five' Disputed"]

[Text] Africanists inside the country have challenged the status of five purported executive members of the exiled Pan Africanist Congress [PAC] who last week "slipped" into the country to lay foundations for "the final push" in the organisation's liberation struggle.

The presence of the five in the country was the main story in yesterday's CITY PRESS.

The group which included Mr A. B. Ngcobo, Mr Velekhaya Shange, Mr Selby Ngendane and two others, left last week.

Ngcobo, who is based in London, jetted out on Friday, according to the newspaper.

The president of the PAC, Mr Zephania Mothopeng, said he had no knowledge of the five's presence or their mission in the country.

He said a formal statement would be issued today.

The newspaper said Ngcobo represented the working committee of the PAC's national executive committee and Ngendane was acting as the group's spokesman.



The group, which met PAC members in Johannesburg, was making preparations for a special conference inside South Africa later this year.

#### Documents

The newspaper was shown documents indicating leadership problems in the PAC and a statement signed by Ngcobo last year in which the organisation's Dar es Salaam-based leadership was denounced.

A spokesman for the Pan Africanist Movement [PAM] said it was surprising that Ngcobo and Shange moved freely in and out of South Africa even though they claimed to be officials of a banned organisation.

However, their movements in and out of the country, as well as those of Ngendane, were known.

The documents in their possession were prepared by the South African Government which was trying to create "a PAC" with which it would negotiate.

"These people were all discredited and expelled from the PAC in the 1960s. Ngendane testified against a PAM executive member Walter Tshikila, who was then sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment," the spokesman said.

He said Ngendane was not in exile but lived in the Transkei. He and the others moved openly with valid passports.

#### \* BCMA Leader Tells Homeland Leaders To Resign

34000359B Johannesburg SOWETAN in English  
10 Jan 90 p 5

[Article by Kenosi Modisane: "Resign, BCMA Tells Leaders of the Homelands"]

[Text] Leaders of the self-governing and "independent" states should resign and publicly confess their past sins against the people before they can be politically accepted by the people.

In his New Year message, Mr Mosibudi Mangena, chairman of the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania, Criticised homeland leaders for suggesting re-incorporation into South Africa.

"They now seek to endear themselves to the people by suggesting that they return to the rest of Azania," said Mangena.

Mangena said he was optimistic about the future of the country and praised the Mass Democratic Movement and the Conference for a Democratic Future for fighting the Labour Relations Amendment Act.

"We can all be justly proud of the level of unity we have been able to achieve in 1989.

"The gallant working class led the way by successfully holding two worker summits which saw thousands from

the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the National Council of Trade Unions, and other independent unions combining in their fight against the LRA [Labor Relations Act]," said Mangena.

Mangena also criticised the "new approach of reform and negotiation": as preached by the newly elected State President, Mr F. W. de Klerk.

He said the recent release of the seven leaders of the banned African National Congress and Mr Japhta Masemola of the Pan African Congress was meant to impress the outside world, particularly Britain and the United States that there was change in the country.

"Margaret Thatcher and others were quick to start a campaign against the imposition of further economic sanctions.

"Even some African countries are beginning to warm up to De Klerk," said Mangena.

"Margaret Thatcher and others were quick to start a campaign against the imposition of further economic sanctions.

Mangena called for unity among people of different ideologies. He was full of praise for the "comradeship" existing between youths in the townships.

#### \* First Trial of BCMA Members Begins

34000353B Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 19-25 Jan 90 p 6

[Article by Cassandra Moodley: "'Terrorists'—If They Exist"]

[Text] The first terrorism trial involving alleged members of the exiled Black Consciousness Movement of Azania [BCMA], began last week—and the state has to prove that the organisation exists.

The trial in the Klerksdorp Magistrate's Court involves seven alleged members of the exiled BCMA who are accused of leaving the country and undergoing political and military training in the organisation's military wing, the Azanian Liberation Army.

Unlike the ANC [African National Congress] or the PAC [Pan Africanist Congress], the BCMA is not a banned organisation "since," says the trialists' advocates Imran Moosa and Dikgang Moseneke, "it was not formed inside South Africa".

The state has firstly to prove that the organisation does, in fact, exist.

The state has handed two basic BCMA documents over to the court, the constitution and a blueprint entitled "Urgent Tasks". The documents trace the beginnings of the movement in April 1980, attributing its inception to the lack of an external infrastructure for black consciousness adherents, especially those forced into exile.



It is alleged that the accused left the country during the period April 1986 to March 1989 and that they reported to BCMA bases at Dukwe in Botswana in Libya, where they received training. They then allegedly infiltrated the country to further the objectives of the organisation and to establish underground cells where new members could be recruited and trained.

According to charges 24-year-old Mziwamadoda Kondile was the head of intelligence and of the movement's military committee.

This is the only trial to have been heard in South Africa in which an 18-year-old woman is alleged to have been a platoon commander.

Another significant aspect of the trial is that it opened with a trial-within-a-trial as the admissibility of statements made by some of the trialists was challenged. It was claimed the documents were obtained under duress.

A statement by one of the trialists, Simon Ndlovu, was drawn by the prosecutor, Louw Pienaar, this week.

Last week the magistrate, J. D. Pretorius, ruled that the onus rested with the state to prove the validity of the statements of four of the accused. The authenticity of three more statements has still to be contested.

#### \* SACTU, Communist Party Draft Charter Texts

##### \* Workers' Charter Introduction

34000331 Braamfontein WORK IN PROGRESS  
in English Nov/Dec 89 p 41

[Article: "The Workers' Charter"]

[Text] A proposed workers' charter endorsed by all major elements of the South African opposition could be in place by the end of next year in terms of a programme agreed on by an education workshop of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) held in November.

This follows a decision by Cosatu's annual congress in July to pursue the idea of a workers' charter 'as a matter of urgency'. The congress resolution is in line with a recommendation in the constitutional guidelines initiated by the African National Congress (ANC) that a workers' charter drafted by the organised working class be incorporated into a post-apartheid constitution.

In terms of the workshop decision, Cosatu will—during the next five months—begin drafting and distributing a questionnaire to establish what demands workers wish to see in a workers' charter.

At the same time, Cosatu will initiate a meeting with 'other formations in the Mass Democratic Movement' (MDM) and the National Confederation of Trade Unions (Nactu), which it hopes will result in a joint workers' charter campaign. This meeting will probably take place in mid-1990, says Cosatu national education officer Khetsi Lehoko.

Cosatu is also planning to consult the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (Sactu), he says.

Thereafter, Cosatu will draw the contributions into a single draft charter to put to a special national congress. Rather than be exclusively representative of Cosatu, the congress is likely to draw representation from all opposition formations with an interest in the formulation of a workers' charter. This will probably take place late next year or early in 1991.

The timetable has yet to be finalised, but Cosatu assistant general secretary Sydney Mufamadi says the federation is laying its stress on the process of defining workers' demands, rather than on the final product. 'A process of discussion and formulation of demands to be contained in the charter is essential to ensure the widest possible participation in, and thus support for, a workers' charter as it is finally formulated'.

Sactu and the SACP have already put forward their suggestions on the matter, in the form of their own draft charters. The SACP offering represents something of an about-face for the party. In 1985 the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (now merged into Numsa) was strongly attacked by sectors of the SACP who charged that Mawu's proposal concerning the compilation of a workers' charter was 'workerist'.

Two years ago, however, the ANC's publication of its constitutional guidelines showed a marked change in thinking on the issue within the outlawed movements. The guidelines argue for a workers' charter as part of a post-apartheid constitution.

##### \* SACP Draft Charter

34000331 Braamfontein WORK IN PROGRESS  
in English Nov/Dec 89 pp 42-43

[Article: "The SACP Draft Charter"]

[Text] We, the working people of South Africa, the main producers of our country's wealth, declare:

- That, as workers, we are daily robbed of a rightful share of the fruits of our labour.
- That, as black workers, we are subjected to even more intense exploitation by a system of capitalism which uses national domination to keep the wages low and profits high.
- That, as part of the black oppressed whose forebears were conquered by force of arms, we continue to suffer all the social, political, economic and cultural deprivations of a colonised people.
- That the most urgent task facing us as workers, as black workers, and as part of the black oppressed, is to use our organised strength both at the point of production and among our communities, to put an end to the racial tyranny and to help bring about a united, non-racial, non-sexist democratic South Africa based on one person, one vote, is broadly defined in the Freedom Charter.

- That we see the winning of such a non-racial democracy as part of a continuous process of creating conditions for the building of a socialist society which will be in the interests of all our people; a society free of exploitation of person by person which alone can complete the liberation objectives in all spheres of life.
- That we are the most vital social constituent of the broad liberation movement in which we play a part both as individuals and through our trade unions and political organisations. We stand ready to work together with all other classes and groups genuinely committed to non-racial democracy, at the same time safeguarding our class independence and our right to propagate and mobilise for a socialist future.
- That we extend a hand of friendship to our white class brothers and sisters whose long-term interests lie in the unity of all labour—black and white.

In order to ensure:

- That victory in the national liberation movement is not hijacked by a new exploiting class of whatever colour;
- that the immediate interest of the working people are fully safeguarded in the post-apartheid state; and
- that we are not prevented from asserting our democratic right to win the majority of the people for a socialist future.

We the working people, adopt this charter (as an elaboration of the Freedom Charter) and pledge ourselves to strike together, using our organised strength, to guarantee its implementation.

### Ownership and Control of the Economy

The commanding heights of the economy shall be placed under the ownership and overall control of the state acting on behalf of the people. Such control shall not be exercised in an over-centralised or commandist way and must ensure active participation in the planning and running of the enterprises by workers at the point of production and through their trade unions.

Economic policy shall aim to generate the resources needed to correct the economic imbalances imposed by race domination, and bring about wealth redistribution for the benefit for the people as a whole. More particularly, steps shall be taken to do away with the white monopoly of ownership and managerial control.

Participation in the state sector by domestic or foreign private capital, where judged necessary, shall not give such capital a controlling share, and all enterprises, whether state-owned or private, shall be compelled to safeguard the interests of workers and the nation as a whole. The continued operation of market forces in the functioning of economy shall not prevent state intervention in areas relating to the people's basic needs.

In the period after the defeat of the race tyranny, the fundamental perspective of working-class political and

trade union organisations shall be to work for the creation of economic and social conditions making possible a steady advance towards a democratic socialist society.

### The Right and Duty To Work and To [Earn] a Living Wage

Every adult person has a right and duty to work and to receive remuneration according to his or her contribution. The new state shall, as a matter of priority, work to create economic conditions in which jobs are available to all. Until this is achieved the state shall ensure that social support is provided for the unemployed and members of their families.

All managerial and administrative posts and other jobs shall be open to every qualified citizen irrespective of race, colour, sex or religion. The equal right of access to jobs, managerial and administrative posts shall be subject to positive measures necessary to correct the imbalances inherited from the era of race discrimination. Public and private institutions shall have a duty to provide facilities for training and opportunities to apply the acquired skills.

The state, in consultation with the trade unions, shall adopt and enforce a national minimum wage.

Child labour and all forms of forced and semi-forced labour shall be prohibited. Special attention shall be paid to redressing the oppressive situation involved in farm-work, domestic service and those trapped in the so-called homelands.

### The Right to Organisation and Struggle

There shall be no restrictions on the right of workers to organise themselves into political parties or trade unions. Trade union organisation shall be based on the principles of "one industry—one union" and "one country—one federation".

Trade unions and their federation shall be completely independent and answerable only to the decisions of their members or affiliates, democratically arrived at. No political party, state organ or enterprise, whether public, private or mixed, shall directly or indirectly interfere with such independence.

The state shall ensure that the trade unions, as the key mass social organisation of the organised working class, are given the opportunity to participate at all levels of economic planning and implementation.

All workers, in every sector of the economy, shall have the right, through their trade unions, to engage freely in collective bargaining and to use the strike weapon.

All legislation dealing with procedures for collective bargaining, including any limitations on the right to strike in exceptional cases, shall require the consent of a majority in the trade union movement.

In the case of all other labour legislation there shall be prior consultation with the trade union movement whose views on such proposed legislation should be timeously tabled in parliament.

#### **The Right to Media Access**

Steps shall be taken to break the existing media monopoly by big business and the state and to ensure effective workers' access to all sections of the media.

#### **The Right to Family Life and Social Facilities**

All legislation and labour practices which prevent or interfere with the right of families to live together shall be outlawed. Migrant labour shall be phased out or, in cases where it is unavoidable, provision shall be made for family accommodation during any period of service exceeding three months.

The state shall aim to make adequate accommodation and children's schools available to all workers and their families close to their places of work. All enterprises shall help to create local or regional recreational facilities for the work-force as well as creches and primary health care facilities.

No parent, male or female, shall be disadvantaged or disabled from any form of employment by virtue of his or her duty to help rear children and, where necessary, this shall be ensured by the creation of special facilities including provision for paid maternity and paternity leave.

#### **The Right to Health and Safety**

Conditions of work shall not threaten the health, safety and wellbeing of the workforce or of the community at large, or create serious ecological risks.

All workers shall have the right to paid annual leave and paid sick leave.

Those injured at work shall receive proper compensation for themselves and their families. Provision shall be made for the rehabilitation of all disabled workers including, where necessary, the provision of alternative employment.

#### **The Right to Security in Old Age**

All workers shall be entitled to an adequate pension on retirement, provided either by the state or the relevant enterprise.

#### **The Right of Women Workers**

The state shall aim to integrate all women workers as full and equal participants in the economy. Any form of discrimination against women workers in regard to job allocation, wages, working conditions, training, benefits, etc. shall be prohibited.

Positive steps shall be taken to help correct the discrimination suffered by women both in the workplace and the

home. Opportunities shall be created to enable women to acquire skills for employment outside the home.

It shall be the duty of the state, trade unions, workers, political parties and all other mass and social organisations to ensure effective women's participation at leadership, management and other levels to take measures, including educational campaigns to combat all forms of male chauvinism both in the home and outside.

We declare that the above immediate and long-term objectives are in the best interest of all the working people and of society as a whole, as individuals and as part of the organised working class, we pledge to struggle, side by side, for their full implementation.

#### **\* SACTU Draft Charter**

34000331 Braamfontein WORK IN PROGRESS  
in English Nov/Dec 89 pp 44-45

[Article: "The Sactu Draft Charter"]

[Text] We, the workers of South Africa, declared that the future of the people of South Africa lies in the hands of the workers. It is only the working class, in alliance with other progressive-minded sections of our community, who can build a happy life for all South Africans, a life free from unemployment, insecurity and poverty, free from racial hatred and oppression, a life of vast opportunity for all our people.

The working class can only succeed in this great and noble endeavour if it itself is united and strong, if it is conscious of its inspiring responsibility. The workers of South Africa need a united trade union federation in which all sections of the working class can play their part unhindered by prejudice or racial discrimination. Only such a truly united federation can serve effectively the interest of the workers, both our immediate interests of higher wages and better working conditions, and our ultimate objective of complete emancipation from national oppression and economic exploitation.

There can be no peace in our country or in the world until all forms of racial discrimination, oppression and exploitation are completely abolished. We, the workers of South Africa, resolve to protect the interest of all workers with our guiding motto:

An injury to one is an injury to all.

#### **All Workers Shall Have the Right To Work**

The most fundamental right of every worker is the right to work.

In a free and united democratic non-racial South Africa, every worker shall be guaranteed the right to work.

#### **All Workers Shall Have the Right to:**

- a. Form and join trade unions of their choice.



b. Organise trade unions on the basis of one industry, one union.

c. Organise all unorganised workers.

d. Work towards unification of all democratic trade unions into one national federation.

e. Oppose victimisation, harassment, bannings, banishment and imprisonment of trade unionists and workers.

f. Reject all forms of representation which are not in conformity with the principles of democracy.

#### **All Workers Shall Have the Right to Freedom of Movement, Assembly and Speech**

Passes shall be abolished and all pass laws shall be repealed. All workers shall receive equal treatment at the workplace and before any court of law.

#### **All Workers Shall Have the Right To Live With Their Families in Decent Housing Near Their Place of Work**

The state shall provide workers with accommodation, recreational facilities, creches, nursery schools and playgrounds for our children.

All racist legislation restricting the right of our people to live where they choose—like influx control and Group Areas—shall be abolished.

#### **There Shall Be Equal Opportunities for All Workers**

Workers shall not be discriminated against on the basis of race, class, colour, sex or religion. All forms of education and training shall be free and compulsory for all.

Workers shall have the unconditional right to strike in support of their demands.

There are irreconcilable contradictions between capital and labour, therefore workers shall have the right to withdraw their labour to win their demands.

#### **Workers Shall Be Paid a Wage Which Enables Him/Her To Satisfy the Minimum Needs of the Family**

a. Discrimination in wages on the basis of colour and sex shall be abolished.

b. All workers shall be paid a living wage.

c. A national minimum wage (NMW) enforced by law shall be established, linked to the rate of inflation.

d. The national minimum wage shall take into account the need to cover rent, electricity and water, upkeep of the home, food and clothing, transport and entertainment.

#### **Workers Shall Have the Right to:**

a. Free medical care.

b. Three weeks sick leave per annum on full pay.

c. Four weeks annual leave on full pay.

d. Women workers shall be guaranteed the right to return to their jobs at the same rate of pay after maternity leave.

#### **There Shall Be a Maximum Eight-Hour Working Day**

a. In order to ensure full employment, a maximum of eight hours per day shall be worked, i.e. a basic 40 hours per week.

b. Overtime must be banned and the working day shortened.

c. Shift work shall be shortened/abolished.

d. Where workers are involved in strenuous work, a six-hour day shall be worked, i.e. 30 hours a week.

This will ensure adequate time for rest and leisure, giving workers the opportunity to develop their talents and skills unrelated to their specific jobs. This will encourage all-round development of the worker.

#### **Unemployed Workers Shall Be the Responsibility of the State**

a. Unemployed workers shall be entitled to unemployment benefits, which will take into account all the basic needs of the worker and his/her family.

b. Unemployed workers will shall be the responsibility of the state and will be fully supported.

#### **All Workers Shall Be Eligible for Retirement With Full Pension**

Pensioners shall be the responsibility of the state.

Male workers shall be eligible for pension at the age of 60. Those doing strenuous work shall be eligible for pension at 55.

Female workers shall be eligible for pension at 55.

#### **Health and Safety Shall Be Guaranteed**

a. A 'health and safety at work' charter should be evolved to guarantee the wellbeing and safety of workers.

b. Families of those injured at work and the injured workers themselves shall be fully compensated.

#### **Women Workers Shall Have the Right To Participate in All Sectors of the Economy Without Discrimination**

a. Women workers shall enjoy full rights as equal participants in the economy of our country.

b. Women workers shall be guaranteed their jobs back after maternity leave at the same rate or higher rates of pay.



c. Childcare shall be available for the children of working parents.

d. Women shall have the right to train for any job they wish to.

**All Racist Labour Legislation Shall Be Outlawed, Including the Racist Labour Relations Amendment Act**

All restrictive racist labour legislation shall be abolished—such as influx control and the Group Areas Act.

**All Workers Shall Have Full Political Rights**

All workers shall have the right to vote without any qualification and to stand as candidates for all institutions which make laws that govern the people in a united people's state.

Workers shall have greater control over and share in the wealth they produce.

All workers and people shall have a universal franchise in South Africa.

The working class, the peasantry, revolutionary intelligentsia, progressive youth and women shall fight side by side until South Africa is free from national oppression and economic exploitation.

An injury to one is an injury to all.

**\* 1913 Charter**

34000331 Braamfontein WORK IN PROGRESS  
in English Nov/Dec 89 pp 45-45

[Article: "The 1913 Charter: A Minimum Wage"]

[Text] The workers' charter currently being prepared is the third such document to have been drafted in South Africa.

The first, drawn up in 1913, was the product of a period of militancy centred on white mineworkers on the Witwatersrand.

Drafted jointly by white Transvaal-based unions, the charter focused on workplace issues and job protection.

Its immediate demands included an eight-hour work day and a minimum wage for skilled workers. It also covered overtime, apprenticeships, notice periods and a range of issues specifically related to conditions on the mines.

Very much a product of its time, the charter demanded a minimum wage for white unskilled workers.

The first charter's broader demands included the right to strike, to meet and to enjoy freedom of speech.

Along with its insistence on the enforcement of an eight-hour work day throughout the country, it demanded limited overtime or Sunday work, healthy working conditions and a greater government role—

through the establishment of wage boards, the consolidation of benefit societies under state control and the drafting of a national Workmen's Compensation Act.

The second workers' charter was drafted in 1943 and '44 by the South African Trades and Labour Council (SATLC) in response to a suggestion from prime minister Jan Smuts that the labour movement draw up a code for submission to his government.

SATLC was the first major initiative towards non-racial trade unionism in South Africa, although African workers never made up more than a tiny minority of its members.

Passed in November 1944, the SATLC charter was a far broader document than its 1913 predecessor, seeking not merely to protect workers from the excesses of their employers, but the ultimate eradication of capitalism.

Its preamble asserted: 'Organised workers... know... the only solution to our problem lies in South Africa adopting socialism as our form of government.'

Against this background, the SATLC charter dealt extensively with agricultural policy and agricultural workers, education, health, housing and labour laws.

It also included a bill of rights which envisaged:

- the right to full employment and to security from loss of income;
- the right to decent housing, clothing, food and medical services;
- the right to recreation and leisure;
- the right to free education; and
- the right to freedom of association, speech, assembly, movement and worship.

The charter also demanded legal entrenchment of a 40-hour working week; the right to join trade unions and to strike; a minimum wage; an industrial court; equal opportunity and pay for women workers; paid maternity leave and creche facilities.

**\* Writers Propose Alternative Afrikaans Culture**

34000364C Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 15-20 Dec 89 p 21

[Article by Hans Pienaar; first paragraph is THE WEEKLY MAIL introduction]

[Text] The Afrikaanse Skrywersgilde has veered to the left. But did it turn sharply enough? Hans Pienaar reports on the organization's decision to help promote a progressive culture—and its indecision on a cultural boycott.

The Afrikaanse Skrywersgilde emerged at its 14th annual meeting at Broederstroom this month as the only Afrikaans organisation with some clout that is willing to throw its weight behind efforts to create a progressive South African culture.

It adopted a re-drafted and expanded constitution which called for co-operation with organisations devoted to the "establishment and maintenance of a non-racial, democratic and unified South Africa..."

And it voted in a new progressive and dynamic executive consisting almost entirely of members of the Victoria Falls delegation that welcomed the African National Congress's position paper on the cultural boycott.

Also significant was a resolution to investigate the establishment and promotion of alternative production systems in order to develop an alternative culture in Afrikaans.

However, there was both caution about and outright rejection of the idea of a cultural desk like that of the Mass Democratic Movement [MDM] administering the cultural boycott and in effect controlling culture. The Gilde decided first to investigate the implications of supporting the cultural boycott and then to have various regions discuss a report.

After these discussions members will be asked to vote on a stand; for this the date of the next annual meeting will be advanced to early next year.

That the Gilde will act as an anti-censorship pressure group within the cultural groupings of the MDM was evident from the election of moderates as president and vice-president. Both were also supported by Gilde members who are also members of the Congress of South African Writers.

New president Charles Malan is well-known as a strong critic of prescriptive tendencies in some progressive circles. Vice-president Fanie Olivier, one of the drafters of the Victoria Falls communique, was involved at the meeting in a heated exchange with cultural activist Wilhelm Liebenberg.

He castigated Liebenberg for using terms like "isolation and disposal of opposition culture" in his description of "cultural strategies in the struggle for liberation". (Other participants accused Liebenberg of treating members of the Gilde like "useful idiots" to be manipulated at will.)

The meeting was also characterised by an unusual lack of interest from many writers, especially on the first two days, which were devoted to discussions of the role of the writer in democratisation.

#### UDF Leader Morobe on Recent Political Events

34000335A Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 5-11 Jan 90 pp 6-7

[Interview with UDF's Murphy Morobe]

[Text] NEW NATION: What are the implications for the South African liberation struggle of the adoption last month by the United Nations of a modified version of

the OAU [Organization of African Unity]'s Harare Declaration which sets out preconditions for negotiations in the country?

[Morobe] The UN's adoption of a slightly amended version of the Harare Declaration is very significant in the sense that the liberation movement was able to take stock of the situation and to make an active intervention to ensure that the struggles of our people are not diluted or led astray by various opportunistic elements.

Embodied in the declaration are the aspirations of our people. The various sections of the document, particularly on the involvement of the international community, makes the point that it is the people of South Africa who have to determine what role the international community will play.

This will avoid a situation where we become totally subservient to external or international demands and conspiracies. We have to determine our own future.

[THE NEW NATION] It has been said that the growing possibility of negotiations and international recognition for the Harare Declaration is likely to bring about a reduction in the armed struggle. Do you think this is likely?

[Morobe] If the response of the regime is a genuine one in terms of the conditions laid out by the declaration, then there should be no problems of armed struggle, violence and conflict.

After all, our struggle is not about violence but about the achievement of peace and democracy. Where the possibilities exist for the resolution of our conflict with minimum force being used, that is the situation that has to be encouraged.

For example, the events in Rumania were very unfortunate. In other parts of Eastern Europe very significant changes were brought about without the need for the authorities or the masses themselves to resort to violence.

Everybody who is concerned about democracy was concerned about the Rumanian developments, especially after applauding the government of the GDR for opening up the Berlin Wall and allowing greater freedoms without a shot being fired.

Equally with our struggle here, our basic consideration is that we achieve our freedom with the minimum loss of life. The declaration is welcome for the extent to which it can contribute to this.

But what is important to note is that the document itself does not in any way presuppose minimising all forms of struggle against the regime, including the armed struggle.

[THE NEW NATION] How are we affected by recent events in Eastern Europe?

[Morobe] I cannot pretend to understand exactly what is happening in those countries and what it means for the future. But I think it poses very important challenges for us to grapple with the process that is unfolding there, especially in this era, where nobody can claim an isolated existence in today's world.

It is the era of international politics and economics. Whatever happens in any part of the globe, whether in Burundi or whether it is in Papua New Guinea, it has an effect on all sectors of the international community.

Therefore there are important lessons for us from Eastern Europe. Some of those lessons are not new, even for the fathers of Marxism, from Karl Marx to Lenin.

It is a dialectical process which tells us that nothing remains the same for ever. Anything that interacts with other forces gets to change. In that sense, what is happening should not come as a surprise for us.

Capitalism today is also undergoing changes and has become an increasingly decadent social formation. The struggle between U.S. president George Bush and Panamanian leader [Manuel] Noriega typifies that.

The struggles between the drug barons and the authorities in Colombia are also nothing more than struggles between representatives of capitalist institutions where this decadence has set in.

The crux of the matter is that the whole world is going through tremendous changes. Maybe we are lucky that in Africa we are the last to win our freedom and can benefit from the experiences of everyone else in setting up a new society and a functioning democracy.

[THE NEW NATION] If we can move onto something very topical for our own situation, it seems clear that Mandela will be released in 1990. Some observers claim that there is a personality cult around Mandela and he could operate beyond the organisation discipline of the liberation forces. Has the MDM [Mass Democratic Movement] started planning how he will be reabsorbed into political structures as the "ANC Seven" have been?

[Morobe] Nelson Mandela is not only the leader of the UDF [United Democratic Front] or Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] or even the ANC. He is the people's leader and his leadership transcends parochial ideological concerns. He is the kind of leader who has an appeal to a broad range of people of different ideological persuasions and classes.

The challenge for Nelson Mandela and his organisation is to ensure that he remains the unifying figure he has become.

We must not deny him the space to realise his true leadership and not just that of the UDF or Cosatu.

This approach would not be undetermined by any fears of the personality cult because the *modus operandi* within the ANC guards against the development of a

personality cult. The collective nature of the leadership ensures that no one person can take all decisions.

Although we as the UDF or the MDM may have been at the forefront of demanding Mandela's release, we will not claim a monopoly over him. Whatever he has been doing all these years has been in the service of the people and all the people are not organised in the UDF or in Cosatu.

[THE NEW NATION] We have seen in the past few months the rise of the Africanist movement. What implications does this have for the MDM?

[Morobe] The MDM has never claimed a monopoly of beliefs and views. We have always had an understanding that the struggle belongs to the people. The talk of the rise of the Africanist movement is not something to make us unduly worried or concerned because we have very strong and effective political content.

We believe that the correctness of our line can only be tested in practice and, at the end of the day, it is the people who make the decision as to which political position appeals to them. It is our task to fight for that political position.

The Africanists will have to come out with a programme themselves. I believe that the MDM approach is a very pragmatic one. It has effective mass action. The question is whether we can sustain this approach as the struggle progresses.

[THE NEW NATION] What is the significance of the deepening split between the Africanists and the BC [Black Consciousness] movement?

[Morobe] The significance of that development is no different to the acceptance that there are differences within the liberation movement; within the MDM itself. We accept that there is a diversity of opinions. Hence there is no absolute, even in our approach as the UDF.

When the UDF was formed as a front, it was done so on the understanding that people have different approaches.

Even within the ANC there are people with different political beliefs.

The unifying perspective is opposition to white minority rule in our country.

The question then becomes that of the future, where the future non-racial government must ensure that a range of political views are accommodated.

At the end of the day, democracy through universal franchise must determine which political party rules the country.

[THE NEW NATION] Was the Conference for a Democratic Future (CDF) a success and can we expect more of such gatherings in future?

[Morobe] As far as the UDF and many organisations within the fold of the MDM are concerned, the most important thing was the process leading to and beyond the CDF. At the CDF itself, there were a number of problems.

The conference took us beyond the confines of our sectarian boundaries and drew more forces to the people's camp. In that sense, the CDF achieved a lot.

The CDF was a lesson in democracy for all of us. The fact that we reached the end of the conference without any major problems was a victory.

There were some disquieting moments in the conference such as when some small group vociferously announced their departure from the conference. Nevertheless we remained confident that the majority of delegates were committed to remaining for the whole conference.

The future beyond the CDF will be determined by how we consolidate the gains made at the conference.

For us, one of the most significant events was the adoption by the conference of the Harare Declaration. We must now ensure that all people in every corner of our country understand the content of the declaration.

[THE NEW NATION] Some people have great expectations of F. W. deKlerk's government bringing about major changes in the country. How does the MDM view the government's new leader?

[Morobe] DeKlerk has a big task ahead of him fulfilling these expectations. The creation of these expectations are beyond DeKlerk's control. It was imperative for the National Party ruler beyond P. W. Botha to take the steps that DeKlerk has done.

The rulers in our country had no other option but to respond to the mass struggles of the people.

The response of the rulers has provided new ground and new space to organise and the liberation movement can never and should never turn a blind eye to new conditions.

DeKlerk did not fear the UDF, he did not fear the ANC but he should fear the masses.

His task is to ensure that the masses do not encounter any obstacles along the path to freedom.

#### **\* COSATU's Mufamadi on 'Workers' Struggle'**

34000335B Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 21 Dec 89-4 Jan 90 pp 16-17

[Interview with COSATU Assistant Gen Sec Sydney Mufamadi]

[Text] The last 10 years have witnessed some of the most far-reaching advances in the history of labour struggle in

SA [South Africa]. Black workers fought for, and won the right to form legally recognised trade unions.

Having won that right they set about building the biggest labour federation in SA, which has among its affiliates some of the most powerful industrial unions.

NEW NATION spoke to Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] assistant general secretary, Sydney Mufamadi, about these developments.

[THE NEW NATION] What would you say represents the most significant achievement of the labour movement in the last decade?

[Mufamadi] Unity across a broad spectrum was probably the most important. In 1981 in particular, the question of unity, not only against the regime but [on a class basis], was placed topmost on the agenda of the trade unions in our country.

Hence, a series of unity talks among progressive trade unions, which started with a meeting at Langa in Cape Town in August 1981, were held. Since then, organised workers never looked back.

Ultimately, after four years of debates, sometimes sharp, the Congress of SA Trade Unions was formed.

In the interest of that broader unity, the Federation of SA Trade Unions (Fosatu) dissolved itself into various independent unions to join with other unions to form Cosatu.

In situations where we saw the possibility of cooperating with other unions outside our fold, as with Nactu [National Council of Trade Unions] and the unaffiliated unions in the anti-LRAA [Labor Relations Act] campaign, we came together.

So I'm saying that the decade that is just about to come to an end has seen us acting in unity on all fronts, including with other formations in the democratic movement.

So that is an important achievement—to get together forces that do not necessarily agree on everything, but agree on the need to fight oppression and exploitation.

[THE NEW NATION] In as far as Cosatu goes, what would you say were the most important advances during the last four years?

[Mufamadi] Once again the point of departure is the question of unity. We have succeeded in building national industrial unions in every major sector of the economy along the lines of "one union one industry". This means that we have consolidated the strength of workers.

That has actually paid dividends in that you begin to see that the striking capacity of workers—not striking in the narrow sense of downing tools, but in terms of them having to fight for their rights—being strengthened.



Not only were workers able to mobilise national strikes in any one industrial sector, but they were also able to generate solidarity action involving Cosatu members in other industries. This is basically what working class solidarity is all about.

[THE NEW NATION] Ultimate organisational unity still seems out of reach—what are the issues?

[Mufamadi] We continue to look for unifying perspectives between workers who are organised in Cosatu and those that are organised elsewhere. We cannot rest and be satisfied that we have Cosatu and therefore those workers outside should remain where they are. However, we are not necessarily saying that everyone must come into Cosatu. I think we are open minded on this issue. We are prepared to discuss unity and agree on the form which that unity will have to take. We, however, remain convinced that there is nothing stronger than one federation in our country. Our ultimate objective therefore remains transforming unity in action into organisational unity.

[THE NEW NATION] Cosatu has in the last four years moved very rapidly onto the centre stage of the political struggle—what is the significance of this in terms of working class leadership in the struggle?

[Mufamadi] Cosatu is a trade union federation, and therefore the organ of the organised working class. What needs to be said is that Cosatu was not pushed into the political arena—Cosatu belongs there.

It belongs there because it organises workers whose aspirations cannot be met with the apartheid system still in place—the apartheid system which was brought about to yield super-profits for the bosses.

The struggles against this system of apartheid were met with naked terror, which took many forms—detention without trial and the banning of organisations. A situation was created where [a previous federation], Sactu [South African Congress of Trade Unions], was forced underground through this type of repression. I'm saying that we exist under similar conditions.

This raises the question of the role of organised workers in the broader struggle for democracy in SA. But of course, there are more profound and deeper questions to be answered. No [transformation], anywhere in the world, could avoid the role of the working class in the struggle for liberation.

Exploitation can only be removed if you have a social organ in which the working class and its allies will be seen to be in the driving seat.

But of course, the working class is not installed into that seat. In a situation where preparations are made to reach an exploitation-free society, the working class must prove in action that it has the capacity to articulate a programme for an exploitation free society.

[THE NEW NATION] Looking at this year in particular, which single victory stands out in your mind?

[Mufamadi] Because of our determination to render the LRAA unworkable, we managed to push the employers from a position of giving the Act unqualified support to a position of wishy-washy support. That is significant.

[THE NEW NATION] Were there any setbacks?

[Mufamadi] To a very large extent our capacity to mobilise action against issues on the shop floor was not maximised. This was because our resources were over-stretched during the campaign against the LRAA.

This is also why we have been unable to mobilise effective solidarity action around strikes this year.

#### \* Refugee Problem Drains Gazankulu's Finances

34000364B Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English  
7 Jan 90 p 9

[Text] Gazankulu's limited financial resources are being drained by the presence of more than 40,000 Mozambique refugees in the homeland.

Despite the financial hardships, the refugees' medical needs are met free of charge, with churches and welfare organisations contributing to the well-being of registered refugees in many ways.

Gazankulu's geographical location makes it the first territory the refugees enter.

There is also a strong cultural link between some Mozambican tribes and the Tsongas of Gazankulu.

Gazankulu Chief Minister Prof Hudson Ntsanwisi acknowledges his responsibility to take care of the refugees, although he has limited financial resources.

The refugees fled Mozambique because their lives were endangered by a civil war raging between the government forces and rebel Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] forces.

The war has crippled a country which used to have a flourishing tourist industry. Today Mozambique can hardly afford to feed its own citizens.

South Africa has often been accused of having links with Renamo which have already cost thousands of lives.

Many refugees die while crossing the border on an electrified fence erected by South Africa to prevent infiltration by illegal immigrants. Others die in attacks by wild animals.

**\* PAM Leader Explains Organization's Outlook**

34000352C Johannesburg SOWETAN in English  
19 Dec 89 p 6

[Article by Quraish Patel in the "Focus" column: "Return of the Land to the People—Peasant Farmer With a Mission"]

[Text] Clarence Mlamli Makwetu is a peasant who farms in Transkei. The 61-year-old former Robben Island prisoner is known to few white people and he is not among the "who's who" of recognised black leaders.

But he has been unanimously elected by 2,000 people from all over the country to led an organisation whose significance is likely to affect the political life of the country.

The people who elected Makwetu did not consider it important that he lives in a remote, dusty Transkeian village called Cofimvaba, near Queenstown.

It was enough for them that Makwetu had walked with Robert Sobukwe during the height of the Pan Africanist Congress [PAC] defiance against the pass laws in the early Sixties; the Makwetu had been actively involved in organising PAC branches and that his involvement in the fight against apartheid began when he was a Youth League member of the ANC [African National Congress] in 1953 and that to them he is their chosen leader.

**Leader**

As a farmer, he loves the land and as a leader of the Pan Africanist Movement—which shares the same political views as the banned PAC—Makwetu will attempt to give prominence to the "return of the land to the people".

"The people" are previous generations of Africans driven off their land by Voortekkers and British soldiers.

"The people" had no knowledge of and were not part of the title-deed system devised by whites to indicate legal ownership of the land occupied mostly through force by foreigners.

According to the declaration of the Pan Africanist Movement [PAM] to the people of Azania, the "struggle by Africans" is against dispossession of land and oppression.

"The struggle is led by the African working class to ensure democracy and the redistribution of resources, particularly land."

Among the guiding principles of the declaration are non-racialism, non-collaboration, the recognition of universal human rights, a planned economy in which "transport, electricity supply, mining and water supply shall be in the hands of the state".

Also in the declaration are the provision of housing as a state duty, free health care and facilities, free education and state-backed plans to reduce illiteracy, independent

trade unions as watchdogs of workers' interest, religious freedom and equality of sexes, and the right of all persons over 21 to vote and to stand for election.

Some of these principles are not unlike those of other ANC's or other anti-apartheid organisations. But between the Africanists and the Charterists (those who adhere to the ANC's Freedom Charter) lies a wide chasm.

The ANC's vision of a "mixed economy" conflicts sharply with the PAM's "planned economy".

Benny Alexander, PAM's general secretary, said the vision of a future society was not based on a slavish imitation of Eastern European socialism.

"We have no intention of a bastard importation of any Eastern model of socialism. Ours will evolve in the unique circumstances of Southern Africa. We do not believe authoritarianism is inherent in a system of a planned economy. Socialism properly practised is the highest form of democracy."

The ANC and the MDM [Mass Democratic Movement]'s recent listing of pre-conditions to negotiations has drawn a sharp response from PAM which wants to negotiate only for the transfer of power to the majority.

It also wants negotiations between "progressive organisations" in an effort to end apartheid. It is not interested in talking about "concessions."

PAM and the MDM differ even on the meaning of "non-racialism".

Alexander said: "Non-racialism does not imply equality of the different race groups. We believe there is only one race—the human race. Africanists were the first to put non-racialism on the agenda when others were talking about multi-racialism."

PAM's idea of non-racialism means that "Africans" include white, Indian and coloured people who are committed to the guiding principles of Africanism. Africanists strenuously oppose claims that "whites will be driven to the sea" after seizure of power.

**Allies**

They say that's white propaganda aimed at driving away allies.

Enjoying dominant public support and media attention, the ANC and the MDM are believed to be central players in the battle for anti-apartheid supporters. That view may be short-sighted and superficial.

Unlike the ANC, Africanists have barely had the chance to initiate their ideas and develop support among the people. Soon after the breakaway from the ANC in 1959, the PAC launched an anti-pass laws campaign and managed, in a short time, to draw huge crowds into the streets.

The banning of the organisation, the arrest and incarceration of leader Robert Sobukwe and the bitter wrangles within the PAC abroad during the Sixties and Seventies have done little to stem the resurgence of militancy that has grown into PAM.

Except for the question of violence, PAC and PAM have the same political views.

#### Power

Dismissing the Africanists—as many seem to be doing—from the political power game is premature: they are organising branches throughout the country, they insist on paying their own way to meetings and conferences, they say they are not concerned about foreign funding, and they say they won't compromise their principles.

Africanists' tentacles reach deeply into student, community, union and women's organisations. They have hinted at "mass action" on an unprecedented scale.

They do not have legend like Nelson Mandela, but they remember Sobukwe with great affection; Oliver Tambo towers over Makwetu; the ANC's international image is unquestionable; many will say the ANC is the premier "liberation organisation". All this is true.

So why do the stirrings of Africanism arouse such uneasiness?

#### \* Rockman's Union Launches Defiance Campaign

34000352A Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN in English*  
19 Jan 90 p 12

[Article by Bert van Hees: "Popcru Plans a Defiance Campaign"]

[Text] The illegal police and Prisons Service civil rights unions, Popcru, formed last year by controversial police officer Lieutenant Gregory Rockman, is set to embark on a defiance campaign against "anything and everything inhumane."

Lieutenant Rockman told a Press conference last night that the union was set to become "very prominent this year," and would highlight all instances of racial discrimination in the SA [South Africa] Police and the Prisons Service.

"Our New Year message is that Popcru members will obey everything that is humane, but anything inhumane will be defied," he said.

He told reporters he himself was "standing with my back to the wall," at a departmental inquiry on various counts, including speaking unlawfully to the Press, "while nothing is happening to those policemen who beat innocent women and others during illegal gathering in Mitchell's Plain last year."

Lieutenant Rockman said Popcru had succeeded in enlisting 2,000 members throughout the country, and was fast becoming a national organisation.

"We have already established seven regional branches, with the aim of phasing out all forms of discrimination," he said.

He said Popcru would also negotiate for better pay packages for members of the SAP [South African Police] and Prisons Service, and ensure that members were accorded their basic human rights.

"We want to improve the image of both the police and Prison Service. We want a properly functioning police force, which will be seen as a service to the public.

"Members of the Popcru will refuse to enforce oppressive laws on people," he said.

He said South Africans lived, breathed and spoke nothing but politics, but politics and the police had to be separated, and Popcru aimed at changing the image of the police for the new South Africa.

Last year, he said, he had asked for an interview with both the Minister and the Commissioner of Police about police brutality, "but nothing was done about my complaints."

This year, he said, Popcru would send a facsimile message to the Ministers of Police and Justice about it.

He said Popcru had also sent a "10-point agenda" to the Commissioner of Prisons Service, raising important issues. [quotation marks as published]

"The result was discrimination against Popcru members. A warrant officer, for example, now does gate guard duty, while a Prisons Service lecturer was transferred to a workshop. He refused his demotion, and has been suspended," he said.

#### \* Report on Increase of Strike Action in 1989

34000354C Paris *THE INDIAN OCEAN*  
*NEWSLETTER in English* 13 Jan 90 p 6

[Text] According to the annual report drawn by the Levy, Porion and Associates business consultants, 50 percent more working days were lost in South Africa due to political strike action in 1989 than in 1988. In other words this means that there were over three million lost working days last year as against two million the previous year. The strike which had the greatest impact was the one called by black unions to protest against the elections of last September. The patronal lock-outs were responsible for 57,830 lost working days. Over three-quarters of this lost time was due to wage disputes. An important feature of these strikes is their duration. More than 15 percent of them lasted for longer than ten days and the ten longest strikes went on for between five and ten weeks. On the whole they were over pay and "few resulted in major gains for unions." The report then says that this is indicative of "the growing resolve on the part of employers to ride out strike action, especially where wages are concerned." It adds, "unions which strike at



levels far in excess of the going rate of wage settlements in the belief that they can realistically hold out for such increases may need to review their strategies."

Even if the level of strike action in 1989 was lower than the exceptionally high one of 1987, they contributed to the tensing of the social climate at the end of the year. Two especially tough disputes (in restaurants and on the railways) led to several clashes with police and between strikers and non-striking workers, which caused several dozen deaths. This situation leads the authors of the report to conclude with the following words, "It is clear that the future (of South Africa) is to be negotiated, and that one of the most important voices and forces in those negotiations will be that of organised labour."

#### \* Figures on Formal Education Compiled

34000356C Johannesburg *THE STAR* in English  
18 Jan 90 p 7

[Text] Bloemfontein—The total number of school pupils in South Africa is expected to be 14,509,900 by the turn of the century, according to enrolment forecasts made by the Research Institute for Education Planning (Riep).

Riep was established in 1974 as a research unit in the Department of Comparative Education at the University of the Orange Free State. Since January 1988 it has functioned on a more independent basis as an institute within the Faculty of Education.

In a brochure compiled to give a concise picture of formal school education in Southern Africa, Riep reveals that in 1988, 3 ½ times as many black pupils attended schools in South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei than all the white, coloured and Asian pupils together.

The largest percentage of black pupils attended schools in the self-governing states of South Africa (Gazankulu, kaNgwane, KwaNdebele, kwaZulu, Lebowa and QwaQwa), while those in Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei represented slightly more than a fifth of the total number of black pupils.

#### Repeating

Just more than half the total number of black pupils were enrolled in the junior primary phase of Sub A to Std 2.

The percentage of black pupils in Sub A was 16.6 percent of the total enrolment compared to 2.7 percent in Std 10.

This was ascribed, in part, to the large number of pupils who repeat a standard, and to pupils who leave and then return to school.

While there were fewer white children in the senior primary standards than in the junior secondary standards, pupils were distributed more evenly from Sub A (8.9 percent) to Std 10 (7.7 percent).

The higher percentage in the junior secondary phase could be attributed, among other things, to a lower birth rate since 1977.

Among coloureds the number of pupils in the senior secondary phase still represented a small percentage of enrolment in 1988.

About 13 percent were registered in Sub A and only 2.7 percent in Std 10.

There was an equal distribution from Sub A to Std 8 among Asian pupils in 1988, but from Std 8 to 10 a considerable decline was observed.

#### Highest

The junior primary phase represented 34 percent of total registrations, while only 13.2 percent was in the senior secondary phase.

The average growth rate of black registered pupils per annum from 1983 to 1988 was the highest of all population groups (4.8 percent).

The growth rate for coloureds was 1.8 percent and for Asians 0.6 percent, while white registrations declined in the period by an average of 0.8 percent.

The report predicts that 12,336,000 black pupils will attend school in the year 2000, compared to about 7,336,500 in 1989.

The present growth rate for coloureds will be maintained for the foreseeable future but might decline towards the end of the century, although an overall increase of 17.07 percent from 847,600 (1989) to 992,300 (2000) could occur.

There is a projected annual decrease in the numbers of white pupils from 916,900 in 1989 to 874,100 in 1994.

It is forecast that white enrolment will then rise to 909,100 by 1998 and be about 932,200 in 2000.

Asian enrolment is expected to decrease from 233,100 in 1989 to 230,100 in 1992 and then increase annually to be 249,400 in 2000.—Sapa.

#### \* Minister Announces No School Desegregation

34000354A Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN* in English  
12 Jan 90 pp 1, 2

[Text] Under the current SA [South Africa] Government the schooling system would never be desegregated, the Minister of Education and Development Aid, Dr Stoffel van der Merwe, said yesterday. Suddenly to desegregate all schools would create havoc, he added.

The government was, however, trying to move away from a system based on race to improve the situation, he told a Press conference at the Department of Education



and Training from Johannesburg Regional Offices' called in response to Sunday's demands from the Soweto education summit.

He said a survey indicated integration of schools would solve less than 20 percent of SA's educational problems.

Asked if schools would be desegregated if the Group Areas Act was scrapped, he said it would unnecessary, as people would still want to go to their own schools.

The worldwide tendency was not towards centralisation of education. He said Switzerland had 26 education departments and the U.S. had more than 3,000 school boards.

The Department of Education and Training was willing to talk to all people, including the recently-released ANC [African National Congress] leaders and others who had the interest of good Black education at heart.

But any talks with Mr Walter Sisulu and his colleagues would be in their personal capacities and not as representatives of the banned organisation, the Minister added.

"We would definitely not be talking to the ANC by talking to them."

Dr Van der Merwe said: "We would like the community at large to assist us in putting Black education right. Some structures already exist whereby we can hear their voices.

"I am also planning meeting with other groups and individuals, and we welcome talks with all who would like to promote the interests of Black education."

His department was prepared to appeal to the Ministries of Law and Order and Justice to lift restriction orders on individuals if such restrictees were willing to talk and end the problems experienced by Black pupils.

#### **\* More Black Students Apply to Indian Schools**

34000354B Durban POST NATAL in English  
17-20 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] Scores of black pupils yesterday applied for admittance to Indian schools under the control of the House of Delegates, following a promise made by the Department of Education and Culture that it would assist in minimising the black education crisis.

A snap survey by POST yesterday—the first day back at school this year for Indian pupils throughout the country—revealed principals of schools throughout the province had been approached for admission by black children, with as many as 20 applying to one school alone.

This demand follows statements made by the Minister of Education and Culture, Dr Kisten Rajoo, that his department was willing to assist black pupils in obtaining a decent education, especially those who were among the

58 percent who failed the Department of Education and Training matriculation examinations late last year.

Promising to help in whatever way he could, Dr Rajoo said Indian schools would be open in the afternoons and on Saturdays to provide tuition for black pupils.

The increase in applications for full-time admission comes as black schools are becoming increasingly beleaguered due to overcrowding, appalling teaching standards, and a complete breakdown of the schooling system.

Among the principals approached by POST was Mr Prem Huri, headmaster of Windsor Secondary School in Ladysmith, who said he had received 20 applications from blacks.

He said the applications would have to be processed before the pupils could be admitted.

Mr Anil Singh, principal of Ferndale Secondary in Phoenix, said there were "several" inquiries from black pupils.

"The pupils appear to be mainly from Kwa-Mashu," Mr Singh said.

"Although they have given no reason for their decision to apply at this school it would appear that the ongoing violence in the townships is a contributory factor."

Last year the school admitted three black pupils.

There were no inquiries from coloured pupils yesterday, the first day of the school term.

"However, it is still too early to give figures for the pupils admitted because some may be admitted later in the week."

Mr Manilall Singh, principal of Northmead Secondary in Phoenix, said a standard six black pupil had applied to be enrolled at his school but there were no inquiries from any black matriculants.

Marklands Secondary in Shallcross, which four years ago became one of the first schools under the control of the HoD to enrol black pupils, had two inquiries from black parents wanting to send their children to the school.

A spokesman said that by late yesterday the parents had not yet been to the school.

Lower Tugela Primary School in Mandini had five applications from class one and class two black pupils and these, in accordance with regulations, had been sent to the Department of Education and Culture in the HoD.

Three black pupils approached the Chatsworth Secondary School for accommodation—two standard six pupils and one standard six pupils and one standard eight pupil.

No black pupils made inquiries for admittance to Lenham Primary in Phoenix.

Commenting on the increase in applications yesterday, Mr Rajoo said it was the "duty of responsible educationists" to do their best to assist with the education of black children in every way possible.

He said he had received a letter from Dr Oscar Dhlomo, secretary-general of Inkatha and Minister of Education and Culture for KwaZulu, welcoming the HoD's initiative and accepting the offer.

PRO for the HoD, Mr Ramhishan Maharaj, said the application of those who had applied to Indian schools would be submitted to the department for approval, along with principals' recommendations.

Criteria which usually apply are:

- The pupil must be living within walking distance of school.
- The child must be proficient in the medium of instruction which in Indian schools is English.
- The intake in a particular class unit must be such that it does not alter the cultural pattern of the class unit, for example there cannot be 29 blacks and one Indian in a class.

Meanwhile the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Delegates expects about 23,000 pupils to be admitted to schools this year.

#### \* Role of Religious Community in Struggle Viewed

##### \* Part I

34000351A Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 5-11 Jan 90 p 14

[Paper by ICT General Secretary Smangaliso Mkhathshwa: "Quo Vadis—The Church of the Nineties," published in two parts]

[Text] For many South Africans the decade which ended last year was possibly one of the most significant in many years.

Since history is generally a continuous process, it would be naive and shortsighted to see the eighties in isolation from the seventies. The social events which culminated in the 1976/77 uprisings were to some extent a preparation for what happened in the decade.

Many people would agree that the eighties started on a rather low key and built up into the uprisings at various stages during the decade.

But suddenly 1989 has introduced new developments in the country which will decide the destiny of millions of our people.

These developments are not only shaped by the people of South Africa. They are also influenced by glasnost and perestroika and many other events around the world today.

While many analysts and representative of organisations are examining their own organisations in the light of the decade, our main focus will be the church.

To avoid any confusion, one must point out that, for many South Africans, "the church" is the main-line English-speaking missionary churches.

The millions of members of the independent churches and sects and members of non-Christian faiths like Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and Judaism are often excluded, if unconsciously, from our discussion on the role of the church in society.

For the purpose of this article it might be important to rather speak of the religious sector, because this category then includes every institution or organisation whose main business is religion.

Yet we cannot escape the fact that the vast majority of South Africans belong to the Christian church. The government of the day prides itself in being a Christian government.

The Christians in South Africa continue to play a particularly important role in the affairs of this country. By Christians we do not necessarily refer to those who are practising their faith. We are also referring to millions of people who at one time or another have come under the influence of the church or its teachings. Whether one agrees or not, the truth of the matter is that the influence of the Christian church is enormous.

For example, the Christian church provided a theological legitimization for white minority domination for many years.

It is the church that enjoyed very close ties with the colonialist powers who occupied and conquered the land of our forefathers. For better or for worse, many Christians and other people in South Africa are still influenced by the ethics of the church, its values, its outlook on life, and its continuing close ties with the Christian countries around the world.

It is also no exaggeration to say that the church in South Africa reflects the greater society. Hence the disproportionate influence of white people on church life.

We only need to look at their role in the leadership, financial control and theological education in the church.

It is common cause that, because of these divisions in the church, the religious sector does not speak with one voice on many social issues.

But our main focus in this article will be a critical analysis of the role the church over the past ten years, particularly in social life and development in South Africa.

It is not the intention of the article to examine each and every action, however good or bad, that religious

believers have engaged in over the past decade. Our attempt will be to try to understand the reasons why the church did what it did and what the significance of this has been.

The words of professor F. Houtart, a famous Belgian sociologist, must be taken seriously when he said: "Speeches of religious leaders, when they refer to these situations (i.e. situations of oppression, exploitation and dependence) remain much the same; and that is, on the one hand, descriptive, and on the other, moralistic, without any connecting analysis, either of causes or of the social dynamic of the relations between oppressor and the oppressed."

#### **The Church as a Site of Struggle**

There are many people who think of the church very glibly in terms of its being an agent of change in liberation or at least a potential one.

When, from time to time, the actions of the church seem ambiguous or full of contradictions, many people are therefore scandalised by this and accuse the church of turning its back on the liberation struggle or of supporting the other side.

We have the extreme viewpoint which dismisses the church as a completely irrelevant factor in the struggle for social change.

These see the struggle as taking place only outside the church and not within the church itself.

In 1985 the Kairos Document very clearly divided the action of the church or its self-understanding into three categories.

The first was state theology which seems to underpin the actions of other right-wing religious groups that have mushroomed all over South Africa.

The second was a traditional church theology which by and large supports the actions of believers of a liberal disposition.

Progressive democrats and activists found more comfort in what the Kairos Document describes as prophetic theology.

This kind of theology takes the social, political and economic realities of our situation very seriously and goes on to support the struggle for the total liberation of all God's people in our land.

How ought we then, understand the role of the church in the apartheid society?

#### **The Church and the Struggle for Social Change**

With very few exceptions, most religious organisations would agree that commitment to social justice is an essential part of evangelisation.

Not even the most conservative members of the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) would dispute this, except that they would apply this to the preservation of white minority domination.

At the time when the Afrikaners suffered under British imperialism, their church sided with the poor and the oppressed. They saw that expression of solidarity as "a way of Christ" and as a responsibility of their church.

Rev C. D. Brink, addressing the Volks Kongress in 1947, had this to say: "The aim of the church is to bring social justice. Justice must be done to the poor and the oppressed, and, if the present system does not serve this purpose, the public conscience must be roused to demand another.

"If the church does not exert itself for justice in society, and, together with the help she can offer, also be prepared to serve as champion for the cause of the poor, others will do it. The poor have their right to say: I do not ask for your charity, but I ask to be given an opportunity to live a life of human dignity."

A quick overview of developments during the past decade will help us to put our discussion in proper perspective.

By the end of the seventies, the church had generally accepted what had come to be known as "preferential option for the poor."

This means that the church has identified itself with the poor and the oppressed, but not only that. The church has also agreed that the oppressed people have the right as well as the duty to defend their rights and to struggle for their own liberation.

The church had agreed in principle that it was necessary to support the struggle of the young people, of the working class, the struggle of progressive professional people, and the struggle of all those who, in one form or the other, were involved in the creation of a new South Africa based on the values of justice, freedom, liberty, non-racialism and genuine democracy.

The early eighties ushered in a new era which culminated in the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983.

There was a very strong feeling that all the anti-apartheid forces and all those who are fighting for justice had to form a united front without formally joining the UDF as an organisation. The church was generally in agreement with what the UDF stood for.

The period from 1983 to 1986 saw what was probably the highest form of the church's involvement in community struggles.

The church was visible at funerals, especially mass funerals of political activists.

The church was seen to be actively intervening between people and the aggressive actions of the police and the army. It supported many detained people. The churches were present, particularly at commemoration services.

It witnessed the oppression and repression of millions of our people first hand. The church was seen to be identifying itself with the activities of the masses of our people.

Then came the imposition of the national state of emergency in 1986 when more than thirty thousand innocent South Africans were imprisoned and detained.

Between 1986 and 1988 the church looked as if it was "on hold" and showed signs of semi-paralysis.

An impression was given that it had somehow been held captive, although it was not banned or its activities restricted in any way.

The church was not seen to be taking any initiative until 1988, when the church leaders issued the following statement in response to the banning of 18 peaceful community organisations and 18 leaders.

This is what the statement said: "In responding to the current crisis we feel we must address primarily the oppressed people in our land, for it is they who will decide in the final analysis when apartheid is going to be abolished.

"We urge the oppressed to intensify the struggle for justice and peace in accordance with the gospel and we encourage them not to lose hope, for victory against evil in this world is guaranteed by our Lord.

"For our part we commit ourselves to exploring every possible avenue for continuing to carry out the activities which have been banned, in so far as we believe that they are mandated by the gospel.

"We now hope that the international community, and especially South Africa's major trading partners, will wake up to the fact that this illegitimate government is threatening their interests as well as the lives and security of black and white South Africans. It has shown quite clearly that it has nothing to offer but instability and bloodshed. It must be isolated to force it off the awful path it has taken".

For many people this meant that the church was willing and ready to involve itself actively in the struggle of the people.

However an unfortunate misunderstanding was created by the statement. For some people this meant that the church was only willing to involve itself in the struggle simply because the leaders of the people had been incarcerated. But for other people this meant that the church was merely continuing the struggle for justice which is its duty.

Then followed the march by eminent clergymen in Cape Town which was forcibly stopped by the police. The

mainline Christian denominations there decided to call a convocation of the church which was held on May 30, 1988. The purpose of that convocation was for the churches to take a clear stand against what they regarded as the excesses of apartheid; to take a stand against the madness of apartheid which had led to a situation of untold suffering by millions of our people.

## \* Part II

34000351B Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 12-18 Jan 90 p 5

[Text] The government plunged the country into a period of the state of emergency, which saw the truth being muzzled forcibly by the excessive control or shutting down of the progressive media; excessive control of funerals and commemoration services. This meant that South Africa was on the verge of total dictatorship.

As though this were not enough, a complete blanket of silence was thrown on South Africa with the result that the question of apartheid in South Africa was almost removed from the agenda of the international community.

During 1989 we have seen churches taking part in defiance marches. We have witnessed the release of the eight prominent African National Congress (ANC) leaders and we have heard much talk about negotiations.

We have seen the growth of the mass democratic movement (MDM).

A mild tension has arisen between the MDM and its allies on the one hand, and some church leaders on the other.

This was caused inter alia by the refusal of some church leaders to march in front of the Red Flag and some criticism of church leaders political interventions and statements on sanctions.

This overview would be incomplete without a word or two about the developments in our neighbouring countries.

The persistent attacks on and destabilisation of the Frelimo government, coup led with economic problems in Mozambique have facilitated healthy relations between the government and the church.

In Zimbabwe we witness a very warm relationship between the Robert Mugabe government and the church.

In Namibia, the church played a crucial role in the struggle for freedom.

Another interesting feature was the setting up of a religious department by the ANC in its Lusaka headquarters during the decade.

The churches have been in some alliance with the mass organisations and movements. The churches have also



taken initiative in offering relief to the defenceless, aiding the poor and intervening in the struggle for people's education.

The real question is, why has the church done these things? How has the church helped to promote the struggle for liberation of our people?

These questions have to be raised because what is important is not only the quantity of actions taken by the church, but it is the quality and extent to which these actions promoted genuine and fundamental social change.

One can ask how do they promote democracy, non-racialism, justice for everybody, peace and reconciliation? The mere fact of being seen to be acting along side people does not in itself mean that the church is necessarily involved in the people's struggle. We have to prove this in the struggle both against those who wish to make it a domesticating approval of the status quo, and those who have legitimate reservations about the truth of what we preach.

This task is necessary if we are to hasten the realisation of the masses. We have seen many of our church believers actively involved in the people's struggle over the past ten years, without being active at all in the life and activities of their own individual congregations! Why is it so?

Church people have great difficulty accepting the reality of the conflict situation without feeling driven to establish and secure a harmony of interest and rights between conflicting parties.

That is why talk of negotiations is so attractive to the church. This line of approach should be recognised for what it is in the present context.

It is idealistically naive and potentially damaging. This is so whatever biblical and theological arguments may be thrown around in defence of the neutralist position.

Some of us are guilty of what we may call romantic moralism. That means, they generally denounce social injustice and exploitation.

But there is either a shallow or simplistic analysis of the precise mechanisms of oppression and injustice. Hence even the call for liberation is too general to be effective. And when it is specified by activists as national liberation from oppressors and exploiters the same people who call for liberation and issued declaration of concern turn against the specific movements and programmes that would work for liberation in concrete.

This, of course, is sometimes caused by conflict in regard to the choice of the means to bring about social transformation.

for the past ten years the church has intervened in the following areas: The Namibian conflict, the state of emergency and Natal conflict, Angola, the cross border attacks by the South African forces, forced removals, the Mozambican refugees, struggle for people's education,

plight of political prisoners, the debate on people's education, the debate on illegitimacy of the state, the debate on violence etc. Last but by no means least was a call for sanctions against the apartheid state.

#### Leadership in the Church

For the church to be fully rooted in the South African soil, it is imperative that there should be a locally born leadership which should give direction and create an ethos of the church at all the levels of its life.

Leaders are not only those at the very top who make policies and laws. We are talking of all those who control of what goes on in the church as a whole. The past ten years has demonstrated very clearly that although there are quite a good number of black people who have been elevated to positions of responsibility, they have so far failed to make their presence felt or to stamp their presence in the sense of giving the direction that is so urgently needed by the situation of our country.

Unless the South African born church leaders are prepared to assume the destiny of their church in their own hands, they may miss a cause to shape the history of christianity in SA.

Whilst this is so we must be realistic. To change society or institution takes time, patience, imagination and determination.

#### The Future

There are a few very important areas of concern which the church should examine and critically reevaluate in order to make a powerful entry in its interventions into the nineties.

The first one is for the church to clearly spell out its own character, identity and its understanding of its function in the world.

A fatal mistake would be for the church to shirk its responsibility of helping to mobilise the people for justice, peace and for democracy now that some of the prominent leaders of our people have been released.

In order to minister meaningfully especially to activists and to the people whose commitment to justice is undoubted it is essential for the church to develop a theology of struggle so that people do not see the struggle for justice and democracy n the one hand and their life in their churches as two separate or even irreconcilable things.

It is only the creation of a genuinely people's church which will bring the church closer to all our people.

Hopefully, the nineties will step up this struggle for a people's church. The church is a church of saints and sinners. We cannot expect perfection.

As freedom loving people cause walls to tumble around the world, the people will shake the walls of our own Babylon to make way for a new city of God's liberated people.

The church's role in this human drama may well turn out to be decisive in the struggle for liberation.

#### \* Ciskei President Holds Talks With De Klerk

34000357B Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English  
19 Jan 90 p 8

[Text] Bisho—The Ciskei government yesterday presented the South African Government with a document setting out the homeland's thinking on constitutional options which may be open to it in a future South Africa.

Welcoming the State President, Mr F. W. de Klerk, on an official visit to Bishop, Ciskei President Lennox Sebe said the documents contained the details and motivation in support of the concept of a confederation.

Pres Dr Sebe said Ciskei believed this was the only type of government that adequately served the needs of Southern Africa with its groups of people of different cultures and races.

He added it was not intended to be prescriptive in any way.

Ciskei, he said, was eager to participate in the negotiation process.

Mr De Klerk said he welcomed the document and it was time that people who shared the same values in Southern Africa stood together putting aside ideological differences and resisting radical influences.

Mr De Klerk added Ciskei had an active role to play in shaping a new Southern Africa.

Both leaders agreed that the future political developments in the region had to be based on continuous consultation between governments.

Bilateral and multilateral talks with the governments of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei would constitute, not only on constitutional matters but also on economic development, Mr De Klerk said.

When Mr De Klerk flew in, Ciskei's Bulembu Airport swung into accustomed action.

The airport, which has seen little activity since construction as a result of the country's failure to get an air service off the ground, was abuzz with security officers and protocol officials when Mr De Klerk and his delegation arrived.

A Ciskeian helicopter circled overhead, while Ciskei international airways two yet-to-be-used jets flanked the airport building.

On the tarmac in front of the building, the cavalcade of official vehicles was lined up ready for the departure to the National Assembly buildings in Bisho.

Inside the building, airport officials rallied around to issue permits for pressmen wishing to photograph the meeting.

The arrivals and departures boards inside the modern terminal were blank.

Few members of the public were at the airport to welcome the delegation, but hundreds of flag-waving schoolchildren lined the route taken by the motorcade into Bisho.

Outside the National Assembly, thousands of people gathered in the blazing sun to watch a display by a guard of honour, choirs and traditional dancers.

#### \* Transkei President Warns of 'Destabilization'

34000352B Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English  
12 Jan 90 p 5

[Text] Umtata—A disillusioned businessman is orchestrating destabilisation activities from South Africa [SA] aimed at the Transkeian Government, the homeland's President Tutor Ndamase told SA State President De Klerk yesterday.

Mr Ndamase asked Mr De Klerk to "see to it that these activities are stopped with immediate effect".

His address was made available to Sapa last night. The remarks were made at a luncheon in Umtata, attended by Mr De Klerk.

Mr Ndamase said: "Transkei upholds the view that the principle of good neighbourliness cannot be maintained if relations between the two states are not good.

"However, to my dismay, the Transkei Government has information at its disposal regarding destabilisation activities launched from South African soil aimed at the present government leadership, and orchestrated by a disillusioned businessman.

"I wish to remind the South African Government of the non-aggression pact operating between the two countries which forbids the use of either state as a launching pad for such activities."

He referred Mr De Klerk to the country's military leader, Maj-Gen Bantu Holomisa, for more details concerning the matter.

#### \* Transkei Gets Share of Customs Union Revenue

34000359A Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English  
17 Jan 90 p 11

[Text] South Africa [SA] has now paid Transkei its R205 million share of the Customs Union Revenue Pool after blocking payment for two weeks.

The Department of Foreign Affairs hinted in Pretoria yesterday that further payments may be withheld unless Transkei lifted "trade restrictions" on South Africa.

The Department said that the payment had been made in the "light of the discussion between the State President, Mr F. W. de Klerk and the Chairman of the Military Council, Maj Gen Bantu Holomisa, in Umtata on January 11, and on the assumption that the problem arising from the imposition of trade restrictions which the Transkei had imposed on South Africa will be resolved before further transfer payments are due".

Transkei apparently broke the customs union agreements by banning the import of sorghum beer from Natal.

This is but one facet of a continuing diplomatic row between Pretoria and Umtata.

Transkei has detained alleged hit squad members, one of them a South African policeman.

The SA Police confirmed that Constable M. Mabunda had disappeared while on duty.

**\* Report: Statistics on Population Concentrations**

34000355B Johannesburg THE STAR in English  
5 Dec 89 p 2

[Text] Up-to-date estimates set the South African-TBVC population at 36.5 million, of whom 29.6 million live in South Africa and the remainder in the TBVC states (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei).

According to a report by the Bureau for Market Research, 42.6 percent of the white group live in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area.

Only the magisterial districts of Pretoria, Randburg, Germiston, Cape Town and Simon's Town have white populations that are larger than their black populations.

Most of the coloured population live in the Cape Province (84.6 percent), with the majority (50.8 percent) in the south-western Cape, including 1.6 million around Cape Town.

The Asian population is concentrated in Natal (79.8 percent), with Durban and Maritzburg hosting 66.1 percent.

The black population is concentrated in the non-independent homelands (32.6 percent); the TBVC states (25.4 percent), followed by the Transvaal (22.7 percent), Cape Province (8.2 percent), Free State (7.2 percent) and Natal (4.0 percent).

A census is planned for 1991.

**\* Report: Housing, Unemployment 'Acute' in Durban**

34000355A Durban THE DAILY NEWS in English  
3 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by David Canning]

[Text] Unemployment could approach 70 percent, and two million people—or 68 percent of the local population—may have to be housed in the Durban region in the next decade.

This is predicted in a major report by a "planning forum" of experts commissioned by the Tongaat-Hulett group.

However, problems of providing the general conditions for survival in the Durban region had become so acute that concern could no longer be directed solely at the ill-housed, Tongaat-Hulett group chairman Dr Chris Saunders said in the latest group magazine, The Condenser.

In an editorial introducing the report produced by the "think tank", he said: "The attention of everybody must be drawn to the failure to handle the social problems surrounding the Durban Functional Region.

"Increasingly, the realities of housing needs are being translated into every imaginable social need and structure, from education to homeless families...from crime and paucity of health care to total lack of services."

In fact, the latest report notes, lack of basic services in shack settlements is a serious health threat—with a great danger of the clock being turned back to early days of Durban's history when plague, malaria and typhoid reached epidemic proportions.

According to The Condenser, the panel was formed by Tongaat-Hulett after an earlier report said the region urgently needed a master plan. It said the lack of co-ordination was a disaster. It seemed that the administrative split between the Natal and KwaZulu areas of the Durban region "and the plethora of authorities had reduced decision-makers to a state of helplessness".

The new report says

- Durban needs faster economic growth to cope with the rapid population rise. But high economic growth does not seem possible without a national political solution;
- Violence is likely to continue, even if a political solution is reached and economic growth is stimulated. Violence has become endemic and rooted in social causes;
- The gap between the "haves and have-nots" will not be closed soon.

Dr Saunders said reports showed three economic factors had contributed to housing affordability in the past 20 inflationary years.

Low income families had lost real income at an unprecedented rate, housing prices for the poor had escalated

faster than for any other group and Government support for new subsidised housing in black townships had dropped sharply.

Because of rising real costs, there had been a big decrease in the number of new homes, relative to population.

Dr Saunders said: "Simply, shelter resources around the Durban Functional Region are now severely rationed, either by price or by queue, and hampered by a thick web of administrative rules."



## Angola

### \* Dos Santos in Favor of 'Pluralism,' Elections

90EF0191B Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese  
5 Jan 90 p 33

[By William Tonet, Luanda]

[Text] The president of the People's Republic of Angola announced, in his New Year's Day message, that pluralism of ideas would be introduced into the agencies of State power.

At a time when the peace negotiations aimed at ending the internal conflict between MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] are at an impasse owing to a lack of flexibility in the proposals of the warring parties, the Angolan statesman begins the year with a new eight-point negotiating proposal.

Jonas Savimbi refrained from commenting on the Angolan Government's new peace plan, which now includes one of UNITA's principal demands: holding general elections.

The leader of the rebels said that he had not been instructed by his political "bureau" and central committee to express an opinion on the proposals made by the Angolan president.

Last October, during the special UNITA congress, he had urged that free elections be held and that a single army be created as a "sine qua non" for political stability in Angola, which has been devastated by 14 years of warfare.

"I believe our people are mature enough to participate in an electoral act, and that the political forces that lose the election must not become an armed opposition, but a parliamentary opposition," the UNITA president said at the time.

And it is a parliamentary opposition that Eduardo dos Santos is now proposing as a condition for a broad-based parliamentary democracy in which deputies who are not members of MPLA will participate, although MPLA, according to the Angolan leader, will continue to lead. However, it will expand its base to include members of religious orders, small property owners, and elements who have belonged to other political forces.

According to the Angolan president, his party plans to pursue two different paths in order to achieve this objective: first, refining the political system and defining the role of the MPLA in the governing function; second, passage of a legal measure to free the social and mass organizations from MPLA tutelage. From now on, the officers of these organizations will be elected, rather than appointed by MPLA as they have been up to now.

At other levels, the broad-based democratization that will begin this year includes the participation of independent candidates who may run for office in the organs of State power.

However, even before this presidential speech was given in Angola, efforts were already under way to set up a so-called Angolan civic organization, composed of intellectuals of various hues, who would serve as a political alternative in guiding the destiny of the nation.

O JORNAL has learned that these individuals, many of whom are former MPLA militants, seek a legal and political guarantee from the powers-that-be so that they may carry out their activities. One of the those heading the Angolan civic organization is Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, a former member of the MPLA old guard.

According to a source close to the leadership of the organization, it will be made official very soon; some well-known jurists are now studying its by-laws in the context of current legislation.

This organization will be the first one not to have sprung from the MPLA structure and to have its survival ensured at the outset in a speech by the Angolan president when he said that "these measures are intended to respect and dignify the participation of the sons and daughters of Angola in the affairs of the nation, according to the law and the expansion of democracy, inasmuch as the conditions and the actual situation in Angola have matured."

### The New System

Angola plans to adopt a system of confrontation of ideas under which, politically, one party—MPLA—will manage the major lines of domestic and foreign policy. Various social and occupational organizations will have seats in parliament and be potentially able to voice their demands concerning the management of the country's economy.

One gathers from the message by the Angolan president that this trial balloon may or may not be accepted by the various groups who are hoping for substantial and far-reaching changes.

However, the Angolan executive apparently does not accept certain outside proposals to accelerate the peace process.

"The United States came up with a formula for the Angolan case that does not take either African desires or the specific conditions in our country into consideration," Eduardo dos Santos emphasized, adding that the U.S. proposal calls for multiple parties and for MPLA-UNITA negotiations. It ignores the existence of the Angolan Government and the Angolan Constitution.

The Angolan leader believes that these conditions increase the difficulties for the African mediators. Mobutu, who has been the mediator in the process, has also

seen a proposal made to the Angolan Government for the signing of a cease-fire get shot down.

The reasons were given by Eduardo dos Santos as follows:

1. The political basis for the cease-fire failed to consider the principles approved at Gbadolite. (In a twist of fate, Mobuto, once again, failed to do his homework.)
2. The verification and monitoring mechanisms called for in the proposal were suitable only for a conventional war. Besides, they conflicted with aspects of Angolan sovereignty—according to its president.

Therefore, the role of the mediator seems to be continuing to fade, owing to his insensitivity in analyzing the proposals of the belligerent parties.

The Angolan president submitted a new eight-point peace plan, which will be considered on 10 January in Luanda during the summit meeting of "The Eight" African heads of state.

Note that, for the first time since the acceptance of pluralism of ideas, this plan calls for the holding of elections, but without specifying whether they will be legislative and presidential.

Some points in this plan seem to approximate certain demands made by Jonas Savimbi's UNITA.

The trend toward peace and stability seems to be becoming pronounced, and the political changes now under way should lead to an end of the war in Angola and Mozambique and the abolition of apartheid in South Africa.

The South Africans are still committed to reaching an agreement to end racial segregation. In a New Year's message, Butelezi, a black leader, appealed to the various black tribes to stop tribal squabbling and cooperate on a democratic plan for South Africa.

At the same time, the government was announcing the end of the division of the city councils. This plan is to be discussed in the parliamentary session that begins next month.

President De Klerk expressed readiness to proceed with the reforms and appealed to all South Africans to work toward overcoming resentments.

Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha was less moderate, in remarks directed to the Organization of African Unity which, through its secretary general had asked the Pretoria regime to act promptly to bring an end to the system of apartheid. "The OAU [Organization of African Unity] should clean up its own house first, before casting its eyes on other people's houses and urging an end to apartheid," the South African minister concluded.

### \* Current Political-Military Situation Analyzed

90EF0192A Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese  
13 Jan 90 pp 4-5

[Commentary by Jaime Nogueira Pinto]

[Text] This is the main reason behind the choice of this particular moment for the FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] offensive: to create complications in the field that would force the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] leader to remain with his troops, thereby upsetting his plans for a visit which, by all indications, would have been a political and diplomatic success. In this initial sense, one might say that MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] has won a victory. But it's a victory that may be only tactical and circumstantial, with costs that could in the very near future, prove to be very high. Let's see why....

Our starting point is the scenario that prevailed in the wake of the New York accords. Those represent the disengagement of Cubans and South Africans, the intermediate and militarily most involved powers—until then in aid of MPLA and UNITA, respectively. In other words, after December 1988 a six-way conflict became a four-way conflict—the USSR and MPLA vs the United States and UNITA. Since both parties maintained that the opposite side was able to survive only because of the direct involvement of these "big brothers"—the 60,000 Cubans and the 3,000 South Africans who were there at the end of 1987, the most heated point of the war—the idea gained acceptance that once these withdrew it would be easier to see who was right in terms of power since, as in all civil wars, both sides claimed to possess the power of right.

Militarily, the issues were complicated and contained some elements of mystery. It will never be understood exactly why it was that early in 1988, the SADF [South African Defense Forces] and UNITA allowed the Cuban and FAPLA forces that had been defeated in the offensive against Mavinga to consolidate and "bunkerize" Cuito-Cuanavale. Or why they made frontal attacks against that fortification, which is connected by a single 200-km road with Menongue (formerly Serpa Pinto), instead of cutting off that supply route at the halfway point, which would have caused the garrison at Cuito-Cuanavale to collapse due to lack of supplies, just as happens to positions downstream of any main base when they become isolated.

It is easier to say with certainty that at the same time as they made Cuito-Cuanavale into one of those urns of revolutionary hagiography—"the biggest battle in Southern African since 1945"—the Soviets, Cubans, and MPLA were, along about March, 1988, building the bridges to the four-party talks. The risks of a Dien Bien Phu in the south were great and in evaluating American domestic policy they believed, along with the polls, that Michael Dukakis might become the next president of the United States and could cut off support to Savimbi.

Remove the risk of increased South African involvement, get some negotiations going, gain time—that was the goal. And, above all, separate UNITA from its allies, or make each of them believe that they could win, letting Savimbi fall.

MPLA's pursuit of this strategy of (dis)information now dominates all its propaganda, both the obvious and the subtle. Jonas Savimbi is no longer the "puppet of the South Africans," the privileged ally of the "hawks" in Washington, but the man who in fact will be abandoned by them. He's been converted from the hated to the future "loser." The number of times that this upcoming sacrifice of Savimbi's was explained in person to me during the past 2 years by highly distinguished and sophisticated politicians, diplomats, and businessmen, or the number of times I saw this theory expounded in thoughtful analyses would fill an entire chapter of my memoirs—as would the prophecies that are not fulfilled but never cease to be accurate because they are always aimed at tomorrow, or at next month. Until now.

Meanwhile, in the field the negotiating firmness of the West—and the courage of Savimbi, who was always able to put the allies in their place—forced Luanda and Havana to abandon their pretensions one after another. "Linkage"—the U.S. and South African concept that Namibia would be independent when the Cuban withdrawal from Angola became irrevocable—ended up being sanctioned by the New York agreements, after being accepted by Cuba, Luanda, and Moscow.

The decisive factor behind Pretoria's acceptance of the New York accords was a rationale based on military psychology. Against their fear that the Cubans would pull a fast one (which they did, for example, when they encouraged and supported the infiltration of SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] guerrillas in April 1989 in Namibia) and end up not leaving, Pretoria weighed the operational paralysis that affects any conscript when they realize that they could die on the eve of a return home, or in the last moments of a war they know is going to end. As soon as they found out that they were heading north and back to their island, the Cubans lost a substantial part of their fighting ability. And so, although not without some fits and starts, they complied with the timetable.

After Bush was elected, one of his first statements on foreign policy reiterated U.S. support for Savimbi and UNITA for so long as the USSR continued to support MPLA and no genuine peace with elections came to pass in Angola. The end of military support from Pretoria following the New York accords eliminated the chief obstacle that the Bush administration faced at home to UNITA aid. This was confirmed when aid to Savimbi was not only voted by an ample bipartisan majority in the Congress but increased substantially in volume.

At the same time, a change was taking place in the play of African forces. In addition to their traditional allies—

Morocco, the Ivory Coast, the majority of the French-speaking nations—UNITA found that its stock was rising in Africa even among traditional supporters of Luanda such as Congo, Nigeria, and Zambia, who either changed sides or took more flexible positions. And in the context of an "Africanization" of the problem, President Mobutu of Zaire assumed the role of mediator.

In Luanda, pressures for negotiations were intensifying, owing to the precarious situation in the cities of the south and the central interior and by growing difficulties in resupplying them. The divisions within MPLA had, and still have, more to do with a survival strategy than with underlying ideological problems. In the view of a more pragmatic wing, headed by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos himself, the economic "opening," rapprochement with Pretoria and Washington, abandonment of forms of Marxist-Leninist gospel, and a certain flexibility in negotiations were the key not only to gaining time—hoping that the long-promised change in U.S. policy would fall from heaven—but to reducing UNITA's territory. The hardline "radicals" felt that any verbal hint of peace or openness would mean the beginning of the end and would open the floodgates and bring on disgrace. It was hard for these two groups to coexist; more and more, it was the allies—Russians and Cubans and with the military—the operational commanders of the FAPLA, who served as referee. The "hardliners" husbanded their strength within the ranks of the MPLA-PT [Labor Party]; the "moderates" worked in the administration and the government, counting on the rank and file troops.

Into this picture came Gbadolite: The story of this comedy of errors has already been told. How the mediator—perhaps to arrange the meeting between the leaders of the government and the resistance—gave each party a different account of what was at stake. Specifically, by convincing Jose Eduardo dos Santos that Savimbi would "secretly" accept conditions imposed by Luanda. And letting Savimbi believe that Gbadolite was no more than it appeared to be. Be that as it may, what was set down in the solemn statement by the 20 African heads of state who were either present or represented was a cease-fire, plus unconditional talks between parties who would meet on an equal footing.

Therefore, the war continued. You could even say that it became more violent. After all, MPLA still hadn't offered UNITA very much: amnesty, reintegration into society, a few scraps from the table, and hardly any posts (and these awarded on an individual basis) in the national government and in the provincial governments. And wanting Savimbi out of Angola. It was really very little. Amnesty is for prisoners, or criminals, or rebels in desperate straits—not at all the case of Savimbi's UNITA.

Diplomatic efforts were essayed while the war continued. Savimbi went to the United States in the fall, received all sorts of assurances from Bush and Congress, saw the British foreign minister in Blackpool, met with



Mario Soares and Joao de Deus Pinheiro in Paris. MPLA was still trying to romance Pretoria—with Colonel Jose Maria, Jose Eduardo dos Santos' right arm, making friendly gestures to the Boers. And Luanda pinning its hopes on its American lobby, in which the "Kennedy clan" plays a prominent role (and promises new efforts to change Washington's policy. A lobby covertly backed by appropriations from the gemstone trade, managed through Luanda's secret discretionary funds. [no closed parentheses as published]

It was under these circumstances, with UNITA increasing its presence in the North and moving closer to the central zone and the southern coast that, in a well-conceived maneuver of indirect strategy, Luanda decided to bet its last hand on a general offensive against the Southeast—Mavinga, the key to Jamba. It was a race against time—Jose Eduardo dos Santos went to Cuba to ask Fidel not to be so quick about removing his men from Angola, and the rainy season was close at hand. Still, just before Christmas, starting out from Cuito-Cuanavale and advancing toward the headwaters of the Cuzumbia, a force of 8,000 men subdivided into three tactical groups (Nos. 1, 5, 6) of 4,000, 2,000, and 2,000 men sets out on another operation to conquer Mavinga. Column C cuts diagonally southeastward, assigned to protect the right flank. The central column, B, advances between the Cuzumbia and Cuzizi rivers, is stopped, and retreats after making 25 km of headway. The main column, 4,000 men with T-57 and T-55 (and, reportedly T-62) tanks, advances along the left bank of the Cuzumbia river to pass Lomba and take Mavinga. The strategic objective is to win a substantial advantage on land so that in the event of a cease-fire they would leave a sword of Damocles hanging over Jamba and have cut a wedge into the territory controlled by UNITA. Owing to the timing, it was also intended to upset Savimbi's visit to Portugal.

The latest news from this front was that FAPLA troops, instructed on the ground by Soviet advisors, had been halted about 15 km from the Lomba River and were awaiting supplies that were becoming more difficult to send as the lines of penetration stretched out and the UNITA forces multiplied their attacks along the left flank. Savimbi traveled within Africa early in the week but the UNITA Central Committee had already made its decision: The way the military situation was developing, the boss couldn't stay away for so long.

Because if things go wrong, he has to be with his men, troops whom he has never abandoned; if there's a standoff, his presence would be a key factor in changing them. If things go well, he would need to be there to exploit the success. Being charismatic has its disadvantages.

No responsible military leader abandons a key front for about 10 days to travel 10,000 km away to a place where he has no direct and secure communications links with the theater of operations. Under these circumstances, Savimbi had to postpone his visit to Portugal. But it is

doubtful that his enemies, who "planted" news of the fall of Mavinga, thereby misleading the Embassy of Portugal in Luanda, for example, will in the end have the success they expected. Naturally they have only postponed and increased a problem, and in an attempt to cover up one hole, they have opened up a much bigger one.

#### [Box, p 4] War At the Mercy of Negotiations

[Commentary by Carlos da Matta]

Despite certain appearances to the contrary, the Angolan situation is evolving in such a way that events that were inconceivable not long ago are actually coming to pass. The contacts aimed at a cease-fire are being made one after another.

In the realm of the armed battle, events depend on the dictates of the negotiations, even if this means that the number of victims must rise. It is very hard to say how many kilometers the Cuito-Mavinga front has moved, if indeed there has been any movement. Furthermore, there are constant clashes along the entire area that lies within the sphere of influence of the Benguela Railroad, i.e. a distance of more than 800 km—from Caibambo to the vicinity of Luena. Further north, UNITA is attacking the zones of Cazengo and Dembos.

Concurrently, a war of communiques with both parties using the same racist demagoguery. Both say that there are whites fighting on the opposite side, and both are right. Who doesn't know that there are high-ranking white officers in both FALA [Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] and FAPLA? Their names are known, and their nationality too: They're Angolan. Incidentally, the same thing is true of both political organizations.

A weapon often used in the political class, its social impact is less today than at the time of independence, and in broad social strata of Angolan society it gives rise to sarcastic comments.

At Jamba, everything revolves around Savimbi's upcoming foreign trip, which this time will not provoke loud protests from Luanda. UNITA, too, declares that it will wait for the Zairian mediator "to sum up the two peace plans," but it has already rejected the content of the governmental proposal concerning the modes of a cease-fire.

In Luanda, the MPLA-PT is getting ready for its third party congress, scheduled for late 1990, and it is widely rumored in official political circles that President Jose Eduardo is going to make several changes in the leadership bodies. But all indications are that in terms of major decisions the authorities believe "that there is no rush and it is safer to move forward slowly."

Another important element, one which could give us some indications on the nature of the announced law on associations, is the proclamation, set for 25 January, of an Angolan civil Association (ACA) in Luanda. In fact,



its promoters didn't even wait for the president's New Year's message—by 15 December they had published a circular signed by the charter commission composed of the writer E. Bonavena, journalist Aguiar Santos, accountant Luis Francisco, and Drs Maria Emaculada Melo and Xavier Jaime.

ACA is defined as a nongovernmental organization and fits into the Angolan tradition of associativism to defend "the principle of citizen participation in community development and the defense of the freedom of rights...a principle that is gaining over the protest movements and civil action in every country of the world."

An initiative that emanated from the civilian society—a concept very often used in Angola for some months now—this is part of a logic that is inevitable in situations of the kind prevailing in Angola: After many years, the citizens no longer accept the rule of silence or permit the parties to have a monopoly on participation in public life.

#### \* Country Moves Toward Negotiated Settlement

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[Article by Laurent C. W. Kaela, University of Zambia]

[Text] As the U.S.-mediated negotiations for Namibia's independence involving Angola, Cuba and South Africa got underway, it was widely expected that their successful conclusion would not only bring independence to Namibia, but also usher in a new era of peace in Angola. Angolan officials made it clear that they were demanding cessation of U.S. and South African support for UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] as one of the conditions for agreeing to Cuban withdrawal from their country. Washington and Pretoria, for their part, attempted to make an MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] reconciliation with UNITA a condition for Namibia's independence as well. Yet the Brazzaville Protocol and the New York Agreement, concluded on 13 and 22 December, 1988, respectively, resolved the problem of Namibia's independence but did not address that of the civil war in Angola.

UNITA vowed to continue fighting and the United States pledged to continue supplying it with weapons. It therefore appeared that South Africa's stoppage of support for the rebel movement, as part of its undertaking under the Namibia independence agreements, would not contribute much to ending the civil war.

Then in June, 1989, the Angolan government and UNITA agreed to stop fighting and to enter into negotiations to resolve the conflict, with President Mobutu of Zaire acting as mediator. The ceasefire accord was reached on 22 June at the summit meeting of eighteen African heads of state held at Gbadolite in Zaire, which was also attended by President Eduardo dos Santos of Angola and UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi. This historic

development makes an assessment of the prospects for a political settlement appropriate. To do this it is necessary to examine the origins and evolution of the conflict.

#### Background to the Conflict

The MPLA, Movimento Popular da Libertacao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), UNITA, Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola), and the FNLA, Frente Nacional da Libertacao de Angola (National Front for Liberation of Angola), were the major movements in Angola that fought a protracted guerrilla war to wrest power from the Portuguese rulers. The MPLA was led mainly by intellectuals. Its ideology was socialist-oriented. The main base of support was the urban Ovimbundu people, particularly in Luanda, Malanje and Kwanza valley. External support came primarily from the Soviet Union. Portuguese authorities in Angola considered the MPLA to be militarily the strongest among the Angolan movements. At the time of the 1974 coup in Portugal, they estimated that its guerrilla army had about 6,000 combatants.

The FNLA had a guerrilla force of 2,000 to 2,500 fighters based in Zaire. Grassroots support was furnished by the Bakongo in Zaire and Uige provinces of northern Angola. The FNLA was supported by the United States and Zaire. Its leader, Holden Roberto, who also lived in Zaire, was basically a non-military person.

UNITA was founded in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi after he resigned as Vice-President of FNLA and left the organization in 1964. The movement's main base of operation was in the south of Angola. Its supporters came mostly from the Ovimbundu ethnic group and China was the principal foreign supporter. At the time of the Lisbon coup, UNITA's guerrilla force numbered less than 1,000. Out of the three movements, UNITA was militarily the weakest. According to Portuguese sources, Savimbi in fact collaborated with their military authorities in Angola during the colonial era by giving them information on MPLA military activities.

Protracted colonial wars in Africa were a major reason for the Lisbon coup of April, 1974. This change of government accelerated the process of decolonisation, especially after the second post-coup administration came to power. In January, 1975, representatives of the three movements and Portugal reached an agreement on the granting of independence to Angola and on transitional arrangements. The Alvor Accord, as it was called, provided for the establishment of a transitional government composed of representatives of the three movements and the Portuguese High Commissioner as the Head. The three nationalist movements were all recognized as legitimate representatives of the Angolan people. Independence was set for 11 November, 1975.

The transitional arrangement was rendered inoperable by armed clashes in Luanda between the MPLA, on one side, and UNITA and the FNLA, on the other. After the

MPLA managed to drive its rivals out of the capital, full-scale civil war then broke out.

U.S. support for the FNLA, carried out by the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], was stepped up. Washington also started to give aid to UNITA for the first time. Former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was the chief architect of U.S. involvement in the conflict.

Unnerved by the successes of the MPLA, South Africa decided to send its troops into Angola to try to influence the course of change to suit its own interests. Units of its forces crossed the border from Namibia in mid-October and, together with UNITA guerrillas, started to advance towards the MPLA-held Luanda. FNLA and Zairean troops advanced from the north. The main objective of these forces was to crush the MPLA before Independence Day and pave the way for UNITA and the FNLA to form the government of independent Angola.

In response to the threat posed by the South Africans, Agostinho Neto, the leader of the MPLA, approached Cuba for help. A force of 650 Cuban troops was the first to arrive in Angola early in November, 1975. Consequently the MPLA was able to hold Luanda and, on November 11, it declared independence and named the new state the People's Republic of Angola.

UNITA and the FNLA formed a rival government with Huambo as the capital. They named their state the Democratic People's Republic of Angola. However, the Portuguese High Commissioner decided not to cede power to any of the warring movements. Instead he surrendered it to "the people of Angola".

With increased Cuban and Soviet assistance, the MPLA was able to defeat its rivals and force the South African troops to withdraw to Namibia by the end of February, 1976. Its government was able to win widespread international recognition. The FNLA disbanded and the leader went to live in exile in Belgium. But UNITA was able to reorganise itself and continue fighting the MPLA government. U.S. support to the rebels was legally restricted by the Clark Amendment, passed in Congress in early 1976, which barred Washington's aid to any Angolan group without its approval. Savimbi did, however, receive valuable assistance from South Africa which also periodically invaded southern Angola, ostensibly to strike at SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] bases.

The policies of the conservative administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan contributed to the intensification of South African and UNITA military operations in Angola. Washington secured the close cooperation of South Africa, Zaire and UNITA over its Southern Africa policy. It accepted South Africa's position that its wars against Angola and national liberation movements—the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), the African National Congress (ANC, SA), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC, SA)—were part of its fight against the spread of communism in Southern Africa and that Washington should get more involved. Viewed in this

perspective, a UNITA victory in Angola would also represent a victory for democracy. South Africa, for its part, accepted Washington's linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to Namibia's independence.

These policy issues were discussed early in 1981 when senior South African defence officials, the country's foreign minister, the defence minister and UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, visited the United States. According to the magazine *AFRICA REPORT* (May-June 1987 issue), in May, 1983, U.S., Israeli, South African, Zairean and UNITA officials held a secret meeting in Kinshasa, Zaire, at which Washington promised financial and military assistance to UNITA. South Africa pledged to step up military attacks against Angola. The magazine also revealed that the Reagan administration had been giving aid to UNITA illegally since 1982, before the repeal of the Clark Amendment in July, 1985.

Emboldened by the cooperation of the United States, which was justified by Washington diplomats as "constructive engagement", South African troops were able to occupy parts of Southern Angola for several years from 1981-1985. They only withdrew after the Lusaka "disengagement of forces accord" was reached with Luanda in February, 1984.

On the ground in Southern Angola the South African Defence Force (SADF) fought alongside UNITA guerrillas equipped by the U.S. After the repeal of the Clark Amendment, Washington started to supply the rebels with anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

This kind of military pressure suited Washington's interests in so far as it could lead to the overthrow of the Luanda regime, which could then be replaced by a friendly or "moderate" UNITA one. Short of this, the United States was also interested in forcing Angola to agree to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from its territory and to the formation of an interim government with UNITA participation, to be followed by elections to decide which of the two movements—UNITA and MPLA—would form the next government in Angola. Washington believed UNITA would win any free elections.

Pretoria shared these objectives with Washington, but not necessarily for identical reasons. U.S. policy was informed more by superpower rivalry than anything else. South Africa's main concern was survival of white domination at home. This, in view of its strategists, required the existence of pliant regimes in Southern Africa which were not supportive of South African liberation movements and SWAPO. UNITA in power in Angola was expected to meet these conditions. More immediately, Pretoria looked at Namibia, which it occupied illegally, not only as a source of wealth, but also as a buffer against forces of national liberation opposed to it. In Pretoria's view, holding on to Namibia in turn required a buffer zone north of the border with Angola to enable it to prevent SWAPO from liberating the territory. Pretoria also wanted to force Angola to stop supporting SWAPO

and South African liberation movements. Pretoria's pursuit of these objectives are concealed under the facade of fighting communism. Thus South Africa, and the United States, misrepresented to the world the struggle of the Angolan people to safeguard national sovereignty and the efforts of the colonial people of Namibia and the oppressed people of Azania (South Africa) to liberate themselves as a "communist threat".

In the face of the serious threat to Angola's sovereignty, both Cuba and the Soviet Union increased assistance to the Luanda government. The number of Cuban troops in Angola rose from an estimated 18,000 in December, 1975, to 50,000 by December, 1988. According to a report in NEW AFRICAN (No. 244, 1988) by Gerry O'Kane, during the 1987/88 heavy fighting involving the siege of the strategic town of Cuito Cuanavale by South African and UNITA troops, Angola received U.S.\$1 billion worth of weapons from the Soviet Union.

However, since the 1975/76 civil war Cuban troops were not heavily involved in the fighting in Southern Angola. Without their participation, the Angolan armed forces, FAPLA (Forças Armadas Populares da Libertação de Angola), were in a position to overrun UNITA's stronghold in the south-east part of Angola in 1985 and 1987. They were only prevented by the intervention of South African troops. Nevertheless, the participation of Cuban troops in the fighting was crucial in tilting the military balance against South African troops and their UNITA allies, following the siege of Cuito Cuanavale, and in forcing Pretoria to accept implementation of United Nations Security Resolution 435 (1978)—the plan for Namibia's independence.

#### **The Namibia Independence Settlement and the Angolan Civil War**

Although the issue of the Angolan civil war had been raised in the course of the negotiations leading to the Brazzaville and New York Accords, Angola refused to accede to Washington's condition that it should reach a settlement with UNITA in return for cessation of U.S. aid to the rebel movement. Consequently Washington declared that it would continue to aid UNITA until such time that the Angolan government fulfilled this condition. However, South Africa did undertake to end its assistance to the rebels.

In December, 1988, the Angolan ambassador to Zambia revealed that U.S. president-elect, George Bush, had sent a delegation to meet UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, to assure him of the incoming administration's support. In February, 1989, according to a report attributed to THE WASHINGTON POST, UNITA asked the Bush administration for \$40 million worth of military equipment as aid.

However, there were diplomatic efforts being made to end the war and bring the two sides to the negotiating table. These involved, on one hand, appealing to the United States and Zaire to stop giving assistance to the

rebels and, on the other, persuading the Angolan government to negotiate with UNITA. For example, at their December, 1988, meeting in Luanda, which was convened to discuss the Namibia independence settlement, the Frontline States called on the U.S. to stop aiding "UNITA bandits". Kenya and Nigeria were among the African countries that called for "power-sharing" talks between the MPLA government and UNITA.

On 13 March, 1989, UNITA announced an eight point proposal for resolving the conflict:

#### **UNITA's 8-Point Peace Plan**

- Observation of a four-month ceasefire to facilitate negotiations.
- Appointment by UNITA of a commission to negotiate with the MPLA.
- Possible exclusion of UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, from early stages of the negotiations.
- Formation of a government of national unity in Angola in which Savimbi might not participate, to be followed two years later by elections, in which UNITA candidates would participate.
- Non-interference by UNITA with reconstruction of the Benguela Railway, on condition that the Angolan government did not use it for military purposes.
- Readiness by UNITA to enter into negotiations with Zambia, Zaire, Zimbabwe and with European investors over rehabilitation of the Benguela Railway.
- UNITA's willingness to enter into dialogue with the future government of Namibia.
- UNITA to extend war to Namibia, if attacked from that territory.

Among other things, the U.S.-backed plan called for the establishment of a government of national unity between the MPLA and UNITA, to be followed by elections to decide which movement would form the next government of Angola. President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, for his part, visited Luanda on 25 April to discuss ways of resolving the conflict.

The turning point was reached on 16 May when, at a summit meeting in Luanda, leaders of Angola, Zaire, Congo, Gabon, Sao Tome, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe agreed on a programme for finding a diplomatic solution to the civil war. This was followed by the enlarged June summit at which the ceasefire agreement was reached.

#### **The Search for a Peace Formula**

President Dos Santos described the agreement as "the first step" towards peace in Angola. This implied that more bargaining lay ahead before a peace accord could be reached. Statements made in Lusaka by President Kaunda on return from the Gbadolite Summit, which he chaired, suggested that agreement in principle had been reached on reintegration of UNITA personnel into the Angolan "political, social and economic fibres" and on the self-exile of the movement's leader, Savimbi, while this process was going on.



Since then, what was agreed on at the summit has been subjected to contention by UNITA. Savimbi has strongly denied that he agreed to go into exile. Whether the rebels dropped demands for open elections and the introduction of a multi-party system in Angola also remained unclear. However, later in August, UNITA's representative in the United States re-emphasized these demands in an interview on *The Voice of America*. In the same month, while in Harare for meetings of African leaders, including that of eight African leaders concerned with the peace process in Angola, the country's Justice Minister, Van Dunen, clarified the nature of the agreement reached with UNITA in Gbadolite. According to him, no formal ceasefire document had been signed between the two sides. However, he implied that the ceasefire agreement was contained in the record of minutes of the summit.

Thus neither side has disputed the ceasefire agreement. Agreement on the two points (disputed by UNITA) relating to reintegration of its members into the Angolan political system and the self-exile of its leader was reiterated in a communique issued in Harare in August at the end of the meeting of eight African leaders on the Angolan problem. The authoritative nature of both this document and the statements made by President Kaunda in June, which have been referred to earlier, suggest that Savimbi had in fact agreed to these terms. Assuming this, the question then is: Why has UNITA subsequently made the denials?

The most probable explanation is that there was no consensus within UNITA over the Gbadolite agreement. Consequently Savimbi has been forced to deny what he in fact had agreed to. The absence of a formal ceasefire agreement has made this easier. Statements made by Mozambican President, Joaquim Chissano, support such a conclusion. A report in the *ZAMBIA DAILY MAIL* (August 28, 1989), cited him as saying that Savimbi had not informed UNITA members about decisions made at the Gbadolite Summit. Consequently, according to him, there had been persistent violations by rebels. This must have also contributed to the problem of consensus within UNITA over the June agreement. It could also be the case that, in accepting the terms that were subsequently disputed, Savimbi had gambled on rallying support a posteriori and this failed.

From all this, it can be concluded that the issues of elections, the multi-party system and the self-exile of Savimbi are still open to negotiation. However, assuming that serious negotiations really get underway, the MPLA government is not likely to yield to the demands for elections and the introduction of a multi-party system.

This is not only because of the far-reaching nature of the concessions that the MPLA would have to make, but also because UNITA is in too weak a position to force the Angolan government's hand that far.

For the MPLA, accepting such demands would imply giving up its monopoly of power for which it has fought for so hard and for so long. It would also mean recognizing UNITA's right to govern Angola. From the MPLA's point of view, by virtue of its history of collaborating with the Portuguese colonial army and with the South African military against it, among other misdeeds, UNITA has basically forfeited its title to such a right.

Assuming such a position of the MPLA over the issue, UNITA would need to be in an extremely strong bargaining position to get the two related demands accepted. Yet it is not. South Africa, whose assistance—including supplying weapons, training and direct intervention in combat in Angola—was so crucial in propping it up, has abandoned the movement as part of the Namibian independence agreement. President Mobutu, whose country also played a key role in supporting it (Zairean officials persistently denied this), is now set on a friendly course with Dos Santos and is playing the role of mediator in the negotiations.

However, Washington appears to be determined to continue with its support for UNITA until a political settlement is reached. Nevertheless, continued aid from Washington should not be taken for granted. U.S. officials must have noticed that, even with massive war material and other assistance from their country, UNITA faced certain defeat in 1985 and in 1987 at the hands of FAPLA and was only saved by the intervention of Pretoria's armed forces. They must have also concluded that, with South Africa's withdrawal from the Angolan conflict, it would be in no stronger position to put U.S.-supplied equipment to effective use on the battlefield. In short, UNITA has become a liability. Therefore, for Washington, a negotiated settlement would be a convenient way of severing ties with it even if it means that the rebel movement got a deal that was far short of what it has been demanding. Hence continued U.S. assistance to UNITA may have symbolic value only or may be intended to bolster the movement's negotiating position.

Mainly confined to the Southeast part of Angola where Mavinga and Jamba (its headquarters) are located, UNITA is basically at the mercy of the Angolan armed forces. Even with the presence of mercenaries and South African troops there, as Angolan officials claimed, it has to contend with an omnipresent fear of being overrun. However, Angolans are not likely to take up the military option for fear of disrupting the Namibia independence process—which could then work to the advantage of UNITA. But they could do so after Namibia's independence.

For the MPLA, being in a relatively strong negotiating position does not necessarily mean that it can easily dispense with the search for a negotiated settlement. On the contrary, there are considerations which suggest that doing so would be politically imprudent. UNITA may be militarily weaker than it has ever been before but it still retains the capacity to continue committing isolated acts



of terror. The situation would also leave a window of opportunity for third parties to the conflict to exploit—to carry out hostile acts against the Angolan people using UNITA, as had been the case in the past. Therefore a negotiated solution offers the best prospects for lasting peace.

There are also economic factors that the MPLA has to take into account. The conflict has forced the government to spend an estimated 40 percent of national income per annum on the war effort. Valuable economic infrastructure has been laid to waste and productive manpower displaced or maimed. Angola, a member of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), has witnessed economic projects supported by the organisation accomplished in other member countries, while those intended for her territory remained on the drawing board because those who could fund them were unwilling to do so due to the risks posed by the civil war, or because they were applying economic pressure to force it to reach a compromise with UNITA. The Benguela Railway, once a major economic asset of the country and principal export route for Zairean and Zambian copper, has remained closed to traffic since 1975 because of sabotage. Efforts to rehabilitate it to enable SADCC member countries to reduce dependence on South African routes have been hampered for the same reason. Clearly, there is need for the creation of conditions of peace that would facilitate tackling the problem of economic development in Angola.

The existence of conditions favouring a negotiated settlement does not in itself guarantee the successful conclusion of such a pact. Nor does it preclude armed clashes. Sustaining the peace process inaugurated by the Gbadolite agreement has so far proved problematic. As already pointed out, some terms of the accord have become matters of dispute and are likely to be renegotiated. Efforts to institutionalise monitoring the ceasefire have also not yet produced results.

Meanwhile, the ceasefire which supposedly went into effect on 24 June, 1989, has basically been ignored on the ground. The MPLA has persistently accused UNITA of violating it, including the shooting down of an airliner on a domestic flight in July, causing the deaths of forty-two people. The rebels, for their part, have also accused government troops of violating the pact. However, both sides have affirmed their commitment to seeking a negotiated settlement.

In conclusion, although the Namibia independence settlement process did not involve reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA, UNITA was left in a weak position militarily. This, in turn, made the movement not only more disposed towards seeking a negotiated settlement, but also potentially more amenable to compromising on its demands.

On the other hand, UNITA's predicament offered the MPLA government an opportunity to negotiate and reach a settlement with the "bandits" that was not

politically unpalatable. More specifically, there was a good chance that it could reach a compromise which did not include accepting the holding of interparty elections and the introduction of a multi-party system. Faced with this scenario and the alternative of continuing the war, even with a weaker enemy, with all the economic and other costs involved, the MPLA chose to reverse its policy of refusing to negotiate with UNITA and just offering an amnesty to the rebels.

On the basis of all this, it is reasonable to conclude that a good basis for a negotiated settlement of the Angolan civil war exists. However, the road to peace is likely to continue to be marked not only by negotiation, but military confrontation as well, some of which may even threaten to disrupt the negotiating process itself, as attempts are made to influence this process by military means. A breakthrough could most probably come after Namibia's independence elections are held. This is because both the MPLA and UNITA attitudes towards the peace process in their country are also influenced by their perceptions of how the negotiations could be affected by different outcomes of the polls. UNITA would expect a pro-South African regime in Namibia (for example, a Democratic Turnhalle Alliance one) to be friendly and allow it to use Namibian territory for rear bases and possibly to facilitate a resumption of South African aid. Conversely, the MPLA expects a friendly SWAPO regime to make this dream of UNITA impossible to attain and finally convince it to compromise on its key demands. Namibian independence would also remove an important reason for the Angolan government's show of restraint in deciding on a major military push against UNITA's stronghold in the southeast of the country. The credibility of even the threat of such a course of action could act as a source of pressure on UNITA to reach a settlement more favourable than the Luanda Agreement.

#### \* Economy's Relation With World Bank Examined

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[Text] The collapse of the cease-fire between the Angolan government and the South African-backed bandit group UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], agreed at Gbadolite in June this year, has dashed immediate hopes that work would soon begin on the urgent task of reconstructing the Angolan economy. So long as Angola, potentially one of Africa's richest countries, is torn apart by war, its government will have to continue to pour hard-earned resources into defence and security expenditure, rather than concentrating on development projects.

The cease-fire, although short-lived, was made possible by the events following on from the joint Angolan and Cuban victory over South African forces at Cuito Cuanavale in early 1988, which forced Pretoria to the

negotiating table and opened the way for Namibian independence. From the economic point of view, however, major shifts are now underway, not just in the military balance of power in southwestern Africa, but in the actual policy direction followed by the ruling Angolan MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-Workers' Party. In September this year the MPLA, which transformed itself into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party soon after independence in 1975, finally led Angola into the World Bank and the IMF. Angola became the newest member of two international organisations whose economic philosophy stands in direct contradiction to her ruling party's cherished socialist aspirations.

### The Resource Base

Angola's resource base, in minerals, in agriculture and fisheries and in the energy sector is impressive. Arable land is abundant, and average population density is low at around 7.2 inhabitants per square kilometre. The diversity of climatic zones, ranging from the near desert of Namibe Province to the temperate plateau around Huambo, allows for the cultivation of a wide range of cash and food crops, including cotton, coffee, sugar, and maize, as well as for the practice of animal husbandry. The national cattle herd was estimated at 3.42 million head in 1987.

The most important mineral resources are oil and diamonds. Angola's proven crude oil reserves amount to 1,418 million barrels, and in early 1988 production was running at about 450,000 barrels per day. This means that the country's reserves-to-production ratio is just below ten years. The sector is relatively well developed, and requires little in the way of new investment. Diamonds are the other major mineral resource, and Angola has some of the largest kimberlite pipes in the world, especially at Catoca, Camatue, Camatchia and Camafuca-Camazombo. There are also significant alluvial and terrace reserves. In the first nine months of 1988, diamond exports earned a net profit of over US\$40 million for Angola. Unfortunately, there are major problems with theft and smuggling of diamonds, especially to Zaire and Portugal, which may amount to as much as half the value of production.

### The Three Cycles

The history of the Angolan economy since the arrival of the Portuguese in the late fifteenth century has been divided by scholars into three major "cycles" or periods, during which the relationship between the local and dependent economy, and a colonial or external power has in each case led to the practical dominance of a particular market or product over the whole system. In our own time, the strategic objective of the MPLA-Workers' Party's development policy is to break out of this succession of cycles, and to try to transform the Angolan economy into a balanced system which would meet the basic needs of the people, rather than of foreign interests.

The three cycles were the slave-trade to Brazil, the coffee trade to Portugal, and the sale of petroleum products to the United States. The first of these was the epoch of the alliance between the Kingdom of Portugal and the Kingdom of the Kongo, during which a massive south Atlantic slave trade developed. In the second period, marked by the arrival of Portuguese settlers who appropriated land from the local inhabitants, took up permanent residence, and used forced labour for cultivation, a transition took place away from the slave trade towards an export-oriented coffee economy. The transition lasted for at least a century, and the coffee cycle only really ended in the early 1970s, just before independence, when the world oil crisis increased petroleum prices dramatically.

In the 1940s, the economy of colonial Angola entered a period of growth, based on the booming world market for coffee. It was this rapid growth which stimulated the massive emigration to Angola of white Portuguese settlers; between 1940 and 1974 the settler population increased from 44,000 to roughly 325,000. But until 1961, it was favourable external trade conditions which fuelled the growth.

Angola has not known peace since the early 1960s, when first the UPA [Union of the Angolan People] (later to become the FNLA) and then, on 4 February 1961, the MPLA launched the armed struggle for national liberation against the Portuguese. After the Portuguese coup of 25 April 1974, the colonial authorities were unable to resolve the conflict between the MPLA and two other nationalist movements, the FNLA [National Front for the Liberation of Angola] and UNITA, and so, on 11 November 1975, they simply declared the country independent and sailed off back to Lisbon.

In 1961, with the launching of the armed struggle by the MPLA, Lisbon responded by relaxing some of the constraints on industrialisation in Angola. This last period, characterised by some analysts as the crisis of colonial capitalism, led up to the oil boom of 1973-1974, when OPEC increased prices, and the MPLA won independence after the Portuguese coup d'etat of 25 April.

The newly independent People's Republic of Angola, under the MPLA government, was attacked from the north by the FNLA, with Zairean support, and from the south by the South African Defence Force, the SADF. Thanks to the internationalist solidarity of Cuba, which sent troops to the assistance of Angola, these attacks were beaten off.

### The World Bank Moves In

It is already clear that the World Bank is planning major changes in economic policy as the price for its financial backing. Reports have appeared recently that the 1989 edition of the Bank's country study on Angola, a useful guide to the organisation's thinking on possible future policy, identifies three factors as the principal causes of the country's poor economic performance. The first two are relatively uncontroversial; the third, the Bank's

experts argue uncompromisingly, was the attempt to realise a socialist transformation in Angola.

The first factor is identified as the war waged since independence against the MPLA government by South Africa, which has repeatedly invaded Angolan territory since 1975, and by UNITA. The Bank estimates that as much as 80 percent of rural Angola has been affected by the war, and in many areas agricultural production and marketing of both cash and food crops has virtually come to a halt. Cotton production, for instance, has fallen from more than 86,000 tons in 1971 to just over 300 tons in 1986. Coffee, once Angola's dominant cash crop, has dropped from 240,000 tons in 1974 to 13,500 tons in 1987. Food crops have also been dramatically affected. Maize production in 1971 reached 710,000 tons; by 1987 it was down by nearly two-thirds to 250,000 tons. The story is similar for cassava, millet, rice and ground-nuts.

The war has also had a negative impact on infrastructure, such as power plants, electricity transmission lines, bridges, and railways, as well as schools and health posts, and has displaced an estimated 600,000 people, forcing them into cities where facilities were already under strain. Finally, of course, the war has cost the Angolan government and people huge amounts of money—an estimated forty percent of the national budget goes into the defence and security account—which might otherwise have been used for development.

The second factor which the Bank's report identifies is the flight back to Portugal in 1974-1975 of about ninety percent of the white settlers in the country—about 300,000 people, many of them with administrative or managerial skills which they had not bothered to communicate to the black population. Scarcity of skilled labour, it is argued, remains to this day one of the major constraints on economic development.

Lastly, and most controversially, the Bank's experts identify what they term "inefficient economic management and inadequate economic policies" (that is to say, a socialist programme) as a contributory factor in the country's poor performance. Without the oil industry, which provided approximately 30 percent of GDP [gross domestic product], and between 40 and 65 percent of government revenue in the 1980s, the situation would have been considerably bleaker. Export sales of petroleum products accounted for around 93 percent of total exports, and paid for running the war and feeding the urban population.

The Angolan government is criticised for attempting to run the economy by administrative decree, and the Bank says quite explicitly that "one of the fundamental reforms of the Angolan economic system should be to introduce a more important role for market forces. However, the rapid transformation of a system in which the official, centrally controlled economy runs alongside a network of black-market operations charging hugely

inflated prices will involve "very harsh decisions" admits the report. [quotation marks as published]

#### **The Economic and Financial Clean-Up (SEF)**

The government had recognised that the economy was in crisis as early as 1980, and in 1987 the SEF programme (Saneamento Economico e Financeiro—roughly translatable as Economic and Financial Clean-Up) was announced. The SEF is designed to achieve two main objectives, namely a stabilisation of the financial situation, and an overhaul of the economic system as a whole.

The first objective is to be realised by reducing inflationary pressures, the huge budget deficits, loss-making parastatal enterprises, cleaning up the banking system, clearing the arrears in foreign debt payments, and working out new debt servicing arrangements. The general economic reform is intended to bring levels of productivity up to reasonable levels again, improve resource allocation, and create conditions for eventual balanced economic growth and development.

It is clear that the World Bank sees SEF (which is a strategic programme), and the tactical "Programa de Recuperacao Economica" (Economic Recovery Programme, or PRE) introduced in 1989, as windows of opportunity for the introduction of the all-too-familiar measures of structural adjustment.

### **Madagascar**

#### **\* Human Rights 'Not Yet' Fully Respected**

90EF0188A Antananarivo MIDI MADAGASIKARA  
in French 7 Dec 89 p 3

[Interview with Raharinarivonirina Alison, president of the National Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CNDDH), by Sammy Rasolo on 6 December 1989; place not given]

[Text] Several years ago, Madagascar was on the blacklist of the international organizations working for the defense of human rights. If we are no longer on that list, this does not, however, mean that all of the basic rights proclaimed by the United Nations are being respected. Mr Raharinarivonirina Alison, the president of the National Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CNDDH), who is very well-known for his militant activities within the VITM [People's Movement for National Unity] and who served as rector of the university a decade ago, was good enough to meet with us yesterday to describe his current impressions on the subject of respect for human rights in Madagascar.

[Rasolo] First, a very general question. Are human rights being respected in Madagascar?

[Raharinarivonirina] Let us say that generally speaking, there are no flagrant instances of violation such as there are in some countries.



[Rasolo] A few years ago, Madagascar was on the blacklist of the international organizations combating violations of human rights. Has there been some development since?

[Raharinarivonirina] To the best of my knowledge, Madagascar has not been on the blacklist for several years—two or three.

[Rasolo] What needs led to the establishment of the National Committee for the Defense of Human Rights?

[Raharinarivonirina] As I said, there have been no flagrant violations, but human rights are not being fully respected. Our committee sees a close relation between the concept of democracy and the concept of human rights. The first thing we want made evident is respect for human dignity in all sectors.

[Rasolo] What guidelines are being pursued by the CNDDH with a view to achieving its goals?

[Raharinarivonirina] Up to the present, in view of the political events that have occurred, the elections, in particular, the committee has not carried out any major actions. Last year, in the month of November, there was a symposium on the electoral system. In the month of December 1988, we celebrated the 40th anniversary of the Declaration on the Rights of Man. The United Nations helped us with the publication of a brochure on human rights agreements in Malagasy.

At the beginning of next year, we will organize several activities, including a cycle of domestic and international lectures.

Our goal, in the short run, is to educate the citizens about the concept of human rights. And then to inform them about the relationship between this concept and democracy.

The problem that concerns me at present is the fate of those under preventive detention, or under sentence. As a lawyer, I note that the conditions under which detainees are held are extremely degrading, in terms of human dignity.

[Rasolo] What about other problems?

[Raharinarivonirina] The problem of child beggars also raises the issue of children's rights. For a large city like Tananarive, this is shameful, not only in the eyes of foreigners, but also in our own eyes as well. Child vagrancy is a breeding ground for crime.

On the political level, one of the basic problems is the reform of the electoral laws. There is much to be said...

[Rasolo] Is there such a thing as a perfect juridical system that effectively protects the rights of man?

[Raharinarivonirina] There is no such thing. What is essential is to organize a system in such a way as to guarantee a certain balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of society.

[Rasolo] Which of the systems that currently exist comes closest to achieving this balance?

[Raharinarivonirina] Ours is not far from it, but what is needed is the will to put it into use and to implement it conscientiously.

Here I return to the concept of preventive arrest. In law, preventive arrest should be justified by the need for information or by the dangerous nature of the individual in question. Now, one gets the impression that the issuance of committal orders is currently tending to become routine. This is an indirect violation of the rights of the individual, in view of the fact that until an individual has been tried, he is presumed innocent. And this is why, moreover, that in France, committal orders must now be issued by a collegiate board of investigative judges, not just a single judge. And this, then, provides a better guarantee of the rights of the individual.

[Rasolo] What needs to be done here, then?

[Raharinarivonirina] The law is already clear. "Freedom is the principle, and arrest is the exception." We must return to the healthy and well-thought-out implementation of this principle. Judges must be able to learn about what is being done, not only abroad, but also in Madagascar as well. For some years, there has no longer been any compendium of jurisprudence in Madagascar, and practically no further research work. This is due, above all, to a lack of resources.

[Rasolo] What is the most urgent problem that needs to be resolved?

[Raharinarivonirina] The rehabilitation of the Malagasy citizen, in general, in terms of political and economic rights. This is a long-term project, but it must be undertaken. And there is also, moreover, the problem of the future of the young people. A young person whose future is blocked is already an individual who has been virtually deprived of his rights as a human being.

[Rasolo] Are the people of Madagascar sensitive to human rights problems?

[Raharinarivonirina] I am convinced of it. There is a part of the population that does not have a clear awareness, but it is beginning gradually to acquire it, as well as a more and more keen awareness of certain rights that are not being respected.

## Mauritius

### \* RSA Intentions Toward Apartheid Questioned

90EF0163A Port Louis LE MAURICIEN in French  
23 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by Jean-Marc Poche]

[Text] "There is no such thing as a confidential communication from the Government of Mauritius to the Government of [the Republic of] South Africa [RSA] or



anything else that could be misunderstood or tarnish the image of Mauritius," insisted the secretary general of the MMM [Mauritian Militant Movement], Mr. Paul Berenger, to LE MAURICIEN. He did, however, confirm a "courageous and original initiative by the government and the Opposition to assist as much as we can in dismantling apartheid. This initiative arose from the convergence of views of the MMM and Sir Anerood Jugnauth on the role Mauritius could play in this context," Mr. Paul Berenger added, refusing, however, to furnish details of the initiative at this time.

The MMM secretary general observed that although recent statements by South African President De Klerk suggest that he has taken positive steps and made promising decisions, Mr. Berenger still sides with those unconvinced "that President De Klerk and the National Party really intend to dismantle and abolish apartheid."

In support, Mr. Berenger cites two interviews by President de Klerk in NEWSWEEK and THE WASHINGTON POST and two other interviews with two journalists who are experts in South African affairs. "For the first time, through reading these interviews closely and between the lines, we could understand better what President de Klerk is really thinking," Berenger continued, adding he had communicated his comments, criticisms, and conclusions to Nelson Mandela.

According to Mr. Berenger, the interviews tended to confirm his skepticism about President de Klerk and his party. "The fact that South Africa has not yet responded to Mauritius' initiative also seems to confirm my conclusion."

Mr. Paul Berenger added that the MMM sides with those who believe it is more necessary than ever to support the ANC [African National Congress] and keep pressure on South Africa until President de Klerk and his party guarantee their intention to abolish apartheid. They should clearly and directly state their intention to:

- (1) revoke the three legal pillars of the apartheid system, the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act, and the Separate Amenities Act;
- (2) put an end to the Bantoustan policy; and
- (3) abolish the Own Affairs Policy that provides for separate educational, health, and other facilities.

"The purpose of the government's and the Opposition's initiative was precisely to get to the bottom of things to find out if de Klerk and his party really mean to dismantle apartheid."

Why is the MMM so interested in South Africa? Mr. Paul Berenger explains that over the years, the party has maintained regular relations with the ANC, named by the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the OAU [Organization of African Unity] as the authentic representative of the South African people.

When the MMM came to power in 1982, one of its first official acts was to recognize the ANC. That remains

unchanged. Over the years, the MMM has strengthened its relations not only with the ANC but also with the Mass Democratic Movement and COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] (the most powerful South African trade union group, which also has close ties to the ANC). Furthermore, the MMM maintains close contact with Nelson Mandela through his lawyers.

"The MMM," Mr. Paul Berenger went on, "is also in contact with other anti-apartheid militants including the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress], the PAN [as published—Pan African Movement?], the NACTU [National Council of Trade Unions] (South Africa's second-strongest union group), the Black Consciousness Movement, the Labor Party (which represents a part of the colored population), some people within the National Party, the party in power in South Africa, and with Inkatha, Buthelezi's Zulu movement. I do not have to add our privileged relations with the ANC."

"The MMM has been intent since 1982 on being one of the best informed parties in the world on the complex and difficult situation that exists and has developed in South Africa."

Mr. Paul Berenger also mentioned an article in the 4 November FINANCIAL MAIL mentioning his proposals as secretary general of the MMM about the constitutional, electoral, and political structures that could replace apartheid in South Africa.

"The article was picked up in the local press, and I commented in the name of the MMM. Through its geographical situation, Mauritius has the duty to assist as much as possible in the dismantling of apartheid and to seek a solution to the ethnic conflicts in the Fiji Islands, Sri Lanka, and the Horn of Africa."

Mr. Paul Berenger pointed out the prime minister had echoed some of these ideas at the conference of non-aligned countries in Belgrade. "As a result of all that, as secretary general of the MMM, I met the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs, Sir Satcam Boolell. These meetings led to the courageous and original initiative by the government and the Opposition with the goal of assisting as far as we are able in the dismantling of apartheid."

[Question] How was this initiative communicated to the South African authorities?

[Answer] I cannot give you those details at this time.

[Question] You must have met with Mr. de Klerk.

[Answer] I will not go into details. I will add, however, that the initiative called for direct discussions of all the problems of dismantling apartheid.

At this point, the book is not closed on the initiative. Too much time is passing, however, without a positive reaction from South Africa.

[Question] Is the initiative connected with the PM's [prime minister's] proposal to host a round table of all the concerned parties on Mauritius'?

[Answer] That proposal was stillborn, for obvious reasons.

[Question] Are Mauritius' actions too pretentious?

[Answer] During our whole conversation, I have stressed that Mauritius can assist in the dismantling of apartheid. We can do what we can according to our means. It is the South Africans themselves, however, who are going to dismantle apartheid and replace it with a constitution and a system of elections of their own design.

#### \* New Trading Partners; Future in Electronics

90EF0163B Port Louis *THE SUN* in French  
22 Dec 1989 p 8

[Text] The Mauritian Government is considering establishing a new program of industrial incentives exclusively for the electronics sector. Minister of Industry and Applied Technology Mr. Clarel Malherbe made the announcement Wednesday, saying he wanted to make Mauritius into an "Electronic City" on the order of "Silicon Valley." The minister pointed to the interest shown in our free zone by such major names as Samsung in South Korea and Citizen and Seiko, two Japanese giants. Mr Malherbe said these firms with worldwide reputations could locate branches here as early as next year.

The minister said he was satisfied with the results of the latest visit to Southeast Asian countries by the joint, triparty mission—government-MEDIA [Mauritius Export Development and Investment Authority]-private sector. He believes that by emphasizing electronics, the free zone should increase the number of firms in this sector, which already number 17. The minister spoke to a group of French industrialists visiting at the beginning of the week and who plan to return in early 1990.

Mr Malherbe let it be known that from his vantage point he has some trepidation about the European "unified market" of 1992 that could spark an economic market of Southeast Asian countries and Australia, something he feels would constitute a threat. He added that the issue calls for a display of prudence.

The minister said the project to establish a petroleum refinery on Mauritius was moving ahead, and since the investors are from outside, the government will step up its efforts to avoid any pollution.

Mr. Chand Bhadain, director of MEDIA, said it is likely that an agreement permitting joint ventures will be signed shortly between Mauritius and the Korea Trade Promotion Commission. He announced the opening of regional MEDIA offices in Korea and Japan through aid from UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development

Organization]. MEDIA expects Japanese and Korean investors to begin visits next year to take advantage of this agreement.

#### \* Expansion of National Coast Guard Detailed

90EF0163C Port Louis *LE MAURICIEN* in French  
1 Dec 89 p 7

[Article by Harish Chundunsing]

[Text] The Soviet Government has made Mauritian authorities a gift of two patrol boats for its National Coast Guard [NCG]. The ceremony to hand over the keys is planned this month.

Coast Guard Commander M.K.M. Rao confirmed the gift to LE MAURICIEN.

The two boats, explained Commander Rao, will expand the NCG considerably. The NCG fleet now comprises the Amar, five patrol boats, and 18 inflatable boats. The NCG's troops number 410, of whom 60 are now training at the nava' school of Le Chaland. The force will grow with the upcoming addition of approximately 140 police force fish wardens. Their integration is subject, however, to the Police Service Commission's adopted recruiting procedures and criteria. Selection will begin next Monday.

In addition, the NCG will receive another gift of three Indian patrol boats soon. They will be advanced versions of the Marlin and Baraccuda boats. Funding for the purchase will come from the line of credit issued to the Mauritian government by the New Delhi authorities of the joint Indo-Mauritian commission.

Next year also, the NCG will begin replacing gradually the inflatable boats now in service.

We have learned also that the government already has taken a firm option on the purchase of a surveillance airplane from the Indian aeronautics firm Hindustan Aeronautical Limited. The plane is also for the NCG.

### Namibia

#### \* Reporter Visits Sam Nujoma, Hears Views

34000361A Johannesburg *THE WEEKLY MAIL*  
in English 19-25 Jan 90 p 7

[Article by Thami Mkhwanazi: "Sam Nujoma Speaks"]

[Text] For Sam Nujoma, home is also a place of work. For the moment, at least, the president-designate of Namibia is preparing for power from his eight-roomed house, perched on a hillock above Windhoek's Katutura township.

To get there I had been led through the main road that divides the sprawling township of Katutura by the official Audio 500 of Swapo [Southwest Africa People's

Organization] secretary-general, Andimba Toivo ya Toivo with whom I had spent time on Robben Island prison.

Katutura, for many a symbol of resistance against colonial domination and imposed South African rule, comprises a cluster of a dozen smaller townships grouped along ethnic lines about 5km from Windhoek.

The area where Nujoma lives is called Wanaheda, the name of a testament to apartheid's ethnic obsession—like Soshanguve near Pretoria, it is a composite name reflecting that Owambo, Nama, Herero and Damara people were meant to live there.

As we pulled up a dozen people were standing in the yard in front of the house and several others on the pavement outside. There were more people at the back of the house—in all quite a hive of activity around the future president.

Inside I followed Ja Toivo—Namibia's shadow minister of mines and energy—and the three staunch Swapo supporters who had acted as my guides down a passage and into the lounge.

After a brief wait, punctuated by the arrival of a trolley bearing cooldrinks and beer, Nujoma stepped into the room with a smile. "Welcome to Namibia," he said, hugging me and each of my guides.

The bearded Swapo president and commander-in-chief of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia was clad in sandals and a striped powder-blue safari suit. A medal given to him by the Organisation of African Unit was clipped on to his left lapel.

I had taken a chair near the fire-place. Nujoma gestured towards the more comfortable sofa. His wife, Kovanbo, came in to meet us. Taking my hand with both of hers, she bowed slightly and smiled, remained seated for a while and left without saying a word.

After helping ourselves from the trolley, I took out my notebook, the president stretched his legs and our interview about his future plans for a free Namibia began.

Our talk ranged over many issues—the direction Namibia's economy would take, what presence the African National Congress [ANC] would have in the country and the importance of improvements in agriculture, education, health and housing. "We cannot talk of development," he said, "without healthy people."

There will be no wholesale nationalisation of business, nor will there be wholesale redistribution of land in an independent Namibia, Nujoma said.

"Our economic development will be based on existing conditions in the country. An independent Namibia will not copy the economies of other countries. We shall, however, initiate a policy of a mixed economy," he said.

He said a free Namibia will encourage foreign investment and that his government would buy shares in existing companies at a price to be negotiated "for the benefit of the Namibian people". He said agreements would be entered into with such companies that would be beneficial to all parties.

"But if the Namibian government feels a certain enterprise should be nationalised, the government will not hesitate to do so, but not without compensation. The government will appoint its own evaluators in the interest of all the parties, more so the people of Namibia," he said.

On the question of the redistribution of land, Nujoma referred to Swapo's election manifesto which said "the objective of the new policy will be to transfer some of the land from the few with too much of it to the landless majority". Presently some 65 percent of Namibia's land is owned by whites.

"Basically, Namibia is an agricultural country. We have got to produce our own food and be self-sufficient. We have to increase the production of beef and mutton and rehabilitate the fishing grounds along the Namibian coast."

Education, he said, was the second priority, followed by health and housing. "We cannot talk about development without a sound education, nor can we talk about development without healthy people."

Nujoma said Namibian whites had been "misled by successive governments of the South African regime about their future in a Swapo-led government.

"They were told there would be chaos, hunger and disease and a lowering of the standard of living. The national liberation will instead offer peace and stability."

He said it was regrettable that some white victims of these swart gevaar tactics had sold their business before the elections. "I am delighted, however, to learn that these very whites have decided to buy new businesses when they realised there was nothing to fear."

He said he hoped this example would help allay white fears of a free South Africa.

Nujoma said an independent Namibia would allow the ANC to open offices in his country. Would this not risk an armed confrontation with South Africa as happened in Mozambique and other southern African countries?

"I don't think there is anything wrong with opening an office with no military bases," he said.

"Many people have asked me if we would allow ANC military bases. My reply is that the ANC has long been waging an effective armed struggle in South Africa: It does not need any bases in Namibia."

The struggle, Nujoma said, had never depended on military confrontation or the supply of arms alone. Worker strikes had been an equally effective method of struggle, he said, "noting that the Boers are lazy people who would not be able to sustain a protracted labour strike."

"Besides, the ANC has not approached us about the possibility of bases in Namibia. If they do ask we shall cross the bridge when we come to it."

Asked what new strategies he would prescribe for the anti-apartheid struggle and the role of the international community in this struggle, Nujoma said: "It is for the indigenous people of South Africa to struggle for freedom. The success of the international community's efforts is dependent on the success of the internal struggle."

Nujoma agreed with Walter Sisulu who warned his organisation would not renounce violence unless the government met certain conditions. "The oppressed people of South Africa have never been responsible for the violence in South Africa. It is therefore the oppressor who must renounce violence and negotiate with the genuine leaders of the people and not with puppets."

#### \* Shadow Cabinet Not Informed of Locomotive Sale

34000361B Durban *THE DAILY NEWS* in English  
12 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Brendan Seery: "End of the Line"]

[Text] Plans by the para-statal transport corporation in Namibia to sell 36 old locomotives to other African rail networks, have dismayed Swapo [South-West African People's Organization]'s shadow transport minister, Mr Klaus Dierks.

Mr. Dierks told the Namibia News Service that TransNamib—the company that took over the operations of the South African Transport Services (Sats) in Namibia two years ago—had not informed the shadow cabinet of the move.

The locomotives have been sold to the national railway in Zaire, to Sats and to a private firm in Zimbabwe. The Operating Manager of TransNamib, Mr Johan du Plessis, said the decision to sell had been motivated by purely business concerns. He said the TransNamib locomotive fleet was old and too big for the current purposes, in the light of improved efficiency within the corporation.

Money earned from selling the old locomotives would be utilised for replacing rolling stock, he added.

Mr Dierks was, however, "dismayed" that the shadow Cabinet was not informed of the move—an important decision which would, in a normal setting, enjoy top government attention.

He did concede, however, that TransNamib was "quite a streamlined and effective department".

Administrator-General, Mr Louis Pienaar, announced recently that there would be tightening-up on road transportation, with fewer permits being issued for a narrower range of goods in order to stimulate use of the country's rail network.

#### \* Country's Farmers Facing Severe Drought

34000349A Johannesburg *SOWETAN* in English  
8 Jan 90 p 9

[Text] Windhoek. Namibia enters the year of its independence with the specter of severe drought—especially in the densely populated northern regions—looming ever larger.

Only one part of the country—the northwestern Caprivi Strip—had more than half its average rainfall by the end of last year.

According to figures supplied by the Weather Bureau in Windhoek, Katima Mulilo in the Caprivi had 171,4mm in October, November and December 1989, compared with an average of 256,2mm for those three months.

#### Rain

Other areas fared much worse—Rundu in the Kavango region had only 30,1mm of its normal 158,8mm, while Oshakati in the Owambo region had virtually no rain, compared with an average of 104,2mm.

Subsistence agriculture is the major economic activity in these three regions and residents now face a major crisis and possible famine.

In many areas water holes have dried up and trips of 40km a day to water stock are not uncommon.

Agricultural specialists say years of overgrazing have reduced the ability of the veld to survive periodic droughts, with the result that grazing is fast depleted when the rains stay away or arrive late.

In the major commercial grain growing area—the so-called Tsumeb-Otavi-Grootfontein triangle-rainfall has been low and planting has been done.

Tsumeb, which had 66,7mm of its average 150,1mm by the end of December, instituted water restrictions some time ago, despite the fact that it gets water from a vast underground source.

#### Dismal

Residents are only allowed to water gardens between 3pm and 7pm.

According to the municipality the restrictions will apply until it has rained properly.

At Otjiwarongo, where a dismal 12mm of an average 117,7mm had fallen by the end of December, water



supply is limited to nine hours a day, although the restriction is lifted on days when it rains enough to make watering gardens unnecessary.

In the surrounding district, however, the situation is even more serious, with rapidly deteriorating grazing and bush fires causing major problems.

Many farmers have already resorted to the costly exercise of feeding cattle.

In Rehoboth there has been no rain at all (average 40,3mm) and water supply is restricted to eight hours a day.

#### **Parched**

Figures from some other towns show a similarly parched situation around the country: Khorixas had no rain (average 27.6mm), while Okahandja had 14,5mm of 64,9mm, Windhoek 6,5mm of 77.1mm, Gobabis

23,3mm of 89,2mm, Mariental 5mm of 36,1mm and Keetmanshoop 3,2mm of 29,2mm.

The drought also has severe repercussions for the country's wildlife and in some nature reserves the situation is so bad that hundreds of animals will have to be culled to ration grazing and assure the survival of the test.

#### **Plans**

The drought could have serious short-term repercussions for plans to make Namibia more self-sufficient in food production and to lessen dependence on South Africa.

The only reassuring fact at this time is that the major dams are still reasonably full, although most are slightly lower than at the same time same last year.

Together the reservoirs are currently at 58,4 percent, compared with 60,2 percent at the same time last year, according to the Department of Water Affairs.

## Guinea

### \* Extension of Rural Credit Program Proposed

90EF0178A Conakry HOROYA in French  
1 Jan 90 pp 18, 19

[Article by Moustapha Aly Camara: "Rural Credit: A Condition of Economic Development"; first paragraph is editor's lead]

[Text] The first condition of a country's development is the creation of an effective financial and banking system accessible to the greatest possible number of people involved in economic activities.

Over 90 percent of the people in Guinea live in rural areas and have rather meager incomes. As a consequence, farmers and small rural craftsmen are frequently compelled to resort to moneylenders who charge exorbitant rates whenever a harvest is bad or an investment, however minor (small tool purchase—wheelbarrow, shovel, etc.), must be made.

Obviously, the notion of rural credit is often limited and is equated to agricultural credit. But rural credit is aimed at all potential users (farmers, animal breeders, fishermen, craftsmen, merchants) and is concerned with all rural funding needs.

As such, rural credit is meant to be the prime instrument of a policy to promote the expansion and development of all. For this reason, it is part of the banking system and is a logical extension of the shift to currency-based trade.

Moreover, rural credit should be seen as a comprehensive set of resources and jobs, and not merely as a production factor on par with fertilizer and seed. That said, its use and management must be planned around all family activities that contribute to the household coffer throughout the year—with the understanding that a loan for rice can be reimbursed with money earned from other activities.

According to the introduction to rural credit presented at the second National Rural Development Conference (April 1989), Guinea's credit policy is still at the embryonic stage. Since the National Agricultural Development Bank was shut down, experiments have been limited to the granting of operating and investment loans to a few agricultural and integrated-development projects.

However, now that a policy of economic liberalism has been adopted and taxes in kind and mandatory marketing eliminated, economic and social realities are undoubtedly creating a social climate uniquely favorable to the implementation of a new rural development policy.

This policy, the introduction stated, enables peasants to freely undertake various agricultural, animal breeding, crafts, and trade activities, etc.

In the meantime, the Guinean peasant is beginning to gain confidence that the product of his labors is his. In this context, an influx of rural credit based on village needs should boost production and noticeably raise incomes.

After 3 April, 1984, the banking system underwent considerable changes and its impact on Guinea's economic development is now decisive. Unfortunately, despite some interesting things done with credit lines for a few development projects, its involvement in the rural sector is quite inadequate.

That is why it is necessary to propose some kind of program for all those (small farmers, small traders, small-time craftsmen, women) now excluded from the traditional banking system and who have no other resource but to seek out moneylenders.

From a practical standpoint, a quick and concise evaluation of how well credit lines functioned in the case of three projects—the Siguiri rice operation, the Upper Guinea rural-development project, and the Gueckedou agricultural project—was done.

Unfortunately, the report found that the loan programs are being used by inexperienced technicians never having received any specific training. As a result, neither the spirit nor the operating procedures of a banking system are being respected: collection interest rates higher than real rates, etc.

As a result of this lack of training, organization and procedural rigor, of the failure to follow up on unpaid debts, and of all the instances of negligence observed, loan operations are not taken seriously by farmers.

The protocol stipulates the banking system procedures to be tested. It can be modified in accordance with results. That said, there are specific conditions attached to rural credit that must be met for loans to be made. A cash loan must, therefore, be reimbursed 100 percent or there will be no new loan. This type of loan is intended for the poorest rural inhabitants: a bank near them and "with them," a system based on member solidarity, etc.

Initially, loans will be granted solely for diversified and immediately profitable activities. Later, and depending on results, they may be granted for other purposes (rural habitat, for instance.)

Beneficiaries of the loans will be the poorest nonminor rural men and women (farmers, fishers, animal breeders, craftsmen, small tradesmen) who are active in several areas or who want to create or develop multiple activities.

To start with, the sums allocated will be small and capped. They will range between 10,000 Guinean francs [GF] and GF100,000, in installments of GF5,000. The ceiling may be raised later depending on results.

As for the duration of loan periods, Mr. Jean-Paul Bustin, head of the agricultural and rural-loan project,

notes that they will be made for short terms (12 months). However, medium-term loans (18 months to three years) may be studied after this initial phase, depending on how well things go. Moreover, he said, the latter will be reserved to groups who never fell behind in payments, even temporarily, during the first phase.

Consequently, reimbursement will be spread out over a 12-month period. The monthly payment will equal:

1/12 of nominal capital; 1/12 of interest due; 1/12 of the solidarity fund.

In addition, all banking transactions will be handled in rural-credit banks installed in markets or any suitable spot. Officers will thus make regularly scheduled visits to the groups concerned to take stock of activities, to verify the use of loans granted, and to carry out any other banking transactions. This will make it possible to do an impact study after the first reimbursement drive.

In Guinea, each of the test zones chosen for the initial phase (Telimele and Koundara) represents the installation and educational phases in the prefectures selected. (sic) [as published]

For Telimele, it is proposed that the program be started in the Sarekaly subprefecture, with the selection of three districts. An extension of the program to Tarihoue is being considered during a second phase. In Koundara, on the other hand, there are plans to start the program in two subprefectures—Sambailo and Kamaby—with one district each, in order to vary the field approach.

However, it goes without saying that the whole operation cannot succeed unless it is truly a joint action undertaken with local officials, who must gradually take over. That is why we would say that the important issue in Guinea today is to make rural credit available to as broad a group as possible, using simple, accessible, but strict procedures. Furthermore, the borrower must be made to take as much responsibility as possible, by making him understand that no system can last unless it generates its own resources.

## Nigeria

### \* Hurdles Said To Impede Power Transfer in 1992

34000318C Lagos AFRICAN CONCORD in English  
11 Dec 89 pp 14-19

[Article by Seyi Olu Awofeso, Bayo Onanuga, Onoise Osunbor, Frank Igwebueze, Sam Ezenwa, and Abdullhai Zuru: "1992—On the Horn of a Dilemma"]

[Text] Zig-zag, jerkily on bumps, and Nigeria's Transition to Civil Rule gets set to approach its sharpest turn. With only 36 months left to complete the process of military disengagement. General Ibrahim Babangida's government is now confronted by strong forces, within and outside Nigeria, all of them emphatically predicting omen, should the military hand over power in 1992.

Compared to the local forces, pressures from the international community have been subtler, although no less formidable. Declassified Intelligence reports in some western capitals foresee a fresh round of instability after the conclusion of the Transition Plan. For instance, the London Economic Intelligence Unit relied largely on distilled security dispatches from the British M-15, and came to a dark conclusion, in 1986, that the probability of meeting the scheduled Transition to Civil Rule rated then at 30 percent.

In United States of America, reports ahead of President Babangida's scheduled meeting with President George Bush in Washington next January, indicate too that apart from the obvious issue of U.S. economic assistance to Nigeria's strained economy, the American business community would want reassurances from President Babangida that Nigeria in the 1990s will be stable enough for long-term foreign investments.

Under the past regime of President Ronald Reagan, only a qualified support was given by the United States to Nigeria's scheduled plan to civil rule, depending on: one, whether the economic strain in Nigeria will not thwart the Transition programme and two, whether because of this economic difficulty, President Babangida's administration might not be forced to take quick measures for self-reliance thereby curtailing U.S. exports to Nigeria.

Today, Nigeria is classified by the IMF as a poor low-income country, entitled to concessionary loans, a fact that is likely to be further impressed on President Babangida when he arrives Washington, January, as another strong reason why the Transition to Civil Rule agenda may have to be extended beyond 1992 to allow foreign investors build enough confidence on Nigeria's current trade policy.

Already, there is a myriad of local pressure groups in Nigeria making strong appeals to Dodan Barracks, that military disengagement in 1992 will be too hasty a thing to do. In a paid newspaper advertisement recently, Alhaji Ismaila Ibrahim Tsawdawa from traditionally powerful Sokoto State made an open case to General Babangida on why the military should stay on after 1992: "If you now hand over to any political newbreed, or the new-groomed, you have let us down as a nation and have misplaced the trust put upon you by your creator;" and besides, "handover is not this nation's problem, but who takes over is."

The advertisement co-signed by another Alhaji Wali Moar Idrisa of Mafoni Ward, Maiduguri, concluded: "there should be no hurry, and that 1992 is very early", according to the views of 98 percent of the people they said they sampled. The duo then sent a warning to General Babangida that "if you handover, you are handing us over to fire and chaos." A printed four-inch photo of Alhaji Tsawduwa accompanied the press statement.

Last Monday, a foremost literary figure in Nigeria, Chidi Amuta, known until recently for socialist inclinations,

also wrote effusively in the DAILY TIMES newspaper, urging the President to stay on by cancelling the strict letters of the five-year (1987-1992) Transition to Civil Rule Programme. "Given the nature and extent of the economic reform programmes which Babangida has set in motion," pleads Chidi Amuta "it would be unpatriotic of him (Babangida) and the military to quit power to the centre as early as 1992."

That 1992 is 'early' is fast turning into a refrain, echoed now and then by sympathisers of President Ibrahim Babangida's military administration and those Yusuf Mamman, Press Secretary to the Chief of General Staff called "Government's fanatical supporters." A straight impact of this new thinking is that it could tear apart the documented phases in the Transition agenda. Of course, there is a grounds-well [ground-swell] of sympathy for the proponents of continued military rule to exploit. Since August 1985, when General Babangida took over power in a coup d'etat, invariably all civilian and military elites have made a statement of complete approval of the military regime. Most remarkable is that from the putative political leader of Western Nigeria till his death, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who unusually showered encomiums on Babangida's military regime in 1986, describing it as "the best government since independence." Professor Olikoye Ransome-Kuti, the current Health Minister has followed from there, saying early this year that Nigerians should be "thankful to God" for having a President as good as General Ibrahim Babangida.

In fact, by mid-1988, the city walls in Kaduna bore graffiti eulogising the gallantry of the ruling military government, an indication too that some ordinary Nigerians are of same opinion.

The Professor Wole Soyinka, 1986 Nobel laureate for literature who was appointed by the Babangida regime to chair the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) had in 1985 been reported to have said of the regime: "At least, this government listens". Quite uncharacteristic of Soyinka who is not known to have in public or in private endorsed any military junta.

In Dodan Barracks, from where President Babangida rules over Nigeria, reactions to this extremely lavish support from a section of the public has been guarded. As the Press Secretary to Nigeria's Chief of General Staff, Yusuf Mamman confirmed last week in an interview, government is quite mindful of its honour to handover. Says Mamman: "Truly, there have been doubts (whether this government will still hand over to civilians in 1992) but I can confirm that government is irrevocably committed to the Transitional Programme."

Whether and when the Transition plan should end in this century is still the main contention between the Babangida administration and his regime's fanatical supporters. Of this, Mamman says: "Yes, indeed there is a school of thought that says look, you want to institutionalise new value systems, this takes time! Therefore if

you cannot achieve that aim within an agreed-upon time, you can change the time but then you stand a risk, ... the risk of undermining the whole programme and not achieving the objectives."

Sideways is the other horn of the dilemma. "If you however try to elongate the time, so that the value system can be institutionalised", continues Mamman "then you stand the risk of your credibility being put to question."

In the very apt words of Yusuf Mamman is the true dilemma of Babangida's regime today. But as Mamman predicts: "President Babangida is a man of honour and integrity," and so it is to be expected that the power-transfer process will surely be concluded in 1992 as schedule.

Honour and integrity however may not count significantly in the latest scenario. Because it is now confirmed that an assorted group has recently sent a memorandum to President Babangida asking that he made an urgent national broadcast on the Transition Programme. The men behind the mask of this group are known to be urging President Babangida to do two things at once: first, to admit that because of disruptions, the good aims of the Transition Agenda cannot be realised in 1992; and two, to say that a decision on whether to transfer power to civilians under the Transition Programme should be that of Nigeria's citizens. A national plebiscite.

Government's reaction to this floated plan, says one of Babangida's aides, is to sweep it under the carpet. "This administration has programmed to hand over the baton of political governance of this country to a democratically elected government in 1992 in accordance with its Transition Programme", re-confirms Nigeria's deputy political leader, Vice Admiral Augustus Aikhomu on Tuesday. "The 1992 deadline for the handover to civil rule is irrevocable," he declared with the finality of a closed door. President Babangida spoke in the same vein last week, dismissing suggestions that he stay longer than 1992.

In separate speeches in the past, including the one he made a fortnight ago in Kano City, President Babangida has held himself out as committed to quitting Nigeria's number one seat at an unstated date in 1992. But this commitment anchors on some other expectations of the President. Broadly: that by 1992 Nigerians would have been practised in electoral system of government, that tribe-centred attitudes would have dissolved and a new visionary leadership tossed up. Lastly, that the economy would be on a path of steady growth.

Unfortunately, these expectations are not turning up; thus making it a moot question whether the President's commitment is to his stated year of quitting, or to his stated goals before quitting. If the President chose the latter option, no doubt, a complete disengagement of the military will have to go further than 1992.

But there are other prominent Nigerians who are saying that despite serious slippages in the implementation of



the Transition calendar, the hand-over should still run its full course, and terminate in 1992. S. G. Ikoku is one of such men. A dramatis persona in the 1960s treasonable felony trial, and a frontliner in the radical north-based (but now proscribed) People's Redemption party, S. G. Ikoku sounded convinced last week when he said forcefully that General Babangida would surely hand over in 1992. "Those who are at present in power want to hand over, I can attest to this." Ikoku then notes rather hyperbolically that "it is the Press that's vitiating the Transition Programme."

"Yes indeed," Ikoku said, "the press makes it appear that President Babangida is engaged in a high-level trickery." In a quick note to self-correction, Ikoku however adds that the press "is not the only factor in the equation." Fortunately.

If it is not exactly clear what equation S. G. Ikoku refers to, it is all because the Transition Programme, as it stands today, does not show the exact direction of phased order to civil rule.

"We understand the true dilemma, Yusuf Mamman said last week, "but the government is irrevocably committed because we first said 1990, and later we said 1992. Now, the first and primary thing for this (Babangida) government is the interest of Nigeria."

However, this interest is defined, it cannot exclude the basic question on the appropriateness of the Transition calendar, now in its disrupted form. Nor can it exclude the appropriateness of 1992 as the date of handover.

The choice the Babangida government will then be making in months ahead is either to keep to the Transition Programme intact, and 'rush over' the census and the elections scheduled for 1991, or extend the agenda somewhat by a couple of years to make up for past disruptions. An indication of how government might decide on this was however given last Tuesday by Vice Admiral Aikhomu. "While the transition calendar may be revised due to administrative and logistic reasons" 1992 remains the handover year, he said.

Ikoku corroborates: "I myself have a lot of faith in the Transition Programme. But I have no faith in its implementation."

Conceived as a document that will indicate subsequent steps of the army's marching boots to the barracks, the Transition Programme seems all of a sudden to have run into an administrative slump, especially over its implementation. [Sentence as published] The programme's jerky progress started with items listed to be accomplished in the first quarter of 1988.

The Code of Conduct Bureau, for instance, was not set up as scheduled, until the later quarter. Then, the remaining programmes in the Transition Plan started to spill over onto subsequent ones, with the result that today, some of the items in the now sandwiched programme have been skipped altogether, or sometimes,

postponed. A reason why Alhaji Gwamua Jega a Sokoto State executive of the now proscribed Nigerian National Congress (NNC) hollered last Monday: "The whole programme is a hide-and-seek game. They (the military) give directives on the Transition Programme and soon they turn back and condemn all actions of the public towards these directions."

Truly, there have been several turn-around on the part of the Armed Forces Ruling Council [AFRC] after an initial delay in setting up the Code of Conduct Bureau. Members of the public had understood the 2nd Quarter of 1988 item in its literal meaning (that SAP will be terminated) until Ministers in Babangida's cabinet started to campaign that there is really no alternative to SAP. Over this particular item in the programme, a student's union official in the University of Lagos went to court last year asking that Babangida's government be compelled to obey the simple letters of the Transition agenda. He was non-suited for lacking a cause of action.

Yet, there is a pending suit, filed by Chief Gani Fawehinmi, asking the court to declare the 7 October 'Abuja Declaration' of President Babangida contrary to the ordinary words in the 3rd quarter items of 1989 (that government will announced two recognised parties, ostensibly from the list of parties submitted to it by the National Electoral Commission [NEC]). The military government on 7 October rather dissolved all the six political associations recommended to it by NEC and decreed two new parties whose manifestoes, prepared by government appointees, would be released soon.

Several other revisions in the calendar, even though not at present before the courts, are as important as any in predicting how possible it would be for the military to complete its self-assigned task of evolving "a viable polity" founded on "grass-roots democracy" which will "put a final stop to future military coups" in just 36 months.

While explaining the rationale for the Transition Programme to a conference in Kuru, 30 July 1987, President Babangida had said it was designed "to avoid the mistake of the past" when a similar power-transfer was effected (in 1979 by General Olusegun Obasanjo) in "a hurry" in November of the same year. Obasanjo retorted at the Victoria Island Institute of International Affairs that the mere extension of a Transition Programme over five years (as against his own regime's three-year plan) does not make it any more sensible, nor does it guarantee a hitch-free transfer of power to civilians.

Taken in today's context, the 'haste' feared by President Babangida may have to be made nonetheless. The learning process of the current Transition Programme is now something less-so. And following the peremptory dissolution of all the elected local government officials mid this year, there is now an obvious break in the learning process, both for the new-breed politicians who were manning the councils, and for the Nigerian electorate who trooped out in large numbers in December

1987 to elect their councillors. It is surprising that there is yet to be a cogent, official reason why this first set of elected administrators under the Transition Programme were so wantonly dismissed by the ruling military government.

Indeed, there is now a lacuna in the democratic process begun in 1987 when the Transition Programme was enacted as a policy of government: other disruptions have followed the sack of the elected councillors. Political associations, 13 of them, banded hurriedly within nine weeks, were understandably found not to have "firmly established themselves at the grassroots level", and were all disbanded on 7 October by the military government. That dissolution meant that the last item of the 1989 programme—local governments elections on party basis—could not take place. Certainly, not without political parties.

In consequence, again, the military government revised the Transition Agenda, pushing the local government elections forward to an indefinite date in 1990. Hence, elections into all local governments and the elections of 21 state governors plus that of the Mayor of Abuja, as well as the elections of parliamentarians into 21 state legislatures must take place now within the first nine months of 1990 (according to the Transition Programme). Nothing else could be hasty.

The 5,000 candidates or more who will be contesting the three separate elections are, as it is, unknown to the public as they are not now holding any elective office; an indication of the yawning gap in the democratic learning process of the current Transition Programme.

Assuming for a moment that these three separate elections somehow manage to take place next year, there will still be a problem with the Transition Programme. For at any rate, the local government councils will be dissolved, once more in December 1991 (see Transition Programme) 18 months after the elected councillors would hopefully have resumed office. Before all these begin to matter however, there must first of all be parties on the ground, with known members. This appears the most difficult cut of all.

According to sources, the manifestoes and constitutions of the two government decreed parties (the Social Democratic Party and the National Republican Convention) expected to be released this Monday will not be the final documents of the parties. Rather, as the government spokesperson intimated what would be released are guidelines. The final documents will be written at the national conventions of the two parties. Then, the documents will be sent back to the military government, and probably, entered into a gazette.

By government's thinking, delegates to these parties' national conventions are expected to be drawn from local governments and then from state levels. This long process, borrowed largely from the United States, can not be ended until March 1990. As such, only six months

will be left for the three separate elections scheduled for the next year. A difficult mission for NEC.

Meanwhile, another significant arm in the Transition Programme—the National Population Commission—announced a fortnight ago that it too has postponed its trial census because "the rainy season of June to September will make an experimental census impossible." (see box story).

The postponement and adjustment notwithstanding, some Nigerians seem to echo military government officials that the Transition to Civil Rule Programme must still be completed by 1992.

Dr Tai Solarin, a social commentator for instance, allowed himself be quoted, early January that he would personally lead a peoples' uprising against any military group that plots to impeach President Babangida and the 'lofty' Transition Programme. But that is on condition that the programme terminates by 1992.

The President, General Ibrahim Babangida himself told a Nigerian newsmagazine last year that his quiet prayer is that his would be the last military government in Nigeria. As yet, the omens are not clear.

"As for disruption of the programme," comments Dr Sina Sambo, a political science teacher at the University of Lagos, "all systems must have disruptions and it is the capacity of the system in being able to steer itself back to equilibrium that matters." For other Nigerians, including Dr Delu Ogunade (a teacher at the same university) equilibrium means disengagement in 1992. "In the history of this country, the people have never taken kindly to their leaders reneging on their promises," Ogunade observes.

Some other Nigerians, however remain sceptical. Segun Osude, a Lagos banker summarises the mood of the sceptics with some drama: "I have had visitors who come to visit me, and I think I know the signs when such visitors are packing to go. I must confess that with just over two years left, I don't see the military packing and getting ready to go." Other sceptics are pointing suspiciously at the Armed Forces Consultative Assembly established early this year. They are saying it is probably intended to complement a civilian parliament under a 10-year diarchy. There are also fears that by refusing to accept the Babalakin Report—that Electoral Commissions be completely independent of government—the AFRC is entrenching itself further and further into Nigeria's electoral processes. For example, sceptics say, section 5 of Decree 23 1987 setting up the National Electoral Commission provides that 'Government' will still take policy control over electoral matters under the National Electoral Commission; thus putting beyond doubts, questions as to who is finally in charge of electoral matters in Nigeria.

Never before has 1992 looked so far away. The serious administrative problems threatening to disturb the

stated date of power-transfer under the Transition Programme do not look like going away soon. But President Babangida is tougher than rawhide himself, for he has said repeatedly that even when all is said and done, 1992 is still realistic. If indeed it is, Nigeria's external debt-overhang of 30 billion U.S. dollars, plus chronic graduate unemployment, and, the continuing deterioration of Nigeria's social service sector, will retroactively decide, finally, whether the decision of the military to hand over or not in 1992 is very truly realistic. Not before then.

**\* CLO Terms 1989 Bad Year for Human Rights**

34000318B Ikeja NEWSWATCH in English  
25 Dec 89 p 17

[Article by Dare Babarinsa and Wale Oladepo: "A Bad Testimonial"]

[Text] The Civil Liberties Organisation, CLO, annual report issued in Lagos last week was a disturbing indictment of Nigeria's human rights record in 1989. The CLO, the Nigerian watch-dog organisation for human rights, listed cases of human rights abuses and said that despite the military regime's avowed policy of human rights, Nigerians were still brutally and arbitrarily denied their fundamental rights as enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights of which Nigeria is a signatory. It cited cases of arbitrary arrests and detention and even killings by agents of the state.

"1989 has been a terrible years for human rights in Nigeria," the CLO stated. "Although President Ibrahim Babangida has frequently claimed that his government is committed to civil liberties, the experiences of the outgoing year show clearly that this is far from being the case. It is true to say that never have citizens' rights been so trampled upon and suppressed since at least the time of the infamous government of General Muhammadu Buhari."

The organisation identified Decree 2 as the principal weapon used by agents of the state to deprive the citizens of their fundamental freedom. Under the decree, anyone can be arrested and detained without charge on the order of the chief of general staff, the inspector general of police or the minister of internal affairs. The group listed 19 occasions when Nigerians were arrested and detained without trial. The first occasion was that of Lewis Obi, then editor of the AFRICAN CONCORD magazine along with two of his reporters. Among journalists who have also been arrested this year were Chris Okolie, editor-in-chief of NEWBREED magazine, Tony Ukpong, a reporter with the WEEKLY METROPOLITAN, Paxton Idowu, then editor of the REPUBLIC newspaper. What was even more bizarre was the arrest of Idowu's wife, Florence, when the security agents could not get hold of the husband immediately.

On the political front, the government was also chided for abridging the people's right to free expression and to hold peaceful assembly. It recalled the arrest and subsequent detention of Lagos lawyer, Gani Fawehinmi, for holding a conference on alternative to the government's economic programme. It also criticised the government for the arrest of Michael Imoudu, veteran labour leader, and Tai Solarin, social critic. It decried the detention of Femi Aborisade, the editor of LABOUR MILITANT, a leftist magazine. The organisation also condemned the jailing for life of eleven labour leaders of the National Electric Power Authority, NEPA, for leading a strike. The CLO also frowned at the arrest and detention of Balarabe Musa, first civilian governor of Kaduna State who was accused of flouting the military junta's transition-to-civil-rule decree.

But the fate of the CLO leaders themselves also showed that playing the watch-dog role could invite danger. Four CLO officers were arrested and detained briefly during the year. Those who chatted with the States Security Service, SSS, were Olisa Agbakoba, president, Clement Nwankwo, national secretary, Mike Ozekhome, director of legal service and Emmanuel Erakpotobor, the national treasurer.

The report also highlighted the violation of group rights of the people. It condemned the brutal attack by the police and the cold blooded killing of 82-year-old Eroveso Irifere, during a dawn raid on Irri, Bendel State, by about 500 armed anti-riot policemen. It also condemned the trigger-happy nature of Nigeria policemen at road check-points leading to the killings of several Nigerians during the year.

Despite the march to democracy, the organisation said a lot has to be done to improve the nation's human rights record. It cited the case of the nation's prison system where convicts are kept in crowded pens that breed not only epidemics and ill-health, but also harden the convicts. It noted that while Ikoyi prison was built for only 800 inmates, for example, it now houses 2,400 people. It said the prisons are overcrowded by 35,000 persons. It warned, therefore, that 'his overcrowding spells doom for the future saying that as a result of this, 78 prisoners died in Ikoyi prison alone this year between January and September.

On the whole, the CLO gives itself kudos for drawing public attention to the evils of Decree 2. It warned that further brutalisation of the citizens by the agents of the state would not augur well for Nigeria's future. It warns: "Recent events across the world, especially Eastern Europe, indicate a crumbling of various dictatorships and undemocratic regimes that had hitherto resisted greater freedom for their people. The government must, therefore, take the initiative here in Nigeria to respect the people's rights."

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